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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether a party to an armed conflict is 
bound to ensure that any incidental harm it may cause to enemy military personnel not or 
no longer liable to attack remains below a certain threshold. While the law of armed conflict 
provides that incidental harm to civilians must not be excessive in relation to the military 
advantage anticipated from an attack, the relevant treaty rules are silent on the position of 
protected enemy personnel. This could indicate that protected enemy personnel may be 
exposed to incidental harm without any limitations. However, this position is difficult to 
reconcile with the humanitarian considerations that underpin the law of armed conflict. 
Alternatively, this silence may hint at a gap in the treaties, though not necessarily in the 
customary rules governing the conduct of hostilities. If so, commanders would be left 
guessing what degree of collateral damage is permissible, which, in the absence of clarifying 
the applicable rules, may lead them to break the law inadvertently. Based on a detailed 
assessment of the law, state practice and the competing arguments put forward in the 
literature, we conclude that the principle of military necessity, more specifically the 
prohibition of causing unnecessary destruction, as complemented by the duty to ‘respect 
and protect’ certain classes of enemy personnel, imposes an obligation on belligerents to 
reduce the level of incidental harm inflicted on protected enemy personnel to what is 
unavoidable and to justify that harm with reference to the military benefit anticipated from 
an attack. We term this the ‘non-civilian proportionality rule’. Based on our analysis, we 
believe that the non-civilian proportionality rule is a necessary part of any targeting process 
that attempts to reconcile humanitarian imperatives with operational requirements during 
times of armed conflict. The rule achieves this by safeguarding protected enemy personnel 
from disproportionate, and thus unnecessary, incidental harm without unduly impairing an 
attacking party’s freedom of manoeuvre against the enemy. By developing these arguments 
in some depth, our aim is to provide a more compelling conceptual foundation for applying 
proportionality considerations to protected enemy personnel and thereby bring clarity to 
those planning, authorising, executing and advising on targeting in current and future 
operations. 
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 ‘Clarity in law is a virtue. In the context of war, that virtue  
becomes a life-and-death necessity.’1  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper was borne out of a real-world targeting query: is a party engaged in an armed 
conflict bound to include persons rendered hors de combat2 in its proportionality analysis prior 
to carrying out an attack on a military objective? Picture, by way of example, an air strike 
on a group of enemy combatants which, with the exception of one fighter, leaves them 
either dead or incapacitated by their wounds and therefore incapable of defending 
themselves. The remaining combatant now mounts a heavy machine gun and maintains 
effective fire on friendly ground forces. Rather than advance on foot and risk casualties, the 
most prudent way to neutralise the fighter would be to strike him from the air. However, 
the rule of proportionality—codified in articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) of 
Additional Protocol I (AP I) of 1977—proscribes any attack ‘which may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated’.3 If the protective scope of this rule is strictly confined to 
civilians, as the wording of articles 51 and 57 appears to suggest, it would not extend to any 
of the surviving incapacitated enemy combatants who feature in our scenario. A second 
strike could therefore be launched without having to include them in the commander’s 
proportionality calculation. By contrast, if the proportionality rule does extend to hors de 
                                                 
2.  Persons who are, or should be recognised as, hors de combat enjoy immunity from direct attack under the 
law of armed conflict. See J–M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules (CUP 2005), Rule 47, 164–70. Pursuant to Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 3 (Additional Protocol I), art 41, a person is hors de combat if 
he (a) is in the power of an adverse Party; (b) clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or (c) has been 
rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable 
of defending himself—provided that in any of these cases he abstains from any hostile act and does not 
attempt to escape. For a more detailed discussion, see section IV.B.6. 
3.  The literature on proportionality is extensive. Amongst other works, see BL Brown, ‘The 
Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian Law of Warfare: Recent Efforts at Codification Note’ 
(1976) 10 Cornell Int’l LJ 134; WJ Fenrick, ‘The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional 
Warfare’ (1982) 98 Mil L Rev 91; J Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality, and the Use of Force by States (CUP 
2004) 85–137; HE Shamash, ‘How Much Is Too Much: An Examination of the Principle of Jus in Bello 
Proportionality’ (2005) 2 Israel Defense Forces L Rev 103; K Watkin, ‘Assessing Proportionality: Moral 
Complexity and Legal Rules’ (2007) 8 YB Int’l Hum L 3; APV Rogers, ‘The Principle of Proportionality’, 
in MH Hensel (ed), The Legitimate Use of Military Force: The Just War Tradition and the Customary Law of 
Armed Conflict (Aldershot 2008) 189; F Hampson, ‘The Principle of Proportionality in the Law of Armed 
Conflict’, in S Perrigo and J Whitman (eds), The Geneva Conventions under Assault (Pluto 2010) 42; I 
Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military Objectives, Proportionality and Precautions in Attack 
under additional Protocol I (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 197–231; RC Else, ‘Proportionality in the Law of Armed 
Conflict: The Proper Unit of Analysis for Military Operations’ (2010) 5 U St Thomas J L & Pub Pol 
195; WH Boothby, The Law of Targeting (OUP 2012) 94–97; A Fellmeth, ‘The Proportionality Principle 
in Operation: Methodological Limitations of Empirical Research and the Need for Transparency’ (2012) 
45 Israel L Rev 125; JD Wright, ‘“Excessive” Ambiguity: Analysing and Refining the Proportionality 
Standard’ (2013) 94 Int’l Rev Red Cross 819; B Clarke, ‘Proportionality in Armed Conflicts: A Principle 
in Need of Clarification’ (2012) 3 J Int’l Hum L Stud 73; E Cannizzaro, ‘Proportionality in the Law of 
Armed Conflict’, in A Clapham and P Gaeta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed 
Conflict (OUP 2014) 332; MA Newton and L May, Proportionality in International Law (OUP 2014); ED 
Gil, ‘Trapped: Three Dilemmas in the Law of Proportionality and Asymmetric Warfare’ (2015) 18 YB 
Int’l Hum L 153; RD Sloane, ‘Puzzles of Proportion and the Reasonable Military Commander: 
Reflections on the Law, Ethics, and Geopolitics of Proportionality’ (2015) 6 Harvard Nat Sec J 299; Y 
Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (3rd edn, CUP 2016) 149–
64; For the application of the principle in specific operations, see WJ Fenrick, ‘Targeting and 
Proportionality during the NATO Bombing Campaign against Yugoslavia’ (2001) 12 EJIL 489, 492–
502; RJ Barber, ‘The Proportionality Equation: Balancing Military Objectives with Civilian Lives in the 
Armed Conflict in Afghanistan’ (2010) 15 J Conflict & Security L 467; M Wells-Greco, ‘Operation “Cast 
Lead”: Jus in Bello Proportionality’ (2010) 57 Neth Int’l L Rev 397. 
 
combat combatants, either through the operation of articles 51 and 57 or as a consequence 
of some other principle of the law of armed conflict, then the attacking force would have 
to ensure that any injury a second air strike is expected to inflict upon the incapacitated 
combatants is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated from the attack. 
 The answer to this question is of some importance. The law of armed conflict is based 
on the principle of distinction, which demands that belligerents distinguish between 
members of the civilian population and combatants, and that they direct their operations 
only against the latter.4 While civilians may not be made the object of direct attack,5 the law 
accepts that incidental harm to civilians is an inevitable aspect of war.6 However, belligerents 
must adopt all feasible precautions to avoid, or in any event minimise, such incidental harm 
and may never intentionally assume a degree of civilian injury that would be excessive when 
measured against the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.7 The principles of 
distinction, precautions and proportionality thus complement each other in a way that 
achieves a subtle balance between military necessity and humanitarian imperatives.8 
Extending the scope of the proportionality rule beyond civilians to cover enemy personnel 
enjoying special protection from attack could significantly expand the obligations that the 
rule imposes on belligerents.9 This would come at a time when the rule’s normative 
foundations are increasingly called into question10 and, at times, are overshadowed by 
                                                 
4.  Additional Protocol I, art 48; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
vol I, Rule 1, 3–8. 
5.  Unless and for such time as they are directly participating in hostilities: Additional Protocol I, art 51(3) 
and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 609 (Additional Protocol 
II), art 13(3). 
6.  Eg Sentencia T-165/06, Judgment, 7 March 2006 (Colombia, Constitutional Court, First Appeals 
Chamber), sec 4 (an armed conflict necessarily produces unwanted effects on the civilian population 
and civilian objects); United States v Ohlendorf and others (Einsatzgruppen Case), 8 and 9 April 1948 (United 
States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg) 4 Trials of War Crimes Before the Nuremburg Military Tribunals 
1, 467 (‘it inevitably happens that nonmilitary persons are killed. This is an incident, a grave incident to 
be sure, but an unavoidable corollary of battle action’). See also United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 
The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004), JSP 383, para 5.33.1. 
7.  Additional Protocol I, art 57; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
vol I, Rules 15–21, 51–67. Cf M Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 
(4th edn, Basic Books 2006) 151–59. 
8.  MN Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the 
Delicate Balance’ (2010) 50 Va J Int’l L 795, 810. See also MN Schmitt, ‘The Principle of Discrimination 
in 21 Century Warfare’ (1999) 2 Yale Hum Rts & Dev LJ 143, 148 (describing distinction, 
proportionality and precautions as the three components of discrimination in attack). 
9.  Along these lines, see RS Adams, ‘Lancelot in the Sky: Protecting Wounded Combatants from Incidental 
Harm’, Harvard National Security Journal (8 August 2017) <http://harvardnsj.org/2017/08/lancelot-in-
the-sky-protecting-wounded-combatants-from-incidental-harm/>. 
10.  Eg EJ Criddle, ‘Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A Relational Theory’ (2011) 87 Notre Dame L 
Rev 1073 (advancing a ‘relational’ theory that imposes human rights proportionality standards in internal 
armed conflicts); L May, ‘Targeted Killings and Proportionality in Law: Two Models’ (2013) 11 J Int’l 
Crim Just 47, 58 (‘[p]roportionality is increasingly being interpreted in human rights terms, even during 
war and armed conflict. In this sense, proportionality can be understood as putting restrictions on when 
combatants can be killed, especially if they could be captured instead’); J Andresen, ‘Challenging the 
Perplexity over Jus in Bello Proportionality’ (2014) 7 Eur J Legal Stud 18 (arguing that military advantage 
should be measured in the number of lives saved); G Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Law, 
Practice, Policy (CUP 2015) (proposing that further restrictions may be read into the proportionality rule 
with reference to human rights law); CP Trumbull IV, ‘Re-Thinking the Principle of Proportionality 
Outside of Hot Battlefields’ (2015) 55 Va J Int’l L 521 (arguing that a higher threshold of proportionality 
should apply to civilians located outside of zones of combat); A Haque, Law and Morality at War (OUP 
2017) (arguing that an attack causing civilian harm is objectively proportionate only if it prevents 
opposing forces from inflicting substantially greater harm on attacking forces or civilians in current or 
future military operations). See also RM Giladi, ‘Reflections on Proportionality, Military Necessity and 
 
operational considerations demanding greater restraint in the use of force.11 The 
simultaneous expansion of the range of persons protected by proportionality and the 
reduction of the acceptable level of incidental harm could, if it were to become part of the 
accepted law, substantially alter the balance between military necessity and humanitarian 
considerations.12 Caution is therefore required lest we undermine proportionality as a critical 
component of the regulatory framework for the conduct of hostilities.13 
 Nevertheless, the exclusion of enemy personnel enjoying special protection from the 
scope of the proportionality calculation does not sit well with their protected status under 
the law of armed conflict. This tension is clear to see in the United States Department of 
Defense Law of War Manual.14 The Manual accepts that combatants must take feasible 
precautions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and ‘other protected persons’, which 
presumably includes enemy personnel protected from attack.15 However, the Manual also 
declares that wounded, sick or shipwrecked enemy combatants on the battlefield, as well as 
military medical and religious personnel present among or in the proximity to combatant 
elements, generally do not need to be considered during the proportionality assessment.16 
The reason given by the Manual is that such personnel ‘are deemed to have accepted the 
risk of death or further injury due to proximity to military operations’.17 This suggests that 
protected enemy personnel may be exposed to any degree of incidental harm irrespective 
of the military advantage anticipated, as long as the attacking force takes feasible precautions 
to reduce the injury they may suffer. This is a puzzling position to take. Granted, a duty to 
minimise the exposure of protected enemy personnel to collateral damage would be 
valuable even in the absence of a corresponding rule that sets an upper limit to the degree 
of damage that may be inflicted upon them, as the proportionality rule does in relation to 
civilians.18 Yet it still seems strange to suggest that the law of armed conflict requires 
belligerents to protect certain enemy personnel from incidental harm without also imposing 
on them a duty to give any thought to the extent of incidental harm they may cause.19 The 
                                                 
the Clausewitzian War’ (2012) 45 Israel L Rev 323 (questioning whether the legitimacy of incidental 
harm can be taken for granted without reference to the political legitimacy of the war). 
11.  Eg General McChrystal, Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, Tactical Directive (9 July 
2009) <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf> (calling for the 
‘carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force’ in light of the ‘overriding operational 
imperative’ of maintaining popular support in the context of counter-insurgency operations). On this 
policy, see JH Felter and JN Shapiro, ‘Limiting Civilian Casualties as Part of a Winning Strategy: The 
Case of Courageous Restraint’ (2017) 146 Daedalus 44. For a critical assessment of such ‘super-
proportionality’, see P Margulies, ‘Valor’s Vices: Against a State Duty to Risk Forces in Armed Conflict’, 
in WC Banks (ed), Counterinsurgency Law: New Directions in Asymmetric Warfare (OUP 2013) 87. But see 
also TW Smith, ‘Protecting Civilians…or Soldiers? Humanitarian Law and the Economy of Risk in Iraq’ 
(2008) 9 Int’l Stud Perspectives 144; V Epps, ‘Civilian Casualties in Modern Warfare: The Death of the 
Collateral Damage Rule’ (2013) 41 Ga J Int’l & Comp L 307. 
12.  See J Rabkin, ‘Proportionality in Perspective: Historical Light on the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2014) 16 
San Diego Int’l LJ 263 (cautioning that a ‘restrictive view of proportionality lends itself to political 
propaganda’ at the hands of ruthless defenders). 
13.  Hence there is more than just ‘doctrinal purism’ at issue here: contra Dinstein, Conduct of Hostilities, 155, 
para 416. 
14.  United States Department of Defense, Law of War Manual (updated edn, December 2016). 
15.  Ibid, §§ 5.2.3 and 5.11. 
16.  Ibid, § 5.10.1. 
17.  Ibid, §§ 7.3.3.1, 7.8.2.1, 7.10.1.1, 17.14.1.2, 17.15.1.2 and 17.15.2.2. However, the Law of War Manual 
declares that those planning or conducting attacks may, as a matter of practice or policy, consider such 
protected enemy personnel in applying the prohibition of attacks expected to cause excessive incidental 
harm. 
18.  Newton and May, Proportionality, 179 (‘jus in bello proportionality delineates the outer boundaries of the 
commander’s appropriate discretion’). On the function of the proportionality rule, see in greater detail 
section II.A below. 
19. This is all the more so, given that the Manual elsewhere takes the position that ‘the requirement to take 
 
Law of War Manual thus raises two questions. If the right to cause incidental harm to 
protected enemy personnel is constrained by a duty to minimise the damage, does this not 
entail a proportionality requirement by implication? Conversely, if protected enemy 
personnel are not subject to proportionality considerations at all, does this not call into 
doubt whether they may be exposed to incidental harm in the first place? After all, one of 
the functions of the classic proportionality rule is to recognise that incidental harm to 
civilians is permissible.20 
 Commanders and their subordinates need to know where they stand in relation to the 
law.21 Intentionally launching a disproportionate attack in the knowledge that it will cause 
excessive civilian harm constitutes a grave breach of Additional Protocol I.22 Such an attack 
in the context of an international armed conflict also amounts to a war crime under the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court if the incidental harm to civilians is clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.23 In 
both cases, criminal liability attaches only to attacks that cause excessive harm to civilians.24 
An attack that would cause injury or death to protected enemy personnel in excess of the 
military advantage anticipated does not, therefore, constitute a grave breach or a war crime 
under these provisions.25 However, it is a war crime to kill or wound an individual who is 
hors de combat.26 The Elements of Crimes adopted under the Rome Statute do not distinguish 
between harm done directly or incidentally, but merely require that the perpetrator should 
have injured or caused the death of one or more hors de combat or other protected enemy 
personnel whilst being aware of the factual circumstances that established their protected 
status.27 This broad formula reflects the wording of common article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, which prohibits violence to the life and person of those who are hors 
de combat ‘at any time and in any place whatsoever’.28 No exception is made for incidental 
                                                 
feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks and the prohibition on attacks expected to cause 
excessive incidental harm are fundamentally connected and mutually reinforcing obligations’: DoD, Law 
of War Manual (December 2016), § 5.10.5. 
20.  See Fenrick, ‘The Rule of Proportionality’, 126 (‘[f]rom a military standpoint, the rule of proportionality 
is useful as an acknowledgment of the unfortunate inevitability of incidental causalities of war’). 
21.  See WB Huffman, ‘Margin of Error: Potential Pitfalls of the Ruling in the Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina’ 
(2012) 211 Mil L Rev 1; M Maxwell and RV Meyer, ‘The Innocent Combatant: Preserving Their Jus in 
Bello Protections’ (2017) 5 Penn St J L & Int’l Aff 111, 137–47. 
22.  Additional Protocol I, art 85(3)(b). 
23.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) 2187 UNTS 90, art 8(2)(b)(iv). On the 
difference between the Additional Protocol I and the Rome Statute standards, see J Kilcup, 
‘Proportionality in Customary International Law: An Argument Against Aspirational Laws of War’ 
(2016) 17 Chi J Int’l L 244. 
24.  This is demonstrated by the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia. See Prosecutor v Galić (Trial Chamber, Judgment) IT-98-29-T (5 December 2003), paras 58–
59; Prosecutor v Galić (Appeals Chamber, Judgment) No IT-98-29-T (30 November 2006), para 190; 
Prosecutor v Martić (Trial Chamber, Judgment) IT-95-11-T (12 June 2007), para 69; Prosecutor v Martić 
(Appeals Chamber, Judgment) IT-98-29/1-A (12 November 2009), para 264. See also W Schabas, The 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd edn, OUP 2016) 263–66.  
25.  R Bartels, ‘Dealing with the Principle of Proportionality in Armed Conflict in Retrospect: The 
Application of the Principle in International Criminal Trials’ (2013) 46 Israel L Rev 271, 304. 
26.  Rome Statute, arts 8(2)(b)(vi) and 8(2)(c)(i). Although the law of armed conflict distinguishes between 
‘murder’ in the context of non-international armed conflict and ‘wilful killing’ in the context of 
international armed conflict, the material elements of the two crimes are understood to be identical. See 
Prosecutor v Delalić and others (Trial Chamber, Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998), para 422. 
27.  Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, First Session, New 
York, 3–10 September 2002, Official Records, ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1, Elements of Crimes, 108, 132 
and 144–45. See also K Dörmann, L Doswald-Beck and R Kolb, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary (CUP 2003) 38–43 and 394–95. 
28.  Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 31 (Geneva Convention I), art 3(1); Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (12 August 
 
harm, at least not in express terms. Consequently, it is not clear whether causing incidental 
harm to hors de combat and other protected enemy personnel constitutes a war crime in all 
cases, is a war crime only if the harm expected exceeds a certain threshold or is not a war 
crime at all, irrespective of the degree of injury caused. Those responsible for planning and 
executing operations need clarity on this point. 
 The purpose of our paper is to determine whether or not an attacking force is bound 
to ensure that any incidental harm it inflicts upon hors de combat and other protected enemy 
personnel does not exceed a certain threshold, either pursuant to articles 51 and 57 of 
Additional Protocol I or another rule of the law of armed conflict.29 In resolving this 
question, our aim is to provide greater clarity on a very practical matter that so far has not 
received the level of scrutiny it deserves. Indeed, in our experience, opinion among both 
scholars and practitioners is deeply divided. Some have argued that the law does not shield 
certain categories of protected personnel from collateral damage at all.30 However, many 
would agree that it feels intuitively wrong and contrary to the humanitarian rationale of the 
law of armed conflict to accept that belligerents may expose protected personnel to 
incidental harm without limitation. Yet intuition and humanitarian sentiments only go so 
far. They do not explain the basis or the scope of the limits, if any, that the law imposes on 
belligerents. A compelling account of the position of the law on the subject of non-civilian 
incidental harm therefore requires a more sustained legal analysis that takes into 
consideration humanitarian motivations, operational concerns and the need to provide clear 
guidance to ‘warfighters’. Our paper aims to offer such an analysis. We proceed in five steps.  
 Section II traces the two meanings of proportionality in the law of armed conflict. It 
shows that proportionality in a narrow sense emerged as a corollary to the concept of 
‘military objective’ and that proportionality in a broader sense is best seen as an aspect of 
military necessity, rather than as a self-standing principle. Section III examines the scope of 
the proportionality rule stricto sensu. It demonstrates that the rule as codified in Additional 
Protocol I is limited to civilian harm, that the notion of ‘civilian’ excludes protected enemy 
personnel and that the customary proportionality rule is identical in scope to the 
conventional one. Since it would be illogical to apply proportionality considerations to 
persons who are liable to direct attack, in section IV we review the different categories of 
enemy personnel that enjoy protection from direct attack and thus may, in principle, be 
subject to proportionality considerations. In particular, we clarify under what circumstances 
enemy personnel qualify for protection as hors de combat or as wounded and sick. As the 
scenario we sketched in the opening paragraphs shows, clarity on this question is essential. 
In section V, we turn to the principal arguments advanced in support of extending the scope 
of the traditional proportionality rule to protected enemy personnel and explain why none 
of them provide a convincing justification for a re-interpretation of articles 51 and 57 of 
                                                 
1949) 75 UNTS 85 (Geneva Convention II), art 3(1); Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 135 (Geneva Convention III), art 3(1); Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 287 (Geneva Convention 
IV), art 3(1). 
29.  For earlier contributions on this subject, see L Gisel, ‘Can the Incidental Killing of Military Doctors 
Never be Excessive?’ (2013) 95 Int’l Rev Red Cross 215; G Corn and A Culliver, ‘Wounded Combatants, 
Military Medical Personnel, and the Dilemma of Collateral Risk’ (2017) 45 Ga J Int’l & Comp L 445. 
See also J Merriam, ‘Must Military Medical and Religious Personnel Be Accounted for in a 
Proportionality Analysis?’, Just Security (8 July 2016) <https://www.justsecurity.org/31905/military-
medical-religious-personnel-accounted-proportionality-analysis/>; M Lederman, ‘A Quick Response to 
John Merriam on Proportionality and Military Medical Personnel’, Just Security (9 July 2016) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/31909/quick-response-john-merriam-proportionality-military-
medical-personnel/>; J Kleffner, ‘Wounded and Sick and the Proportionality Assessment’, Intercross (12 
October 2017) <http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/transatlantic-workshop-on-international-law-and-
armed-conflict-wounded-and-sick-and-the-proportionality-assessment>. 
30.  Eg Adams, ‘Lancelot in the Sky’. 
 
Additional Protocol I. Proceeding on the basis that protected personnel are liable to 
incidental harm under the law of armed conflict, we develop an alternative argument that 
focuses on the legal limitations to the amount of incidental harm that belligerents may 
lawfully inflict. We derive such a limit from the principle of military necessity, more 
specifically from the prohibition of unnecessary destruction, as complemented by the duty 
to respect and protect certain categories of enemy personnel. We suggest that the combined 
effect of these principles and obligations gives rise to a duty not to expose protected enemy 
personnel to a level of incidental harm that may be expected to be disproportionate in 
relation to the military benefit anticipated from an attack carried out against a lawful military 
objective. This ‘non-civilian’ proportionality rule is distinct from the traditional, civilian 
proportionality rule. In section VI, we therefore discuss the relationship between the two 
rules and how those who are planning, deciding upon and executing attacks should apply 
them on the battlefield. We suggest that the non-civilian proportionality rule is best 
expressed in the same language as the traditional test, but that non-civilian harm may be 
calculated differently from civilian collateral damage. Finally, we illustrate the practical 
operation of the ‘non-civilian’ proportionality rule with the help of two hypothetical 
scenarios. Overall, our argument is meant to provide a more compelling legal justification 
for the application of proportionality considerations to protected enemy personnel and a 
more robust guide to their implementation on the battlefield than alternative approaches. 
II. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
Proportionality is widely recognised as a ‘precept of justice’31 that is firmly entrenched in 
both domestic and international law. The constitutional courts of many nations, including 
those of Canada, Israel and most European countries, have turned proportionality into a 
cornerstone of their jurisprudence on fundamental rights and freedoms.32 The courts of 
other countries have also drawn upon the concept, for example in the field of administrative 
law.33 Whilst proportionality has not evolved into a constitutional principle in the United 
States, its influence can be discerned in several areas of law.34 Proportionality is a prominent 
feature of international law too. It can be found in such diverse areas as the dispute 
                                                 
31.  Weems v United States, 217 US 349 (1910). See Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39 
(Lord Reed, dissenting: ‘[t]he idea that proportionality is an aspect of justice can be traced back via 
Aquinas to the Nicomachean Ethics and beyond’). See also E Engle, ‘The History of the General Principle 
of Proportionality: An Overview’ (2012) 10 Dartmouth L J 1. 
32.  Eg Doré v Barreau du Québec [2012] SCC 12 (Supreme Court of Canada) (whether or not an interference 
with Canada’s Charter of Rights and Values is reasonable centres on proportionality). The principle 
plays a particularly prominent role in German jurisprudence. See G Lübbe-Wolff, ‘The Principle of 
Proportionality in the Case-Law of the German Federal Constitutional Court’ (2014) 34 Hum R L J 12. 
On the role of proportionality in balancing constitutional rights, see R Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional 
Rights (OUP 2002); A Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (CUP 2012); M Klatt 
and M Meister, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality (OUP 2012). 
33.  Eg Union of India v Ganayutham [1997] 7 SCC 463 (Supreme Court of India); Om Kumar and Other v Union 
of India [2001] 2 SCC 386 (Supreme Court of India). See P Jalan and R Rai, ‘Review of Administrative 
Action’, in S Choudhry and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (OUP 2016) 432, 
439–40. See also H Cheng-Yi and SL David, ‘Proportionality Review of Administrative Action in Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, and China’, in F Bignami and D Zaring (eds), Comparative Law and Regulation: 
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‘Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality’ (2015) 124 Yale LJ 3094. 
 
settlement rules of the World Trade Organization,35 the law of state responsibility,36 the 
sentencing practice of international criminal tribunals,37 the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights38 and the law of the European Union.39  
 Expressed in general terms, the principle of proportionality demands that there must 
be a reasonable relationship between the means employed and the aims pursued by an actor. 
According to the Arbitral Tribunal appointed in the Naulilaa case, an act that exceeds its 
own justification is not proportionate and therefore must be regarded as illicit.40 
Proportionality also incorporates the notion that any harm an otherwise legitimate act 
inflicts must not outstrip the objectives pursued by the actor. By requiring a correlation 
between means and ends, and between harm and benefit, proportionality thus provides a 
normative framework that enables parties to weigh the legitimate interests of an actor 
against the competing interests of third parties affected by its actions.  
 Proportionality is an established aspect of the regulatory framework of warfare too. 
Under the rules of the jus ad bellum, recourse to the use of force in the exercise of the right 
of individual or collective self-defence must be proportionate to the armed attack a state 
seeks to avert.41 Proportionality in this sense is concerned with maintaining a reasonable 
relationship between the nature and degree of force employed by a state and the defensive 
purpose of that force. Professor Ian Brownlie once called this the ‘essence of self-defence’.42 
By contrast, proportionality under the law of armed conflict is understood in at least two 
different senses. Used in a narrow or strict sense, proportionality refers to the rule set out 
in articles 51 and 57 of Additional Protocol I. Used in a broad sense, proportionality refers 
to a general principle of the law of armed conflict. We will explore these two meanings of 
the term in detail below, as it is important for our purposes to distinguish between them. 
                                                 
35.  Eg United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (12 October 1998) 
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A. Proportionality stricto sensu 
References to proportionality in the context of the law of armed conflict are typically 
concerned with the duty of an attacking force to ensure that the incidental harm civilians 
and civilian objects are expected to suffer is not excessive in relation to the military 
advantage anticipated. At the international level, this duty was set out in express terms for 
the first time in article 24 of the Hague Rules on Aerial Warfare of 1923,43 albeit not in a 
formal legal instrument and thus without binding effect.44 The purpose of article 24 was to 
adapt the existing rules of land and naval warfare for the circumstances of aerial attack. 
Article 25 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 barred belligerents from bombarding 
undefended towns, villages, dwellings and buildings ‘by whatever means’,45 a phrase 
specifically chosen to include bombardment from the air.46 However, the land-centric 
distinction between defended and undefended localities drawn in article 25 was difficult to 
reconcile with the practicalities of air warfare.47 Since the mere presence of ground forces 
and fortifications does not enable a town or village to defend itself from aerial attack, a 
reasonable case could be made that localities lacking effective air defences were 
‘undefended’ within the meaning of article 25 of the Hague Regulations and hence immune 
from aerial bombardment. Yet to deny belligerents the right to carry out air raids behind 
enemy lines against ground forces and other military targets present in such ‘undefended’ 
localities would have greatly reduced the strategic value of air power and was therefore an 
unrealistic proposition. 
 The Hague Rules on Aerial Warfare attempted to resolve this dilemma in two steps.48 
First, they abandoned the traditional distinction between defended and undefended 
localities and instead adopted the ‘the nature of the objective or the use to which it is being 
put’ as the appropriate test for establishing the legality of aerial bombardment.49 
Accordingly, the Hague Rules prohibited direct attacks on non-combatants and on private 
property not of a military character,50 but permitted the bombardment of military objectives 
and of civilian buildings used for military purposes.51 Second, article 24 of the Hague Rules 
distinguished between combat zones and rear zones for the purposes of civilian protection. 
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The aerial bombardment of military objectives located in the immediate neighbourhood of 
ground operations was permitted, provided that the military concentration was ‘important 
enough’ to justify the danger to the civilian population. However, the bombardment of 
military objectives not in the vicinity of ground operations was not permitted if it entailed 
a risk of incidental harm to civilians.  
 While the Hague Rules attracted their fair share of criticism,52 it is not accurate to 
suggest, as William Hays Parks has done, that they were the subject of ‘virtually unanimous’ 
condemnation.53 On the contrary, the Hague Rules crystallised agreement on three points 
of fundamental importance. First, direct attacks on civilians are prohibited.54 Second, 
‘military objectives’ are the proper target of aerial attack,55 rather than the broader notion 
of ‘defended’ localities.56 Third, incidental harm to the civilian population is permissible, 
provided that the military benefits outweigh the harm.57 In fact, the majority of 
commentators writing at the time accepted that these new targeting rules represented a 
viable compromise between military necessity and humanitarian sentiments.58 
 The Hague Rules of 1923 had a direct impact on articles 51 and 57 of Additional 
Protocol I, as is plain to see from their negotiating history.59 By abandoning the distinction 
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between defended and undefended localities in favour of permitting attacks against military 
objectives wherever located, the Hague Rules rendered civilians immune from direct attack, 
but at the same time exposed them to the risk of incidental harm in combat zones.60 Article 
24(4) of the Hague Rules was designed to mitigate this risk by imposing a duty on 
belligerents to justify civilian harm with reference to the importance of the military 
objectives to be attacked. The targeting rules of Additional Protocol I follow the same logic. 
The purpose of articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I is to 
complement the principle of distinction—which directs belligerents to spare the civilian 
population and to direct their attacks only against military objectives—in two ways. First, 
by recognising that incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects is an inevitable 
consequence of the conduct of attacks against military objectives and therefore not unlawful 
as such. Second, by imposing an upper limit on the level of incidental harm that may be 
inflicted upon civilians as a consequence of lawful attacks. It is important to realise that, 
contrary to popular accounts and parlance,61 the application of these rules does not entail a 
balancing of military and humanitarian considerations.62 Their purpose is to determine, with 
binding effect, what amounts to a proportionate relationship between the legitimate aims 
of warfare and its adverse effects on third parties. That relationship is permanently fixed by 
the law: the military advantage anticipated from an attack may never excessively outweigh 
the incidental harm it is expected to cause. It is not for the belligerents and individual 
warfighters to balance these competing considerations.63 Rather, their duty is to calculate 
the military advantage and the civilian harm in each specific case and to apply a pre-
determined balance, the rule of excessiveness, to the outcome.64 If the civilian harm is 
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excessive in relation to the military benefits, they must forego the attack. The application 
of the proportionality rule in practice has everything to do with comparisons and the 
avoidance of excessiveness, as the Department of Defense Manual correctly notes,65 and 
nothing with balancing military benefits against civilian harm. 
 This point highlights the true nature and function of articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 
57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I. These provisions require belligerents not to exceed a pre-
determined level of collateral civilian damage. Proportionality within the meaning of these 
provisions is therefore not a legal principle in the Dworkinian sense of a general standard 
that carries weight as part of a balancing exercise,66 but a specific rule that operates in an 
all-or-nothing fashion.67 Civilian harm may not be excessive. Further balancing is neither 
required nor permitted by the rule. 
B. Proportionality as a general principle 
In addition to its narrow meaning as a specific rule, proportionality is commonly described 
as a general principle of the law of armed conflict in the literature,68 in official publications69 
and in judicial decisions.70 The point is often expressed in sweeping terms. For example, 
Robert Kolb and Richard Hyde declare that ‘[a]ll military measures taken by belligerents 
must be proportionate to the aim they seek to accomplish’.71 Despite its breadth, this 
statement is hardly objectionable. If the only legitimate aim which States may seek to 
accomplish during war is to ‘weaken the military forces of the enemy’,72 any act of warfare 
must be proportionate to that sole objective, otherwise belligerents would exceed the scope 
of their lawful authority.73 Nevertheless, expressed in these general terms, proportionality 
                                                 
nature of the assessment of the threshold of excessive harm with the absence of a threshold). 
65.  DoD, Law of War Manual (December 2016), §§ 2.4.1.2 and 5.12.4. See ICRC, Draft Rules for the Limitation, 
80. See also Boothby, Law of Targeting, 97 (‘[t]he proportionality rule is not about a “balance” but, rather, 
is all about “excessiveness”’). 
66.  R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977) 26 (‘[p]rinciples have a dimension 
that rules do not—the dimension of weight or importance’). 
67.  Cf Summary Record of the 21st Meeting, Committee III, 17 February 1975, Official Records of the 
Diplomatic Conference, vol XIV, para 83 (Hungary: declaring that the draft of what became art 57(2)(b) 
‘stated not a principle, but a special and very important rule’). 
68.  Eg Brown, ‘The Proportionality Principle’, 136; R Kolb and R Hyde, An Introduction to the International 
Law of Armed Conflicts (Hart 2008) 48; D Stephens, ‘Human Rights and Armed Conflict: The Advisory 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case’ (2001) 4 Yale Hum Rts & 
Dev LJ 1, 15; APV Rogers, Law on the Battlefield (3rd edn, Manchester University Press 2012) 3; T Gill, 
‘Chivalry: A Principle of the Law of Armed Conflict?’, in M Matthee and others (eds), Armed Conflict and 
International Law: In Search of the Human Face: Liber Amicorum in Memory of Avril McDonald (TMC Asser 
Press 2013) 33, 40–41; E Crawford and A Pert, International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2015) 41 and 44–
45; Solis, Law of Armed Conflict, 268; J Kleffner, ‘Sources of the Law of Armed Conflict’, in R Liivoja and 
TLH McCormack (eds), Routledge Handbook of the Law of Armed Conflict (Routledge 2016) 71, 81. 
69.  Eg DoD, Law of War Manual (December 2016), § 2.4; MoD, Joint Service Manual, para 2.6. 
70.  Eg HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v The Government of Israel (2005) 38 Israel L Rev 83, para 37 
(proportionality was applied outside the targeting context to a decision of the Israeli Government to 
erect a ‘separation fence’ under the law of belligerent occupation: ‘[p]roportionality is recognized today 
as a general principle of international law…[and] plays a central role in the law regarding armed conflict. 
During such conflicts, there is frequently a need to balance between military needs and humanitarian 
considerations’). See also HCJ 769/02, Public Committee against Torture in Israel and others v Government of 
Israel and others (Targeted Killing Case) [2006] ILDC 597 (IL 2006). 
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is little more than a restatement of the principle of military necessity.74 If belligerents are 
entitled to take only those measures that are necessary to compel the submission of the 
enemy, their operations ‘must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it’75—or 
at the very least there must be a ‘reasonable connection’ between those operations and the 
overall objective of overcoming the enemy.76 This is precisely why it is not permissible to 
inflict wanton devastation and unnecessary suffering as ends in themselves. This is also how 
the latest update to the Department of Defense Law of War Manual presents proportionality. 
Whereas earlier versions of the Manual distinguished between proportionality as a general 
principle and proportionality as a specific rule,77 the current update consistently describes 
proportionality as a general principle that requires belligerents not to exercise the right to 
engage in attacks against military objectives in an unreasonable or excessive manner.78 
Understood in this fashion, proportionality is the principle that prohibits the conduct of 
hostilities beyond the limits of military necessity. Consequently, to the extent that 
proportionality is conceived as a principle that governs the relationship between the means 
and ends of warfare, it is not truly a self-standing standard of the law of armed conflict, but 
a condition implicit in the notion of military necessity.79 
 Occasionally, proportionality is described in somewhat narrower terms as a core 
principle of the law of targeting.80 This reflects the fact that many of the legal restraints 
imposed on belligerents may be derived either directly or indirectly from the principle of 
proportionality. For example, it is prohibited to conduct hostilities on the basis that no 
quarter will be given to enemy combatants who are, or should be recognised as, hors de 
combat.81 The traditional justification for this rule is set out by Vattel, who suggests that there 
is no need to kill enemy combatants who have laid down their arms and have surrendered.82 
Vattel’s argument is based on considerations of necessity, not proportionality. The 
unnecessary destruction of life is illicit not because it is out of proportion to the legitimate 
objective of war, but because no reasonable relationship exists between means and ends at 
all where an act of warfare is wholly unnecessary to weaken the enemy. However, Vattel’s 
argument may be recast in the language of proportionality to say that killing a subdued 
enemy exceeds the legitimate object of war.83 Indeed, it is not unreasonable to describe any 
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act of warfare which exceeds the bounds of military necessity as disproportionate.84  
 These considerations bring to light a more general point. Proportionality is concerned 
with the existence of a reasonable connection between means and ends, while much of the 
law of armed conflict is concerned with imposing limits on the means and methods that 
belligerents may employ to weaken the enemy.85 By striking a balance between military 
necessity and the dictates of humanity,86 these legal limits determine what constitutes a 
reasonable connection between the conduct of hostilities and the legitimate object of 
warfare. Seen from this perspective, virtually all rules of the law of armed conflict appear to 
reflect the idea of proportionality.87 Even the foundational principles of the law, such as the 
duty of distinction, may be derived from proportionality on this basis. For example, William 
Hall argued that the military advantage of killing civilians and other persons who do not 
participate in hostilities is too uncertain and too distant to justify their death.88 Since the 
harm outweighs the benefits, Hall declared that belligerents must distinguish between non-
combatants, who should enjoy immunity from attack, and combatants, who do not benefit 
from such immunity.89 
 While it is certainly plausible to describe proportionality as a general principle of the 
law of armed conflict along these lines, doing so risks turning it into a redundant synonym 
for the balance between military necessity and humanity.90 Depicting proportionality as a 
general principle may also give rise to the misperception that every act of warfare is subject 
to a proportionality assessment. This is not the case. For instance, an object that constitutes 
a military objective within the meaning of article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I is liable to 
attack.91 Nothing in the language of article 52(2) or its negotiating history suggests that 
belligerents must weigh humanitarian considerations against military advantage when 
deciding whether an object is a military objective.  
 While proportionality is commonly portrayed as a general principle of the law of armed 
conflict, closer inspection thus reveals that it typically features as an aspect of military 
necessity or as a synonym for the balance between military necessity and humanity. Treating 
proportionality as a self-standing principle of the law of armed conflict conceals the fact 
that its traditional function is to guide the development of the law, rather than to govern its 
implementation on the battlefield.92 The law seldom directs warfighters to balance means 
and ends. More often than not, it requires them to respect certain thresholds and standards 
that reflect or incorporate the proportionality calculations made by those who drafted the 
rules.93 The paucity of situations where the law demands a genuine balancing of means and 
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ends by warfighters often leads commentators to equate proportionality as a general 
principle with proportionality stricto sensu.94 Needless to say, this merely calls into question 
whether it is meaningful to describe proportionality as a general principle of the law of 
armed conflict at all. Yoram Dinstein, for one, emphatically denies that this is the case.95 
While we do not have to go this far, the fact remains that not every rule of the law of armed 
conflict calls for a proportionality assessment. We should therefore guard against the fallacy 
of deducing a general principle of proportionality from certain rules of the law of armed 
conflict, only to project this principle onto other rules from which it is absent. As we 
examine in more detail below,96 failure to heed this warning leads to a circular justification 
for extending the application of proportionality stricto sensu to enemy personnel shielded 
from direct attack. 
III. SCOPE OF THE PROPORTIONALITY RULE 
The idea that lies at the heart of the proportionality rule as formulated in articles 51 and 57 
of Additional Protocol I is simple: the incidental harm that an attack is expected to inflict 
upon civilians must not be excessive compared to the military benefit anticipated. Despite 
the simplicity of the underlying idea, the application of the rule is anything but 
straightforward.97 The meaning of key elements is not fully settled.98 For example, confusion 
surrounds the term ‘excessive’. The authoritative Commentary to the Additional Protocols 
prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) suggests that the 
proportionality rule could never justify extensive civilian harm, even if the military 
advantage involved is significant.99 This position appears to be based on the notion that the 
duty to take precautions precludes extensive loss and destruction among the civilian 
population.100 However, this conflates the precautionary duty to minimise incidental harm 
with proportionality stricto sensu and equates the term ‘excessive’ with ‘extensive’.101 
                                                 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949’). 
94.  Eg Kolb and Hyde, Introduction, 48; A Rubinstein and Y Roznai, ‘Human Shields Modern Armed 
Conflicts: The Need for a Proportionate Proportionality’ (2011) 22 Stan L & Pol’y Rev 93, 99–100; 
Crawford and Pert, International Humanitarian Law, 44; Solis, Law of Armed Conflict, 268 and 292ff. See 
also MoD, Joint Service Manual, para 2.6.1. 
95.  Y Dinstein, ‘The Principle of Proportionality’, in KM Larsen and others (eds), Searching for a ‘Principle of 
Humanity’ in International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2013) 72, 74. 
96. See section V.A.2 below. 
97.  See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the 
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 8 June 
2000 (2000) 38 ILM 1257, para 48 (‘[t]he main problem with the principle of proportionality is not 
whether or not it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied’).  
98.  As Parks, ‘Air Law’, 175, noted more than 25 years ago, ‘there remains a substantial lack of agreement 
as to the meaning of the provisions in Protocol I relating to proportionality’. This assessment still holds 
true today. 
99.  Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, Commentary, para 1980. 
100.  ICRC, Draft Rules for the Limitation, 81 (without the duty to take precautions, the proportionality rule 
‘might give the impression that these humanitarian rules envisage a priori extensive loss and destruction 
among the civilian population’). 
101.  Eg State of Israel, The 2014 Gaza Conflict (7 July–26 August 2014): Factual and Legal Aspects (2015) 185, 
para 330 (‘[e]xcessiveness…is not measured using absolute numbers. It is assessed on a case-by-case 
basis, in light of the specific military advantage anticipated by the commander based on the information 
reasonably available to him at the time of the attack. As long as there is no significant imbalance between 
the expected collateral damage and the anticipated military advantage, no excessiveness exists’). See also 
GS Corn and GP Corn, ‘The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the LOAC through an Operational 
Lens Symposium’ (2011) 47 Tex Int’l LJ 337, 365. Moreover, even extensive accidental or incidental 
civilian losses do not necessarily violate the duty to take precautions, provided that all feasible measures 
were taken to verify the nature of the target and to minimise civilian harm. 
 
Substantial disagreement and uncertainty also surrounds other aspects of the rule, including 
the nature of the harm caused to civilians,102 the extent to which ‘reverberating effects’ 
should be included in the calculation,103 whether a series of near-indiscriminate attacks could 
serve as evidence of a policy of indiscriminate targeting104 and how considerations of force 
protection affect the military advantage anticipated from an attack.105 On top of these 
conceptual difficulties, it must be remembered that decisions in armed conflict are taken in 
a climate of ‘danger, exertion, uncertainty and chance’.106 More often than not, the 
proportionality rule has to be applied on the basis of incomplete, inaccurate and even 
contradictory information. The uncertainty of the law is thus compounded by the 
unpredictability of war.107 
 The difficulties that the interpretation and application of the proportionality rule gives 
rise to are well known and for the most part have been the subject of detailed assessment 
and debate.108 Less attention has been paid to the rule’s application to persons other than 
civilians. The most likely explanation for this is the clear and unambiguous language of 
articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I. All three provisions refer 
exclusively to the ‘incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, 
or a combination thereof’. On its face, the proportionality rule as articulated in Additional 
Protocol I is clearly limited to civilian harm and does not take cognisance of harm caused 
to military medical personnel and chaplains, enemy personnel rendered hors de combat or any 
other specially protected persons and objects that are not civilian in character. This 
interpretation is not in doubt. Applying the rules of treaty interpretation set out in articles 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969 confirms its 
accuracy,109 as we will show below. The limited scope of articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 
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57(2)(b) nevertheless raises two other questions. Even if the ambit of the proportionality 
rule is confined to civilian harm, does this include harm caused to all non-combatants and 
all civilians, as has occasionally been claimed? Moreover, bearing in mind that the 
proportionality rule forms part of customary international law, is the scope of the customary 
rule limited to civilian harm in the same way as its treaty-based equivalent? The purpose of 
this section is to address these matters. 
A. The position under Additional Protocol I 
The proportionality rule as worded in articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) refers to 
civilians and civilian objects only. Reading these provisions within their context suggests 
that the drafters deliberately excluded harm to non-civilian persons and objects from its 
scope. Article 57(2)(b) stipulates that an attack must be cancelled or suspended in three 
situations: where it becomes apparent, first, that the objective to be attacked is not a military 
one; second, that the objective is subject to special protection; or, third, that the attack may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated. Since any civilians and civilian objects that benefit 
from special or heightened protection110 are not military objectives, they fall within the 
ambit of the first situation mentioned in article 57(2)(b). This suggests that the second 
situation covers military objectives subject to special protection, such as hors de combat enemy 
personnel or military medical units.111 This in turn suggests that the reference to civilians 
and civilian objects in the third situation detailed in article 57(2)(b), which sets out the 
proportionality rule, was adopted in contradistinction to non-civilian persons and objects. 
Evidently, the drafters could have specifically included non-civilian objectives enjoying 
special protection within its ambit but chose not to use this language. The context therefore 
confirms the clear meaning of the text of articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b): the 
proportionality rule as formulated in Additional Protocol I is confined to civilian harm only.  
 This interpretation is further confirmed by the Protocol’s preparatory work. 
Historically, proportionality stricto sensu was preoccupied exclusively with collateral damage 
to the civilian population.112 There is no sign in the preparatory work that the negotiating 
States intended to broaden the traditional scope of the rule. The first draft of the 
proportionality rule submitted by the ICRC to the second session of the conference of 
experts held in 1972 required those who order or launch an attack to calculate the ‘probable 
losses and destruction’ caused by the attack.113 The draft failed to specify whether such 
losses and destruction were limited to damage among the civilian population or whether 
they also included damage caused to enemy personnel and other military objectives.114 
During the conference, a number of experts noted that it was therefore unclear whether the 
proposed rule applied between combatants and civilians, between opposing combatants or 
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both.115 A joint proposal submitted by the experts of Egypt, Finland, Sweden and 
Switzerland sought to remedy this ambiguity by explicitly limiting the rule to civilian harm 
only.116 
 The draft Additional Protocol prepared by the ICRC for the diplomatic conference 
that opened in 1974 followed this narrower approach and made express reference to civilian 
harm only.117 However, the ICRC’s Commentary on the draft struck a more ambiguous 
note, suggesting that the concept of ‘civilian objects’ for the purposes of the proportionality 
rule extended to ‘any object protected under existing treaty law or customary international 
law’, including civilian and military hospitals.118 This expansion of the concept of ‘civilian 
object’ to include military objects enjoying special protection from attack, such as military 
medical establishments or military medical aircraft,119 undermines the binary logic of the 
principle of distinction. Nothing indicates that the negotiating States adopted this elastic 
understanding.120 On the contrary, the records reveal that they employed the terms ‘civilian’ 
and ‘civilian object’ in their strict, technical meaning to exclude non-civilian persons and 
objects.121 Nor did any government representative suggest that the proportionality rule 
should encompass anything other than harm to civilians and civilian objects.122  
 Accordingly, the negotiating history confirms the textual interpretation of articles 
51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b). The proportionality rule as codified in Additional 
Protocol I only applies to civilian harm and deliberately does not extend to harm caused to 
persons and objects that are not civilians or civilian objects.123 
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B. The notion of ‘civilian’ harm 
Proportionality stricto sensu is closely related to the principle of distinction.124 The principle 
stipulates that belligerents must discriminate between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, and they must only direct 
their operations against military objectives.125 The principle of distinction plays a 
fundamental role in limiting the effects of hostilities by shielding civilians and channelling 
violence towards lawful targets. As such, it has been hailed as ‘the greatest triumph of 
international law’ in mitigating the evils of war.126 Proportionality blunts the edge of the 
principle of distinction, in so far as it recognises that civilians cannot be shielded from the 
dangers of warfare in absolute terms. Moreover, matters are complicated by the fact that 
protecting a person against excessive incidental harm only makes sense if that individual is 
not a lawful target of attack in the first place. However, a person’s liability to direct attack 
does not depend exclusively on the dichotomy between civilians and combatants.127 Rather, 
liability to attack depends, first, on the classification of a person as a civilian or as a member 
of the armed forces and, second, on the applicability of any special regimes or special 
protections to that individual.128 To understand the personal scope of proportionality stricto 
sensu, we must therefore concentrate on these distinctions.  
 Article 50 of Additional Protocol I defines a ‘civilian’ as anyone who is not a member 
of the regular armed forces of a party to the conflict, a member of other militias and 
volunteer groups belonging to such a party or a member of a levée en masse.129 The gist of this 
definition is reflected in Rule 5 of the ICRC study on Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, which declares that civilians are persons ‘who are not members of the armed forces’.130 
The armed forces of a state may consist of combatants and non-combatants.131 Understood 
in a functional sense, the term non-combatant refers to those members of the armed forces 
who are not deployed in a combat role, such as cooks, technicians or administrative 
personnel. Despite their non-combatant function, such persons are not immune from 
attack due to their membership in the armed forces,132 unless they are employed as hospital 
orderlies, nurses or auxiliary stretcher-bearers,133 form part of the hospital personnel or crew 
of hospital ships134 or have been assigned to civil defence organisations.135 Used in a legal 
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sense, the term non-combatant refers to two categories of persons—military medical 
personnel and chaplains—who are not entitled to participate directly in hostilities.136 Since 
medical personnel and chaplains must be respected and protected at all times,137 they are 
immune from attack, unless they commit acts harmful to the enemy outside their 
humanitarian duties.138 In the different context of non-international armed conflict, the legal 
category of combatants entitled to participate directly in hostilities does not exist.139 
Accordingly, individuals who fight on behalf of a non-state actor as members of its 
organised armed group do not qualify as combatants in a legal sense. However, due to their 
membership of an armed organisation, we share the view that they do not qualify as civilians 
either.140 Such persons are therefore not immune from attack and may be exposed to lawful 
acts of war based on their membership in the armed organisations to which they belong.141  
 In certain circumstances, the law of armed conflict assigns a secondary status to 
civilians and to members of the armed forces.142 Civilians who directly participate in 
hostilities lose their general protection against the effects of hostilities, including their 
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immunity from direct attack.143 Enemy combatants who are hors de combat are no longer 
liable to direct attack144 and may benefit from additional protections based on their 
circumstances.145 In both cases, the persons concerned gain a secondary status which 
modifies the scope of their legal protection without altering their primary status as civilians 
or members of the armed forces.146 There has been some confusion on this point in the 
jurisprudence of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals. In Akayesu, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda declared that ‘[m]embers of the civilian population are 
people who are not taking any active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed 
forces who laid down their arms and those persons placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention or any other cause’.147 In Blaškić, the Trial Chamber of the International 
Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) distinguished civilians ‘in the strict sense 
of the term’ from ‘former combatants’ who are placed hors de combat, claiming that a person’s 
standing as a civilian had to be determined on the basis of their specific circumstances, 
rather than their status.148 Taken to their logical conclusion, these judgments would deprive 
the Third Geneva Convention of its purpose, since the interment of enemy combatants 
would fall under the rules governing the internment of civilians pursuant to the Fourth 
Geneva Convention. This manifestly erroneous position was corrected by the Appeal 
Chamber in Blaškić, which rightly held that it is a person’s membership in the armed forces, 
and not their specific circumstances, which determines their civilian or non-civilian status.149 
Accordingly, the fact that members of an armed organisation are unarmed or hors de combat 
does not accord them civilian status.150 
 These points have important implications for the proportionality rule. Since articles 
51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I apply only to civilian harm, any 
collateral damage caused to persons whose primary status is not that of a civilian falls 
outside their scope.151 Incidental damage caused to members of armed forces, militias and 
volunteer groups belonging to a state party to an armed conflict, members of organised 
armed groups fighting on behalf of a non-state party and members of a levée en masse is 
                                                 
143.  Additional Protocol I, art 51(3). 
144.  Additional Protocol I, art 41(1). 
145.  Eg the special protections due to wounded and sick members of the armed forces. See Geneva 
Convention I, art 13. 
146.  Regarding civilians directly participating in hostilities, see ICRC, Interpretive Guidance, 44–45. See also 
DoD, Law of War Manual (December 2016), § 5.8.3. Regarding hors de combat enemy personnel, see n 
150. 
147.  Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Chamber, Judgment) ICTR-96-4 (2 September 1998), para 582. Confirmed by, 
eg, Prosecutor v Bisengimana (Trial Chamber, Judgment) CTR-00-60-T (13 April 2006), para 48; Prosecutor 
v Muvunyi (Trial Chamber, Judgment) ICTR-00-55 (12 September 2006), para 513; Prosecutor v Seromba 
((Trial Chamber, Judgment) ICTR-01-66 (13 December 2006), para 358. 
148.  Blaškić (2000), para 214. Confirmed by Galić (2003), para 143 and Prosecutor v Limaj (Trial Chamber, 
Judgment) IT-03-66 (30 November 2005), para 186. Followed by Prosecutor v Bagilishema (Trial Chamber, 
Judgment) ICTR-95-1A (7 June 2001), para 79. See also Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Appeals Chamber, 
Judgment) IT-95-14/2 (17 December 2004), para 421. 
149.  Prosecutor v Blaškić (Appeals Chamber, Judgment) IT-95-14 (29 July 2004), para 114. See also Prosecutor v 
Fofana and Kondewa (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber, Judgment) SCSL-04-14-T (2 August 
2007), para 116; Prosecutor v Bemba (Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) ICC-
01/05-01/08 (15 June 2009), para 78.  
150.  Ibid, para 113. Confirmed by Galić (2006), para 144; Martić (2007), para 55; Martić (2009), para 302; 
Prosecutor v Mrkšić (Trial Chamber, Judgment) IT-95-13/1 (27 September 2007), para 461. 
151.  In this respect, it is worth noting that only members of armed forces and groups belonging to parties 
to the conflict are not civilians. Members of armed forces affected by an armed conflict without being 
parties to it are civilians for the purposes of the law of armed conflict. Cf Henckaerts and Doswald-
Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol I, Rule 33, 112 (‘[s]tate practice treats peacekeeping 
forces, which are usually professional soldiers, as civilians because they are not members of a party to 
the conflict and are deemed to be entitled to the same protection against attack as that accorded to 
civilians, as long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities’). 
 
therefore excluded from the proportionality rule as defined in Additional Protocol I. 
Whether or not these persons benefit from special protections is immaterial. As we saw, 
the fact that enemy personnel enjoy special protections, either as non-combatant members 
of the armed forces or as hors de combat persons, does not alter their primary status as 
members of the armed forces and does not turn them into civilians.152  
 By contrast, the secondary status of civilians is relevant to the application of the 
proportionality rule. The rule is designed to protect civilians against the incidental effects 
of warfare. This rationale does not apply in situations where civilians forfeit their immunity 
from direct attack due to their direct participation in hostilities. It would be entirely illogical 
and contrary to the principle of military necessity to accept that civilians directly 
participating in hostilities are lawful targets of attack,153 but to insist that any incidental harm 
they may suffer must not be excessive compared to the military advantage anticipated from 
an attack targeting other objectives.154 This is why article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I 
provides that civilians directly participating in hostilities do not enjoy the protection against 
the effects of hostilities afforded by Section I of Part IV of Additional Protocol I. This 
section includes articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b), which are therefore inapplicable 
to civilians directly participating in hostilities in their entirety.155  
 While the position of civilians directly participating in hostilities is regulated in express 
terms, the effect that other special protections or circumstances affecting civilians may have 
on the application of the proportionality rule is less clear. Since the proportionality rule 
applies to all civilians, there is no reason to doubt its applicability, in principle, to civilians 
enjoying special protections, for instance civilian medical personnel.156 However, the fact 
that belligerents are bound to respect and protect such civilians may cast doubt over the 
extent of their liability to incidental harm. As a matter of principle, there is no reason why 
the special protections accorded to certain civilians could not increase an individual’s 
normative value in relation to other civilians not enjoying such protections and thus in 
relation to the military advantage anticipated from an attack.157 Whether or not this is the 
case depends on the content of the special protections in question.158 For example, it would 
                                                 
152.  According to Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, Commentary, para 1602, ‘an enemy soldier is no 
longer a combatant because he is hors de combat’. This is correct in so far as any person who is hors de 
combat cannot, by definition, be a combatant in a factual sense. The law may even restrict or suspend the 
right of certain hors de combat combatants to directly engage in hostilities. For example, under Additional 
Protocol I, art 93, escaping or escaped prisoners of war are liable to disciplinary and penal punishment 
by the detaining power upon recapture for certain acts that would be lawful acts of war if committed by 
combatants who are not prisoners of war. However, in none of these cases do the persons concerned 
lose their primary status as members of the armed forces. 
153.  ICRC, Draft Additional Protocols, 58 (‘a civilian taking part in fighting, whether singly or in a group, 
becomes ipso facto a lawful target for such time when he takes a direct part in hostilities’). 
154.  Targeted Killings Case, para 46. This position would lead to absurd outcomes. For example, while it would 
be lawful to directly target and kill a group of ten civilians directly participating in hostilities, it is not 
inconceivable that a strike which directly targeted only one of the individuals, but was expected to injure 
or kill the remaining nine persons incidentally, might not pass the proportionality test and therefore 
could not be carried out lawfully.  
155.  But cf Targeted Killings Case, para 40 (relying on human rights law to hold that the less harmful means 
must be employed against civilians directly participating in hostilities and equating that with the principle 
of proportionality under domestic law). 
156.  Additional Protocol I, art 15. 
157.  By analogy, it is worth noting that Additional Protocol I, art 56 essentially creates a heightened 
proportionality regime by prohibiting attacks against dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating 
stations, or against military objectives located in their vicinity, if such attacks may cause the release of 
dangerous forces and consequent severe, rather than excessive, losses among the civilian population. The 
US takes the position that this provision does not reflect customary international law to the extent that 
it deviates from the regular application of the proportionality rule. See DoD, Law of War Manual 
(December 2016), § 5.13.1. 
158.  Eg the special protection conferred on women against incident assault under Geneva Convention IV, 
 
not be unreasonable to demand a greater military advantage to justify incidental harm to 
civilian medical personnel compared to inflicting the same harm on the same number of 
‘ordinary’ civilians. Conversely, it is undeniable that civilians who accompany the armed 
forces and those who are located inside military objectives run the risk, as a matter of fact, 
of exposing themselves to the effects of hostilities.159 Whether this risk justifies excluding 
such civilians from the proportionality calculation altogether, as the initial version of the 
Department of Defense Law of War Manual published in 2015 claimed,160 or decreasing their 
normative value compared to ‘ordinary’ civilians, is a more contentious question.161 We will 
not pursue these matters here, as it is not necessary to resolve them at this stage.162 The key 
point for our purposes is that the proportionality rule under Additional Protocol I does not 
apply to members of armed forces and groups, irrespective of their non-combatant status 
or circumstances, or to civilians directly participating in hostilities. 
C. The customary rule of proportionality 
The fact that a particular rule of international law derives from an international agreement 
does not preclude the possibility that it may also exist separately under customary 
international law.163 Notwithstanding its codification in articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 
57(2)(b), it is universally accepted that proportionality stricto sensu forms part of international 
custom.164 In principle, there is no reason why the customary manifestation of the rule could 
not be broader in scope than the conventional one articulated in Additional Protocol I.165 
A number of writers argue that this is indeed the case. Leslie Green, for example, suggests 
that customary international law directs belligerents to take into account ‘potential collateral 
                                                 
art 27 is not relevant in the context of the proportionality rule and does not affect its application. 
159.  Draft additional Protocol, art 45(5), Conference of Government Experts, vol II (‘[n]evertheless, civilians who 
are within a military objective run the risks consequent upon any attack launched against this objective’). 
160.  United States Department of Defense, Law of War Manual (2015), §§ 5.12.3.2 and 5.12.3.3. Responding 
to sustained criticism of this position (see n 161), the latest update of the Manual no longer excludes 
such civilians from the proportionality rule: DoD, Law of War Manual (December 2016), §§ 4.15.2.3 and 
5.16.4. For remaining concerns, see O Hathaway, M Lederman and M Schmitt, ‘Two Lingering 
Concerns about the Forthcoming Law of War Manual Amendments’, Just Security (30 November 2016) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/35025/lingering-concerns-forthcoming-law-war-manual-
amendments/> and M Lederman, ‘Thoughts on Distinction and Proportionality in the December 2016 
Revision to the Law of War Manual’, Just Security (19 December 2016) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/35617/thoughts-distinction-proportionality-december-2016-revision-
law-war-manual/>. 
161.  Eg AA Haque, ‘Off Target: Selection, Precaution, and Proportionality in the DoD Manual’ (2016) 92 
Int’l L Stud 31, 58–72; O Hathaway, ‘The Law of War Manual’s Threat to the Principle of 
Proportionality’, Just Security (23 June 2016) <https://www.justsecurity.org/31631/lowm-threat-
principle-proportionality/>; M Lederman, ‘Troubling Proportionality and Rule-of-Distinction 
Provisions in the Law of War Manual’, Just Security (27 June 2016) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/31661/law-war-manual-distinction-proportionality/>. 
162.  We return to these matters in section VI.B below. 
163.  Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Jurisdiction) 
[1984] ICJ Rep 394, para 73; Nicaragua [1986], paras 174–79. 
164.  The inclusion of the proportionality rule in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, vol I, has prompted no principled objections and is indicative of this consensus. See 
Kupreškić, para 524. Cf MN Schmitt, ‘The Law of Targeting’, in E Wilmshurst and S Breau (eds), 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2007) 131, 134. This may 
be contrasted with the reception of other aspects of the study. Eg see JB Bellinger III and WJ Haynes 
II, ‘A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89 Int’l Rev Red Cross 443. 
165.  Cf Nuclear Weapons, para 84 (‘Additional Protocol I in no way replaced the general customary rules 
applicable to all means and methods of combat’). 
 
damage caused to civilians, civilian objects and other protected persons or installations’.166 Similarly, 
in their commentary to Additional Protocol I, Bothe, Partsch and Solf assert that hors de 
combat personnel should not be exposed to incidental harm that is excessive in relation to 
the military advantage anticipated.167 
 The existence and content of a rule of customary international law must be established 
with reference to two elements, state practice and opinio juris.168 This is so irrespective of the 
process that gave birth to the customary norm concerned. Three scenarios may be 
distinguished in this respect.169 First, the relevant provisions of Additional Protocol I may 
be declaratory of pre-existing custom. Second, they may have ‘crystallised’ an emerging 
customary norm. Third, they may have initiated the development of a new rule of customary 
international law.  
 The negotiating history of Additional Protocol I suggests that articles 51(5)(b), 
57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) did not codify a pre-existing rule of custom.170 While the United 
States representative at the diplomatic conference convened in Geneva claimed that 
proportionality was ‘already established by custom and in practice’,171 other delegations were 
more ambivalent172 and a few representatives expressly contradicted the US position.173 A 
substantial number of delegations strongly objected to proportionality stricto sensu as such,174 
                                                 
166.  LC Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (3rd edn, Manchester University Press 2008) 391 
(emphasis added). 
167.  Bothe, Partsch and Solf, Commentary, 253, § 2.2.1. The authors make this point in the context of 
Additional Protocol I, art 41, which implies that it is based on custom, rather than on arts 51(5)(b), 
57(2)(a)(iii) or 57(2)(b). 
168.  For classic statements of this position, see eg North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v Denmark; 
Germany v Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 77; Continental Shelf (Libya v Malta) (Judgment) 
[1985] ICJ Rep 13, para 27. For more recent confirmation, see Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany 
v Italy; Greece intervening) (Judgment) [2012] ICJ Rep 99, para 55; Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute 
or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (Judgment) [2012] ICJ Rep 422, para 99. 
169.  Cf North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, paras 60–80. See also RR Baxter, ‘Treaties and Custom’ (1970) 129-
I Recueil des Cours 27; Y Dinstein, ‘The Interaction between Customary International Law and Treaties’ 
(2006) 322 Recueil des Cours 243; BB Jia, ‘The Relations between Treaties and Custom’ (2010) 9 
Chinese J Int’l L 81.  
170.  Contemporary commentators held competing views on whether or not proportionality stricto sensu 
already formed part of customary international law at the time. Cf BM Carnahan, ‘The Law of Air 
Bombardment in Its Historical Context’ (1975) 17 Air Force L Rev 39, 56–58; PJ Goda, ‘The Protection 
of Civilians from Bombardment by Aircraft: The Ineffectiveness of the International Law of War 
Comment’ (1966) 33 Mil L Rev 93. See also Shimoda and others v State (1964) 8 Japanese Ann Int’l L 212 
(7 December 1963) 238 (declaring the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks under the Hague Rules on 
Aerial Warfare to be part of customary international law). 
171.  Summary Record of the 8th Meeting, 19 March 1974, Committee III, Official Records of the Diplomatic 
Conference, vol XIV, 59, para 67. See also Summary Record of the 21st Meeting, Committee III, 17 
February 1975, ibid 181, para 91. See also ibid, para 32 (UK). Cf ‘Letter dated September 22, 1972 from 
J. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, to Senator Edward Kennedy, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees of the Committee on the Judiciary’ (1973) 67 AJIL 122, 
123–24 (suggesting that the proportionality rule embodied in Article 2 of Hague Convention IX of 1907 
applied to aerial bombardment by way of analogy). 
172.  Summary Record of the 41st Plenary Meeting, 26 May 1977, Annex, Official Records of the Diplomatic 
Conference, vol IV, 175, 193 (Mexico), 199 (Sweden). 
173.  Summary Record of the 8th Meeting, Committee III, 19 March 1974, Official Records of the Diplomatic 
Conference, vol XIV, 59, para 79 (Hungary); Summary Record of the 21st Meeting, Committee III, 17 
February 1975, ibid, 181, para 81 (Democratic Republic of Vietnam); Summary Record of the 31st 
Meeting, Committee III, 14 March 1975, ibid, 299, para 42 (Romania). 
174.  See Summary Record of the 6th Meeting, Committee III, 15 March 1974, Official Records of the Diplomatic 
Conference, vol XIV, 43, para 48 (Syria) and para 50 (Hungary); Summary Record of the 7th Meeting, 
Committee III, 19 March 1974, ibid, 51, para 16 (Mongolia), para 25 (Iraq), para 48 (German 
Democratic Republic), para 49 (Egypt), para 55 (Romania); Summary Record of the 8th Meeting, 
Committee III, 19 March 1974, ibid, 59, para 13 (Poland); para 17 (Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea), para 20 (Uganda), para 81 (Hungary), para 82 (Czechoslovakia), para 83 (Indonesia), para 88 
 
questioning its compatibility with the law of armed conflict on the basis of an absolutist 
reading of the principle of distinction.175 Despite these differences, a consensus eventually 
emerged in support of the rule on the back of a compromise to strengthen the duty to take 
precautions.176 
 While the negotiations thus demonstrate a lack of agreement regarding the customary 
nature of proportionality as it stood at the time, it is not farfetched to treat them as having 
crystallised it as an emerging norm of customary international law.177 The United Kingdom, 
Ukraine and the United States used language to this effect in explaining their votes at the 
diplomatic conference.178 Indeed, even before the conference came to an end, the United 
States Department of the Army revised its field manual on The Law of Land Warfare to mirror 
the wording of the draft proportionality rule.179 In any event, whether the adoption of 
Additional Protocol I has crystallised proportionality as an emerging norm or has triggered 
its development as a new rule of customary international law, in both cases this customary 
rule descended from the terms of articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b), which restrict 
proportionality stricto sensu to civilian harm. Consequently, the burden rests on those who 
claim that the customary rule applies to non-civilian harm to prove, with reference to state 
practice and opinio juris, that its scope has somehow expanded beyond the terms of articles 
51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) since their adoption in 1977. Since the task, therefore, is 
to establish whether the customary rule deviates from the conventional one, the practice of 
States that are parties to Additional Protocol I is equally relevant as the practice of States 
that are not. If the customary proportionality rule really is broader in scope than the 
conventional one, we should expect the practice of all States to reflect this, irrespective of 
                                                 
(Albania); Summary Record of the 21st Meeting, Committee III, 17 February 1975, ibid, 181, para 11 
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Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference, vol XIV, 51, para 36 (Canada); Summary Record of the 8th 
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Summary Record of the 21st Meeting, Committee III, 17 February 1975, ibid, 181, para 30 (UK), paras 
53–4 (Finland), para 73 (Australia), para 85 (US), para 94 (Egypt). 
176.  Report of Committee III, Second Session (3 February–18 April 1975), Official Records of the Diplomatic 
Conference, vol XV, 259, para 97. 
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178.  Summary Record of the 41st Plenary Meeting, 26 May 1977, Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference, 
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conflict’); ibid, Annex, 175, 202 (Ukraine: ‘Paragraphs 4 and 5 [of what is now Additional Protocol I, 
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humanitarian law, [namely the] prohibition of indiscriminate attacks’); Summary Record of the 42nd 
Plenary Meeting, 27 May 1977, Annex, ibid, 219, 241 (US: Additional Protocol I, art 57 ‘represents a 
major step in the reaffirmation and development of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict’ as ‘it 
codif[ies] for the first time the rule of proportionality’). 
179.  Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare (1956), FM 27-10 C1, § 41 (revision of 15 July 1976). 
Cf Draft Protocol I, art 50(2)(a)(iii) and 50(b) in Annex to Report of Committee III, Second Session (3 
February–18 April 1975), Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference, vol XV, 297, 313–14. See also 
Department of the Air Force, International Law: The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations (1976), 
AFP 110-31, § 5-3(c)(2)(b) (belligerents ‘must refrain from launching an attack if injury or damage [to 
civilians or civilian objects] would be excessive or disproportionate compared with the military 
advantage anticipated’); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Review of the 
1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 3 May 1985, 48 (JCSM-152-85) 
(‘[m]any legal experts believe that this rule is already binding on the United States as part of customary 
international law. Even if this rule is not already legally binding, considerations of proportionality have 
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United States’). 
 
whether they are parties to Additional Protocol I.180 
 Whilst evidence of practice must be looked for ‘primarily in the actual practice’ of 
States,181 national military manuals may be relied on as useful indicators for our purposes.182 
As documented by the ICRC’s customary humanitarian law study, the majority of national 
military manuals and other relevant doctrinal publications, including those of Belgium, 
Benin, Cameroon, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Hungary, Israel, Madagascar, the Netherlands, 
Nigeria, Spain, Switzerland and Togo, set out the proportionality rule in the same or close 
to identical terms as Additional Protocol I.183 For example, the German Law of Armed Conflict 
Manual declares that ‘attacks on military objectives which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
of these, and which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated are prohibited’.184  
 The position adopted in the latest revision of the US Department of Defense Law of 
War Manual is of particular interest. The Manual describes proportionality as a general 
principle that gives rise to two obligations: first, a duty to refrain from attacks in which the 
expected incidental harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated and, second, a duty to take feasible precautions in planning and 
conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other persons and objects.185 
In effect, the Manual suggests that proportionality stricto sensu and the duty to take 
precautions both derive from the underlying principle that belligerents may not conduct 
hostilities in a manner that is unreasonable or excessive. There is no fault with this approach, 
except that labelling this underlying principle the ‘proportionality principle’ gives rise to 
unnecessary confusion. This is so because it obscures the fact that proportionality stricto 
sensu and precautionary duties are conceptually distinct and entail discrete legal 
obligations,186 leading the Manual to embrace a seemingly self-contradictory position 
regarding the applicability of what it calls the proportionality principle to enemy personnel 
and objects protected from direct attack. On the one hand, the Manual declares that 
belligerents must take feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks to reduce the 
risk of harm to protected enemy personnel and objects.187 On the other hand, it also states 
that the prohibition of excessive incidental harm ‘generally does not require consideration 
                                                 
180.  The ‘Baxter paradox’ therefore does not apply here. See RR Baxter, ‘Multilateral Treaties as Evidence 
of Customary International Law’ (1965–1966) 41 BYIL 275, 296–97 and Baxter, ‘Treaties and Custom’, 
64. 
181.  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, para 27 (emphasis added). 
182.  According to Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
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183.  J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: Practice 
(CUP 2005) §§ 14–44, 299–305. 
184.  Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Law of Armed Conflict Manual (2013), Joint Service Regulation 
(ZDv) 15/2, § 404. 
185.  DoD, Law of War Manual (December 2016), § 2.4.1.2. 
186.  See Lederman, ‘Thoughts on Distinction and Proportionality’ (fittingly describing this as a ‘systemic 
error’). 
187.  DoD, Law of War Manual (December 2016), § 5.10.1. 
 
of military personnel and objects, even if they may not be made the object of attack, such 
as military medical personnel, the military wounded and sick, and military medical 
facilities’.188 Consequently, according to the Manual, the proportionality principle applies to 
protected enemy personnel as regards the duty to take feasible precautions, but it does not 
apply as far as the prohibition of excessive incidental harm is concerned. The Manual thus 
confirms that proportionality stricto sensu is confined to civilian harm only, although the 
more categorical position adopted in earlier editions189 is now qualified by the proviso that 
proportionality considerations do not ‘generally’ apply to protected enemy personnel. 
 This may be contrasted with the position adopted by Australia. The Australian Manual 
of the Law of Armed Conflict treats proportionality as one of three foundational principles that 
govern the conduct of warfare. It proclaims that proportionality requires commanders to 
‘choose the least destructive method or axis [of attack] compatible with military success’ 
and to ‘weigh the military value arising from the success of the operation against the possible 
harmful effects to protected persons and objects’.190 Taken at face value, the Australian 
manual thus seems to extend the application of the proportionality rule to direct attacks 
against military objectives and to incidental harm affecting non-civilian persons and objects, 
though it should be noted that the text is not entirely consistent in its approach.191 A handful 
of other national manuals also appear to suggest that proportionality extends to non-civilian 
harm.192 For example, the Canadian manual declares that proportionality ‘involves weighing 
the interests arising from the success of the operation on the one hand, against the possible 
harmful effects upon protected persons and objects on the other’.193 However, on closer reading, 
this formula seems to be the result of poor drafting rather than any deliberate expression 
of opinio juris,194 not least because subsequent passages of the manual limit the 
proportionality test exclusively to civilian harm.195 The position in the United Kingdom 
Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict can only be described as confused. The fact that the 
manual’s definition of the proportionality rule is limited to civilian harm suggests that the 
UK does not consider itself bound by a broader customary proportionality rule.196 This is 
confirmed by the manual’s position on civil defence personnel, which implies that only 
civilian (but not military)197 personnel assigned to civil defence duties need to be included 
in the proportionality calculation.198 By contrast, when dealing with maritime warfare, the 
UK manual defines collateral damage to include ‘the loss of life of, or injury to, civilians or 
other protected persons, and damage to or the destruction of the natural environment or objects 
that are not in themselves military objectives’.199 The manual thus suggests that incidental 
harm to protected non-civilian persons, though not objects, must be included in the 
proportionality calculation in the context of maritime, and possibly aerial, warfare, but not 
in the context of land warfare. This position lacks logic and consistency.  
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 Turning to treaty practice and jurisprudence, both the original and the amended 
version of Protocol II on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices to the 
Conventional Weapons Convention of 1980 reproduce the proportionality rule found in 
Additional Protocol I verbatim.200 The fact that the amended version of Protocol II applies 
to non-international armed conflicts suggests that proportionality stricto sensu is limited to 
civilian harm under the customary law of non-international armed conflict too.201 By 
contrast, article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute includes ‘widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment’ in its rendition of the rule. However, closer reading 
reveals that article 8(2)(b)(iv) simply combines two distinct norms of international law, the 
duty not to cause excessive incidental civilian harm and the duty not to cause wide-spread, 
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, into a single provision.202 At first 
sight, the International Court of Justice appears to have adopted a broader understanding 
of proportionality in the Nuclear Weapons case when it held that ‘States must take 
environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and 
proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives’.203 However, to the extent that 
the environment is composed of civilian objects, it is covered by the proportionality rule as 
formulated in Additional Protocol I, unless a particular component of the environment 
qualifies as a military objective.204 There is no discrepancy, therefore, between the Court’s 
advisory opinion and Additional Protocol I on this point. The traditional understanding of 
proportionality is also reflected in the dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins in the same case, 
who stated that ‘even a legitimate military target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian 
casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military gain from the attack’.205 
Similarly, in Kupreškić, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that the principle of proportionality 
demands that ‘any incidental (and unintentional) damage to civilians must not be out of 
proportion to the direct military advantage gained by the military attack’.206 The Eritrea-
Ethiopia Claims Commission declared article 51(5) of Additional Protocol I to be an 
expression of customary international humanitarian law.207 National courts have adopted 
the same position.208 
 Manuals prepared by international experts present a somewhat more mixed picture. 
The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict reproduces the proportionality test 
found in Additional Protocol I.209 The Tallinn Manual follows the same approach, adding 
                                                 
200.  Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may 
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol II on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (10 October 1980) 1342 UNTS 
137, art 3.3(c); Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (3 May 1996) 2048 UNTS 133, art 3(8)(c). 
201.  To similar effect, see Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on the Human 
Rights Situation in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102 Doc 9 rev 1 (26 February 1999), paras 75 and 78. 
202.  Dörmann, Doswald-Beck and Kolb, Elements of War Crimes, 166. See also MN Schmitt, ‘Humanitarian 
Law and the Environment’ (2000) 28 Denv J Intl’l L & Pol’y 265, 283–84; Y Dinstein, ‘Protection of 
the Environment in International Armed Conflict’ (2001) 5 Max Planck YB UN L 523, 536. 
203.  Nuclear Weapons, para 30. 
204.  Cf Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol I, Rule 43(A) and (B), 
143. See also C Droege and M-L Tougas, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed 
Conflict – Existing Rules and Need for Further Legal Protection’, in RG Rayfuse (ed), War and the 
Environment: New Approaches to Protecting the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict (Brill 2014) 11. 
205.  Nuclear Weapons, 583, para 20 (dissenting opinion by Judge Higgins). 
206.  Kupreškić, para 524. See also the cases cited above at n 24. 
207.  Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related 
Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 & 26 (2005) 26 RIAA 291, para 95. 
208.  Eg Oberlandesgericht Köln, Kunduz Tankers Case, 7 U 4/14 (30 April 2015), para 42, as confirmed by 
Bundesgerichtshof, III ZR 140/15 (12 January 2017); Targeted Killings Case, paras 42–43. 
209.  International Institute of Humanitarian Law, The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict: 
With Commentary (2006) § 2.1.1.4. 
 
that the proportionality rule formulated in articles 51 and 57 of Additional Protocol I ‘is 
generally accepted as customary international law applicable in international and non-
international armed conflicts’.210 Given the depth and breadth of the research underpinning 
the ICRC’s study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, it is noteworthy that its 
formulation of the customary proportionality rule is identical in all material respects with 
the wording of article 57(2)(a)(iii) of Additional Protocol I.211 The Manual on Air and Missile 
Warfare, however, includes ‘incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to 
civilian objects or other protected objects’ within its definition of ‘collateral damage’.212 The 
commentary explains that this definition is drawn from articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 
57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I.213 However, as Ian Henderson has pointed out, those 
provisions are limited to civilian harm and as such do not support the manual’s broader 
definition of proportionality.214 Also, it seems somewhat peculiar to extend the notion of 
‘collateral damage’ to other protected objects but not to other protected persons. The San 
Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea also adopts a broader 
approach and defines collateral damage to encompasses ‘loss of life of, or injury to civilians 
or other protected persons, and damage to or the destruction of the natural environment or 
objects that are not in themselves military objectives’.215 As the commentary explains, the 
experts drafting the manual adopted this definition because ‘in practice the rule extends to 
damage or injury caused to all persons or objects that may not be directly attacked’.216 
However, the manual fails to offer any evidence to substantiate this claim. Also, it should 
be borne in mind that targeting directives and rules of engagement routinely impose 
constraints on the use of force for policy, rather than legal, reasons. One should be slow to 
interpret such self-imposed constraints as indications of opinio juris. 
 Finally, reference must be made the Chairman of the United States Joint Chief of 
Staff’s Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) Methodology.217 The CDE is a process 
designed to afford military decision-makers a reasonable estimate of certain types of 
collateral damage that will result from the employment of a weapon on a lawful target. It 
requires planners to determine whether any collateral concerns are present within the 
projected hazard area of a weapon to be utilised in an attack. If collateral concerns are 
identified, progressively more demanding mitigation techniques will be employed to avoid 
collateral damage.218 Once the CDE has exhausted potential mitigation techniques, meaning 
that no technical options exist to prevent collateral damage short of not conducting the 
planned attack, a decision is made on whether the attack would comply with the 
proportionality rule. In this way, CDE directly facilitates the legal requirement to take 
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precautions in attack and helps implement the proportionality rule by, amongst other things, 
giving a numeric estimate of the number of protected persons it is anticipated will be injured 
or killed in a proposed attack.219 
 The notion of collateral damage is at the core of the CDE. The latest publicly available 
version of the Joint Chief’s CDE Methodology defines collateral damage as ‘the 
unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful 
military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time’.220 All persons protected from direct 
attack, including protected enemy personnel, are therefore included in the CDE. This 
reflects the Methodology’s understanding that the law of armed conflict demands that 
neither civilian nor ‘non-combatant’ injury or loss of life be excessive in relation to the 
military advantage anticipated from an attack.221 Non-combatants are defined as ‘military 
medical personnel, chaplains, and those out of combat, including prisoners of war and the 
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked.’222 
 Although the Joint Chief’s CDE Methodology thus extends the proportionality rule to 
protected enemy personnel, it is open to question to what extent this supports the 
conclusion that the scope of proportionality stricto sensu is broader under customary 
international law than treaty law. The Methodology is a means of accommodating policy 
and other limitations that the US Government may impose on its forces beyond legal 
requirements. The Methodology therefore specifically warns that it should not be construed 
as state practice with respect to customary international law.223 We should remember that 
the last publicly available iteration of the document was published in 2012, that is three 
years before the Department of Defense Law of War Manual. Although the most recent 
version is not in the public domain,224 it should not come as a surprise if it had been brought 
in line with the legal position adopted in the Manual. Any remaining discrepancy between 
the Methodology and the Manual would suggest, at the most, that there is some 
disagreement within the US about the scope of the proportionality rule. We should also 
note that whilst the Joint Chief’s CDE Methodology has been widely adopted by other 
nations and partners,225 its extended definition of collateral damage has not always been 
followed. For example, the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology approved by the 
European Union Military Committee in 2016 for the purposes of EU-led military 
operations defines collateral damage to include civilian harm only and expressly excludes 
harm to other non-combatants from the scope of the CDE process.226  
 Whilst our review does not amount to an exhaustive assessment of state practice, the 
material nevertheless generally points in the same direction and permits a firm conclusion. 
The evidence suggests that the scope of the proportionality rule under customary 
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international law has not expanded to include non-civilian harm at any stage since the rule’s 
formation on the basis of Additional Protocol I. Although some material does exist that 
may suggest otherwise, the weight of this contrary practice is limited. This is so partly 
because of the small number of States concerned and partly because it is questionable 
whether it reflects their opinio juris. It certainly does not amount to ‘a settled practice’,227 nor 
does it carry sufficient weight to indicate that the traditional rule, as codified in Additional 
Protocol I, is in the process of transformation.228 Accordingly, the scope of the conventional 
and the customary rule of proportionality is identical.229 However, the absence of absolute 
uniformity may be taken as a sign of States recognising that protected enemy personnel do 
raise proportionality considerations of some sort. 
IV. ENEMY PERSONNEL PROTECTED FROM DIRECT ATTACK 
So far, we have found that proportionality stricto sensu is limited, both under conventional 
and customary international law, to incidental harm caused to civilians not directly 
participating in hostilities and to civilian objects. Members of national armed forces, 
irregular formations and levées en masse, members of non-state organised armed groups and 
military objectives are excluded from the scope of the proportionality rule as traditionally 
understood. Nonetheless, it has been argued that the rule should be interpreted or applied 
so as to cover incidental harm caused to certain non-civilian persons as well. Before we turn 
to these arguments in section V below, it is necessary to clarify, as a preliminary matter, 
what categories of non-civilians might benefit from the rule at all. For the reasons we 
discussed in connection with civilians directly participating in hostilities,230 it would be 
contradictory if the law entitled belligerents to attack lawful targets directly but prohibited 
exposing them to incidental damage. An individual who is liable to direct attack cannot 
enjoy immunity against the incidental effects of lawful attacks directed against other military 
objectives.231 Accordingly, it only makes sense for the law to protect persons from excessive 
incidental harm if they are protected against direct harm in the first place. In this section, 
we will first clarify which enemy combatants are liable to direct attack, before turning to the 
categories of enemy personnel who are not liable to direct attack. 
A. Enemy personnel liable to direct attack 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the legal position of enemy combatants who do not 
enjoy special protections would appear to be straightforward. Given that such enemy 
combatants are liable to direct harm, it would be illogical to include them in the calculation 
of incidental harm. However, it has been suggested that even harm caused to combat 
effective personnel, in other words adversaries who are not incapacitated or defenceless for 
other reasons, should be subject to some form of proportionality assessment.232 Ryan 
Goodman in particular has argued that the law of armed conflict directs belligerents to 
choose means and methods of attack that render enemy combatants hors de combat with the 
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least amount of harm to their person.233 In essence, Professor Goodman suggests that this 
principle of ‘least-restrictive-means’ (LRM) demands that in each individual case 
belligerents must employ only such degree of violence against enemy combatants liable to 
attack as is necessary and proportionate to accomplishing a military objective.234 
Accordingly, if the LRM principle forms part of the law and restricts the degree of harm 
that may be caused to enemy personnel directly, as Goodman suggests it does, then there 
would be no reason why proportionality stricto sensu could not, in principle, extend to cover 
harm suffered by such personnel incidentally. 
 Professor Goodman’s argument has been criticised in detail elsewhere.235 We will not 
repeat those objections here but instead confine ourselves to a few observations relevant in 
the present setting. At the heart of Goodman’s thesis lies the claim that the prohibition of 
superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering includes a prohibition of unnecessary killing.236 
This misreads the impact the St Petersburg Declaration of 1868 has had on the law of armed 
conflict.237 The Declaration’s preamble proclaims as follows: 
 
That the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of 
war; 
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the 
military forces of the enemy; 
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men;  
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of 
disabled men, or render their death inevitable[.] 
  
 The prohibition of arms that uselessly aggravate the suffering of combatants, as 
articulated in the fourth preambular paragraph quoted above, is well established. The Hague 
Regulations of 1899238 and 1907239 outlaw weapons which are of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or which are calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. This principle is 
confirmed by article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I, which reformulates it to cover both the 
means and methods of warfare.240 By contrast, state practice has not carried the prohibition 
of weapons that render death inevitable over from the preamble of the St Petersburg 
Declaration into the general corpus of the law of armed conflict. Had it done so, any 
weapon system that causes fatal injuries in the course of its ordinary operation would 
contravene the law.241 That this is not the case is demonstrated by the fact that neither the 
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Hague Regulations nor Additional Protocol I prohibit means and methods of warfare that 
render death inevitable. The permissibility of such means and methods is confirmed by the 
consistency with which states have deployed weapons capable of causing fatal injuries in 
theatres all over the world during the last century and a half.242 Indeed, the operative part 
of the St Petersburg Declaration itself falls significantly short of the sentiments articulated 
in its preamble. While the Declaration bans the use of explosive projectiles under 400 grams 
in weight, projectiles above that limit—such as artillery shells, mortar rounds or multiple 
rocket launcher munitions—remain permissible, despite the fact that these heavier 
projectiles render the death of their targets no less inevitable than do their lighter 
counterparts.243 
 Commentators, courts and governments frequently pay lip service to the idea that 
rendering enemy combatants hors de combat is sufficient to achieve the object of war, as 
asserted by the third preambular paragraph of the St Petersburg Declaration, but they rarely 
admit that this proposition, if taken literally and followed through to its logical conclusion, 
implies that killing is an excessive method of warfare.244 Most treatments of the subject 
simply gloss over this matter or quietly correct it.245 Hall, for instance, cites the preamble of 
the Declaration with approval, but hastens to add that ‘the amount of destruction or of 
suffering which may be caused is immaterial if the result obtained is conceived to be 
proportionate’.246 James Spaight accepts that the end of war is the disabling of the greatest 
possible number of men, but in the same breath recalls that ‘[k]illing, of course, is not 
forbidden by war law; neither custom nor convention prohibits the rifleman from aiming 
at his enemy’s heart and brain; such a prohibition would not be practical politics’.247 In the 
Shimoda case, which assessed the legality of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki under 
the law of armed conflict, the Tokyo District Court cited the St Petersburg Declaration as 
authority for the unnecessary suffering rule.248 The International Court of Justice did the 
same in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.249 However, despite the fact that nuclear 
weapons are a prime example of weapons that render death inevitable, neither court 
invoked this principle in its reasoning.250 Doctrinal publications often adopt the same 
approach and cite the St Petersburg Declaration solely as authority for the prohibition of 
unnecessary suffering.251 
 Professor Goodman’s argument rests largely on the support expressed for the LRM 
principle in connection with the drafting of the Additional Protocols, including by the 
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ICRC252 and by some of the experts and government representatives studying the use of 
certain conventional weapons at meetings held in parallel with the main diplomatic 
conference.253 However, contrary to what Goodman suggests,254 these expressions of 
support do not prove that article 35 of Additional Protocol I was meant to codify the LRM 
principle. The draft version of article 35 prepared by the ICRC prohibited the use of 
‘weapons, projectiles, substances, methods and means which uselessly aggravate the 
sufferings of disabled adversaries or render their death inevitable in all circumstances’.255 As the 
ICRC explained, the draft was based on the notion, expressed in the St Petersburg 
Declaration, that it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men in order to 
weaken the forces of the enemy.256 While government representatives expressed support 
for the unnecessary suffering rule, no delegation explicitly embraced the proposed 
prohibition of means and methods of warfare that render death inevitable.257 In fact, several 
amendments put forward by the negotiating States omitted this prohibition from the scope 
of the draft rule.258 In this respect, the UK representative declared that it was preferable to 
follow, as the UK had done in its manual on The Law of War on Land of 1958,259 the Hague 
Regulations of 1907, which he suggested reflected customary international law, rather than 
the broader formulation of the St Petersburg Declaration.260 This was not an isolated view. 
The Brazilian delegate believed that the draft of article 35 ‘should be limited to the general 
rules related to the prohibition of unnecessary injuries’,261 while the Australian delegate 
questioned in more general terms whether the ICRC text accurately reflected what he 
thought was the more limited scope of the existing law.262 These objections carried the day, 
for article 35 of Additional Protocol I omits any reference to means and methods of warfare 
that render death inevitable. In so far as Additional Protocol I confirms the St Petersburg 
Declaration, it confirms the unnecessary suffering rule only.263 
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 While the LRM principle enjoys a measure of support in international practice,264 this 
support carries considerably less weight than what Professor Goodman suggests. Even 
proponents of the principle were prone to describe it as a ‘philosophy’ rather than as a rule 
of law.265 As we have seen earlier, the prohibition of denying quarter and the duty to spare 
hors de combat enemies are justified at least in part with reference to the principle of 
necessity.266 However, except as embodied in such specific rules, the law of armed conflict 
does not subject the killing of lawful targets to a necessity or proportionality requirement. 
On the contrary, it recognises that certain acts, including the destruction of enemies liable 
to direct attack, are inherently necessary and therefore legitimate in warfare.267 Far from 
codifying a general prohibition of unnecessary killing, the drafting history of Additional 
Protocol I demonstrates that the negotiating States rejected the idea that means and 
methods of warfare which render death inevitable should be prohibited.268 This is consistent 
with earlier rejections of the St Petersburg Declaration’s far-reaching implications.269  
 The fact that it is permissible to employ means and methods of warfare against enemies 
liable to attack that render their death inevitable leaves no room for the LRM principle. The 
law cannot permit belligerents to expose lawful targets to inevitable death, but at the same 
time insist that any harm inflicted upon them must be kept to a minimum. Since the law of 
armed conflict does not constrain the level of direct harm that may be caused to enemy 
personnel in the employment of lawful means and methods of warfare, it would be absurd 
to protect them from incidental harm by extending proportionality stricto sensu to them. 
Accordingly, only enemy personnel who are not liable to direct attack may, in principle, 
benefit from the proportionality rule.  
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B. Enemy personnel not liable to direct attack 
We now turn to the categories of enemy personnel who enjoy immunity from direct attack. 
They include non-combatant members of enemy armed forces, that is military medical 
personnel and chaplains, as well as enemy combatants and members of organised armed 
groups who benefit from certain special protections due to their specific function or 
circumstances.  
 
1. Military medical personnel, chaplains and auxiliary medical personnel 
Military medical personnel are members of an adversary’s armed forces who are assigned 
by the Party to the conflict to which they belong to engage exclusively in the search for the 
wounded or sick, in their collection, transport or treatment, in the prevention of disease or 
in the administration of medical units and establishments.270 Military chaplains are members 
of an adversary’s armed forces who are attached to those forces and assigned by the Party 
to the conflict to which they belong to serve exclusively in a religious function.271 In both 
cases, the assignments may be temporary or permanent.272 Auxiliary medical personnel are 
those members of an adversary’s armed forces who are specially trained for employment as 
hospital orderlies, nurses or auxiliary stretcher-bearers in the search for or the collection, 
transport or treatment of the wounded and sick.273 
 Military medical personnel and chaplains must be ‘respected and protected’ in all 
circumstances.274 Auxiliary medical personnel must likewise be ‘respected and protected’, 
but only if they are carrying out their duties at the time when they come into contact with 
the enemy or fall into its hands.275 At a minimum, the duty to ‘respect and protect’ entails 
an obligation not to make these three categories of personnel the subject of direct attack, 
unless they commit acts harmful to the enemy outside their humanitarian functions.276 
Military medical personnel and chaplains also benefit from a range of additional privileges, 
facilities and protections,277 for instance the benefits due to prisoners of war, should they 
be retained by an adverse Party.278 However, these additional protections do not affect their 
position for the purposes of the proportionality rule and therefore are not relevant here. 
Article 9 of Additional Protocol II provides that ‘[m]edical and religious personnel shall be 
respected and protected and shall be granted all available help for the performance of their 
duties’. Accordingly, medical and religious personnel are immune from direct attack in non-
international armed conflict as well.279 
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2. Religious, medical and hospital personnel of hospital ships and their crews 
The religious, medical and hospital personnel of hospital ships and their crews must be 
respected and protected under the Second Geneva Convention.280 The words ‘religious, 
medical and hospital personnel’ are not defined in the Convention. They are, however, 
broad in scope and so include medical personnel exclusively engaged in the treatment of 
the wounded or sick, technical personnel in charge of the upkeep of medical equipment 
and anyone else who works on or helps operate a hospital ship.281 The religious personnel 
of hospital ships should be seen as akin to chaplains under the First Geneva Convention.282 
The protection afforded these individuals essentially mirrors that provided to religious and 
medical personnel under the First Geneva Convention.283 The religious, medical and 
hospital personnel of hospital ships and their crews may not, therefore, be the subject of 
direct attack, unless they commit acts harmful to the enemy outside their humanitarian 
functions.284 
 As we have already noted, the effect of article 9 of Additional Protocol II is that 
‘medical and religious personnel’ are immune from direct attack in non-international armed 
conflict. Additional Protocol II does not define ‘medical and religious personnel’, but the 
definitions set out in article 8(c) of Additional Protocol I, which encompasses the medical 
personnel of hospital ships, can be applied mutatis mutandis.285 
 
3. Parlementaires 
A person is regarded as a parlementaire when authorised by a belligerent to enter into 
communication with an opposing belligerent, generally under a flag of truce.286 Parlementaires 
are, therefore, individuals designated by a commander to negotiate with enemy forces over 
matters such as surrenders, cease-fires or casualty collection.287 In contemporary conflicts, 
such negotiations are likely to be conducted via radio or similar means of communication. 
However, more traditional methods for communication between commanders remain 
relevant. For example, during the battle for Goose Green in the Falklands War, the British 
forces area commander sent an individual under a flag of truce to call upon his Argentine 
opposite to surrender.288  
 Article 32 of the Hague Regulations declares that a parlementaire ‘has a right to 
inviolability’. That same provision also provides that any trumpeter, bugler, drummer, flag-
bearer or interpreter accompanying a parlementaire must not be made the object of attack 
too. The UK Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict clarifies that in modern warfare this 
protection from direct attack would extend, more realistically, to any driver, radio operator 
or interpreter accompanying a parlementaire and thus travelling under the protection of a flag 
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of truce.289 Under the Hague Regulations, a parlementaire and his party will lose their 
inviolability if it is proved, in a clear and incontestable manner, that he or she has taken 
advantage of their privileged position to commit an ‘act of treason’.290 Such an abuse could 
take the form of taking photographs of defensive positions or secretly gathering 
information.291 It should also be recalled that feigning an intent to negotiate under a flag of 
truce is a perfidious act292 that would amount to a grave breach of Additional Protocol I if 
committed wilfully and caused serious injury or death.293 
 
4. Parachutists descending from an aircraft in distress 
A person parachuting from an aircraft in distress is protected from direct attack during the 
period of their descent,294 provided they do not engage in a hostile act.295 The ICRC,296 
military manuals297 and many commentators298 consider parachutists descending from an 
aircraft in distress as a specific case of persons temporarily placed hors de combat. The better 
view, however, is to treat enemy combatants parachuting in distress as a distinct class of 
protected personnel. This is so not only because Additional Protocol I deals with such 
persons separately from those who are hors de combat,299 but also because not all individuals 
parachuting from an aircraft in distress are protected. Airborne troops, including 
paratroopers and special forces, are expressly denied the benefit of protection during their 
descent from an aircraft,300 regardless of whether they are parachuting in distress and 
whether they refrain from any hostile act.301 This suggests that the mere predicament of 
jumping from an aircraft in distress does not render an enemy combatant hors de combat 
within the meaning of article 41 of Additional Protocol I. Parachutists protected during 
their descent must first be given an opportunity to surrender before being made the object 
of attack, provided they have reached the ground in territory controlled by an adverse Party 
and unless it is apparent that they are engaging in hostile act.302 
 
5. Military civil defence personnel 
Civil defence personnel are persons assigned by a party to the conflict exclusively to the 
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performance of civil defence tasks, such as evacuation, fire-fighting or decontamination,303 
or to the administration of civil defence organisations.304 This definition includes not just 
civilians, but also members of the armed forces permanently assigned and exclusively 
devoted to civil defence tasks.305 Provided that these members of the armed forces do not 
perform any other military duties during the conflict and fulfil certain additional conditions, 
they are to be respected and protected.306 As in other cases, this duty to ‘respect and protect’ 
implies that military civil defence personnel are not liable to direct attack.307 Although the 
United States supports the principle that civilian civil defence personnel shall be respected 
and protected, it does not accept that the provisions of Additional Protocol I on civil 
defence reflect customary international law.308 The Department of Defense Law of War 
Manual suggests that these provisions ‘may be understood not to preclude an attack on an 
otherwise lawful military objective’.309 Given that military personnel permanently assigned 
and exclusively devoted to civil defence tasks are lawful military objectives were it not for 
the provisions of Additional Protocol I, the Manual appears to suggest that military civil 
defence personnel do not benefit from a protected status under customary international 
law. If this position is correct,310 such personnel would remain liable to direct attack and 
thus could not be subject to the proportionality rule as a matter of customary international 
law. 
Additional Protocol II makes no express reference to civil defence. Some have 
argued that permitting direct attacks against military civil defence personnel in non-
international armed conflicts would run counter to the principle of distinction, assuming 
that such personnel are assigned to civil defence duties permanently and are prohibited 
from directly participating in hostilities.311 Professor Dinstein offers an alternative view 
when he asserts that the decision of the negotiating parties not to include the subject of 
civil defence among the provisions of Additional Protocol II demonstrates its ‘palpable 
irrelevance’ in the context of non-international armed conflict.312 Regrettably, the ICRC’s 
study on customary international humanitarian law does not address the matter.313 The 
position of customary international law on military civil defence personnel in non-
international armed conflict thus remains unclear. 
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6. Persons hors de combat 
Pursuant to article 41(1) of Additional Protocol I, a ‘person who is recognized or who, in 
the circumstances, should be recognized to be ‘hors de combat’ shall not be made the object 
of attack’. This prohibition is well-established and forms part of the customary law 
applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts.314 Article 41(2) of 
Additional Protocol provides that a person is hors de combat if that individual is (a) in the 
power of an adverse Party; (b) clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or (c) has been 
rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is 
incapable of defending himself. In all three cases, the individual concerned does not qualify 
as hors de combat unless he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape. 
Despite this detailed definition, the personal scope of the rule is not fully settled. 
 It was common ground in the lead-up to the diplomatic conference on the Additional 
Protocols that the definition of hors de combat would benefit from certain clarifications.315 
Proposals to expand its scope were also made. Under the Hague Regulations, enemies who 
exhausted their means of defence did not qualify as hors de combat, unless they surrendered.316 
In his second report on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, the United Nations 
Secretary-General proposed that the rule should be extended to combatants who have not 
surrendered, but who ‘obviously’ no longer have any weapons.317 The ICRC suggested that 
the rule could be given more ‘specific content’318 and distinguished between three situations 
in this respect.319 First, it submitted that enemy combatants may become hors de combat in 
cases of ‘automatic surrender’ where all resistance has come to an end or where they lie 
wounded in the field. Second, they may become hors de combat by clearly indicating their 
intention to surrender. Third, an armed force may become hors de combat in a case of 
‘circumstantial surrender’ where it is reduced to actual powerlessness by being outclassed 
by its adversary. In line with this broader approach, the ICRC removed surrender as a 
condition from the definition of hors de combat in its 1973 draft of the Additional Protocols.320 
Under the draft, an enemy combatant could thus qualify as hors de combat either on an 
objective basis after having lost his means of combat or on a subjective basis after having 
clearly indicated his intention to surrender.321 
 At the diplomatic conference, much of the debate among government representatives 
was concerned with the dividing line between hors de combat and prisoners of war status.322 
Some delegations argued that an hors de combat enemy could be within the hands of an 
adversary without being a prisoner of war. In their view, it was therefore necessary to 
confirm that such persons were protected from torture and ill-treatment.323 Other 
delegations argued that as soon as a person came within the hands of an adversary, he was 
entitled to prisoner of war status and immediately protected by the Third Geneva 
Convention. In their view, it was inappropriate to include enemy combatants who have 
fallen into the hands of the enemy within the definition of hors de combat and to reiterate the 
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prohibition of torture and ill-treatment in this context.324 Article 41(2) of Additional 
Protocol I attempts to reconcile these two opposing positions by including combatants who 
have fallen into the hands of the enemy within the definition of hors de combat, but leaving 
to other provisions their protection from mistreatment.325 
 Nevertheless, the wording of article 41(2) is ambiguous. Subparagraph (a) refers to 
persons who are ‘in the power’ of an adverse Party. On a narrow reading, this phrase may 
be understood to refer to persons within the physical custody of an adversary.326 However, 
as the ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols points out,327 being ‘in the power’ is 
not necessarily the same as having ‘fallen into the hands’ of the enemy for the purposes of 
the Third Geneva Convention.328 The meaning of ‘in the power’ appears to be wider than 
being in physical custody. On this reading of article 41(2)(a), an enemy may qualify as hors 
de combat even where he has not surrendered, is not incapacitated or has not been 
apprehended. By way of illustration, the ICRC Commentary suggests that an attack by air 
assets may bring ground troops within their power, while ‘land forces might have the 
adversary at their mercy by means of overwhelmingly superior firing power to the point 
where they can force the adversary to cease combat’.329 If the interpretation advanced in the 
ICRC Commentary is correct, combatants who have lost their means of defence or face 
overwhelming firepower would be immune from direct attack. This could potentially also 
bring them within the scope of an expanded proportionality rule. 
 Regrettably, the negotiating history of article 41 sheds only limited light on the meaning 
of the phrase ‘in the power’. Delegations at the diplomatic conference agreed to move 
beyond article 23(c) of the Hague Regulations by recognising enemy combatants 
incapacitated by their injuries as hors de combat, whether or not they had surrendered. 
However, beyond this point, it is difficult to identify a shared position. A few negotiating 
States supported the idea that defenceless combatants should be recognised as hors de 
combat.330 Other delegations rejected this and proposed to limit the definition to combatants 
who have either surrendered or become incapacitated.331 However, the fact that 
disagreement among the delegations centred on whether the concept of hors de combat 
included detainees suggests that the phrase ‘in the power’ must be interpreted in this light. 
A report by Committee III confirmed this link in express terms and explained that the 
definition of hors de combat adopted by the negotiating States was designed to include 
‘persons who had already fallen into the power of the enemy’.332 This suggests that article 
41(2)(a) should be understood to refer to persons who have either been apprehended or 
who, as a minimum, are liable to physical apprehension,333 even if this means construing the 
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phrase ‘in the power’ more narrowly for the purposes of the hors de combat rule334 than in the 
context of other provisions of Additional Protocol I.335  
 A number of military manuals make clear that a person is ‘in the power’ of an adversary 
if that individual has been apprehended or is subject to control.336 The majority of expert 
opinion supports this approach.337 It is also worth noting that the ICRC study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law declares it to be ‘uncontested that a person who is in the 
power of an adverse party is hors de combat’.338 This statement is unproblematic if it was meant 
to refer to persons who have fallen into the hands of the adversary, but it is clearly not 
accurate if it was meant to suggest that States regard enemy combatants who have exhausted 
their means of combat to be hors de combat. This is simply not the case.339 Indeed, such a rule 
would not be viable. Some forces have weapons at their disposal against which their 
adversaries have no effective means of defence. For example, if the ICRC Commentary is 
taken literally, all surviving enemy aircrews confronting a state that has achieved complete 
air superiority may have to be considered hors de combat.340 This is divorced from reality and 
nothing in the negotiation of Additional Protocol I or in state practice suggests that it 
reflects the law.341 Accordingly, article 41(1)(a) should be understood to apply to those 
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Conflict, § 608 (equating ‘in the power’ with being a prisoner); DoD, Law of War Manual (December 
2016), § 5.9.2 (equating persons ‘in the power’ with detainees). 
337.  Eg F Kalshoven and L Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International 
Humanitarian Law (4th edn, CUP 2011) 97; Corn and others, ‘Belligerent Targeting’, 586–88; Schmitt, 
‘Wound, Capture, or Kill’, 860; Dinstein, Conduct of Hostilities, 190, para 507; WJ Fenrick, ‘Methods of 
Land Warfare’, in Liivoja and McCormack (eds), Routledge Handbook of the Law of Armed Conflict, 251, 253; 
J Dill, ‘Just War Theory in Times of Individual Rights’, in C Brown and R Eckersley (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Political Theory (OUP 2018) 221, 222. See also Ohlin and May, Necessity, 217. 
338.  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol I, 166. 
339.  Eg Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol II, § 350, 963 (‘[t]he 
opinio juris of the United States is that quarter must not be refused to an enemy who communicates an 
offer to surrender under circumstances permitting that offer to be understood and acted upon by US 
forces. A combatant who appears merely incapable or unwilling to fight, eg, because he has lost his 
weapon or is retreating from the battle, but who has not communicated an offer to surrender, is still 
subject to attack’). 
340.  Eg air crews and other military personnel defending an air base with weapons that are completely 
ineffective against superior air-delivered missiles would thus be hors de combat. 
341.  See also Henderson, Contemporary Law of Targeting, 85 (‘combatant is not hors de combat merely due to 
being no longer capable of offering effective resistance’). In support of its position, Sandoz, Swinarski 
and Zimmermann, Commentary, para 1612 observe that ‘a formal surrender is not always realistically 
possible, as the rules of some armies purely and simply prohibit any form of surrender, even when all 
means of defence have been exhausted’. However, nothing in the law of armed conflict compels a 
 
enemy combatants who have fallen into the hands of the enemy as a consequence of having 
been apprehended or becoming liable to apprehension. 
 In practice, cases involving incidental damage to hors de combat enemies who are in the 
power of an adverse party or who have expressed an intention to surrender are likely to be 
less frequent than cases involving persons who have been rendered unconscious or are 
otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and who are therefore incapable of 
defending themselves. Examples falling into the first category may include situations where 
a detaining power uses armed force against certain detainees who are rioting or attempting 
to escape and in doing so causes incidental harm to other detainees.342 Cases in the second 
category may include situations where enemy combatants in the process of surrendering are 
injured as a result of attacks directed against other adversaries who have not laid down their 
arms. By contrast, cases involving incidental damage to enemy combatants who are 
incapacitated by their injuries are likely to occur in a wide range of battlefield scenarios, in 
particular where a specific target is subject to repeated attacks, as in the example we offered 
in the introduction to this paper.   
 
7. Wounded, sick and shipwrecked 
The protection of wounded and sick enemy combatants has been at the heart of the modern 
law of armed conflict.343 Today, the relevant protections are found in the Geneva 
Conventions, as complemented by Additional Protocols I and II. Pursuant to articles 12 of 
the First and Second Geneva Conventions, wounded, sick or shipwrecked members of the 
armed forces, other militias and volunteer corps of a party to the conflict, as well as 
members of levées en masse, must be ‘respected and protected in all circumstances’. Article 
7(1) of Additional Protocol II extends the duty to ‘respect and protect’ to all the wounded, 
sick and shipwrecked in non-international armed conflicts.344 
 Neither the First nor the Second Geneva Convention defines when a person is to be 
considered wounded, sick or shipwrecked. Reference should therefore be made to article 8 
of Additional Protocol I, which defines ‘wounded and sick’ to mean persons ‘who, because 
of trauma, disease or other physical or mental disorder or disability, are in need of medical 
assistance or care and who refrain from any act of hostility’ and ‘shipwrecked’ to mean 
individuals ‘who are in peril at sea or in other waters as a result of misfortune affecting them 
or the vessel or aircraft carrying them and who refrain from any act of hostility’.345 As the 
ICRC’s new Commentaries to the First and Second Convention point out,346 it would be 
wrong to restrict the definition of wounded and sick only to those enemies whose medical 
condition is of such severity as to render them physically incapable of fighting.347 This would 
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impose a duty of care on belligerents only in relation to enemy combatants who are hors de 
combat due to injury,348 but would absolve them from providing any medical assistance or 
care to enemy personnel in their power who suffer from less serious ailments. Such a 
restrictive interpretation cannot be reconciled with the terms of the Geneva Conventions.349 
The notion of ‘wounded’ and ‘sick’ therefore should not be interpreted narrowly.350 
Nevertheless, the decisive factor under article 8 of Additional Protocol I is whether a person 
suffering from wounds or sickness is ‘in need’ of medical assistance or care.351 A number of 
delegations at the diplomatic conference expressed their understanding that this 
requirement excluded trivial injuries.352 It is therefore misleading for the ICRC Commentary 
to assert that ‘any medical condition requiring care, no matter the severity, suffices to trigger 
the application’ of articles 12 of the First and Second Geneva Conventions.353 Rather, it is 
any medical condition of such severity as to render a person ‘in need’ of medical assistance 
or care that suffices to trigger the application of the Conventions. 
 Even with the exclusion of trivial injuries, the Geneva Conventions’ scope of 
application remains broad. This presents certain difficulties. The duty to ‘respect and 
protect’ wounded, sick or shipwrecked enemy combatants entails, as a minimum, an 
obligation not to subject them to direct attack.354 However, no express exception is made 
in the Geneva Conventions for enemy combatants who continue to participate in hostilities 
despite their wounds, sickness or shipwrecked position. It would be bizarre if such enemies 
had to be respected and protected. Article 8 of Additional Protocol I addresses the matter 
by stipulating that only persons ‘who refrain from any act of hostility’ qualify as wounded, 
sick or shipwrecked. Although not a particularly elegant solution,355 article 8 thus confirms 
that injured enemy combatants who engage in hostile acts remain liable to attack. The ICRC 
Commentary suggests that this limitation should be regarded as implicit in the Geneva 
Conventions. This not only reflects common sense, but also the fact that other protected 
enemy personnel, including hors de combat combatants, prisoners of war and military medical 
personnel,356 forfeit their protected status or their special protections if they engage in 
hostile acts or attempt to escape. 
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 In this context, the ICRC Commentary states that it would be ‘unrealistic and 
impossible’ to interpret the law so that ‘every combatant who is in need of medical care 
would automatically be entitled to be respected and protected and could thus no longer 
lawfully be attacked’.357 The Commentary therefore suggests that enemy personnel who are 
being treated in medical establishments and who do not engage in hostile acts may qualify 
as wounded or sick, while combatants who have resumed their normal military duties do 
not so qualify, even if they are still be in need of medical assistance or care.358 This is an 
eminently sensible interpretation of the law. It implies, as the Commentary points out,359 
that the primary, though not exclusive, factor that attacking forces may rely on in order to 
distinguish between combatants who qualify as wounded or sick and those who do not 
qualify is the fact that the former are being treated in a medical facility. In other words, 
enemy combatants should be presumed to be wounded or sick if they are receiving 
treatment inside medical facilities. 
 This still leaves open the question under what conditions enemy combatants are 
entitled to protection outside medical facilities, in particular when they are injured during 
active combat. At least two aspects of such a situation are clear from doubt. If a combatant 
injured during active fighting does not refrain from acts of hostility, he will not qualify as 
wounded or sick in the legal sense and will not enjoy immunity from further attack. By 
contrast, if his injuries render him unconscious or otherwise incapacitate him, so that he is 
incapable of defending himself, he will qualify as hors de combat and must not be made the 
object of direct attack. However, what is the position of enemy combatants who do not 
visibly engage in acts of hostility and whose injuries are not such as to render them incapable 
of defending themselves? Similarly, what is the position of enemy combatants whose 
physical condition cannot be verified by the attacking force? The ICRC Commentary 
answers these questions by declaring that ‘those who have the task of determining a person’s 
status on the battlefield, may not proceed with an attack if they recognize or would have 
reason to believe that a person is wounded or sick’.360 This position is not quite correct. 
 The law of armed conflict imposes different precautionary duties at different stages of 
an attack.361 Before launching an attack, those who plan or decide upon it must do 
everything feasible to verify that, amongst other things, the target to be engaged is not 
subject to special protections, but constitutes a military objective liable to attack.362 The fact 
that there is reason to believe that the attack will affect wounded or sick enemy combatants 
does not in any way increase the scope of the duty to do everything feasible to verify the 
target.363 Nor does it prevent those who plan or decide upon the attack from proceeding to 
launch it, provided they have in fact done everything ‘practical or practically possible’364 to 
verify the status of the target. It makes no difference in this respect whether the attack 
prosecutes a new target or re-engages one that has been attacked before: the duty to verify 
its status is the same. Once an attack has been launched, those who execute it are not subject 
to a separate duty to verify the target, but instead must cancel or suspend the ongoing attack 
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‘if it becomes apparent’ that, amongst other things, the target benefits from special 
protection.365 Firing a rifle at an advancing soldier, dropping a 1,000 lbs bomb on an enemy 
dugout or releasing a missile against a hostile pick-up truck should give most reasonable 
observes grounds to believe that the persons targeted will have sustained some injury. If 
this ‘reason to believe’ were sufficient to trigger the duty to cancel or suspend the attack, 
attacking forces would have to grind to a halt in order to establish the status of their target 
immediately after they have fired the first bullet, dropped the first bomb or released the 
first missile. Using a rifle in burst mode would be unlawful, as would dropping two bombs 
in succession or switching from missile to cannon fire in one continuous engagement. This 
approach does not reflect the law. As the ICRC Commentary concedes, during combat, the 
fact that ‘a combatant is wounded or sick must be visible or have some outward 
manifestation such that an opposing combatant is able to be aware of it’.366 An attack must 
be cancelled or suspended only if the protected status of the target ‘becomes apparent’ on 
the basis of observable, external factors, rather than on the basis of a mere ‘reason to 
believe’.367 This conclusion finds support in the fact that hors de combat enemy personnel are 
entitled to protection either when their protected status has in fact been recognised or when 
it should be recognised by a reasonable person based on their actual circumstances.368 The 
same standard should apply to the wounded and sick. 
 However, the scope of the duty to ‘respect and protect’ wounded or sick enemy 
personnel must be interpreted and applied consistently with the hors de combat rule. As we 
saw earlier, pursuant to article 41(2)(c) of Additional Protocol I, a combatant is no longer 
liable to direct attack if he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by 
wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself.369 Whilst different 
standards of protection applicable on the basis of distinct rationales may accumulate,370 in 
the present case, articles 12 of the First and Second Geneva Conventions and article 41(2)(c) 
of Additional Protocol I are concerned with the same matter and motivated by the same 
rationale: restricting the liability of enemy combatants to harm on the basis of their medical 
condition. Interpreting the duty to ‘respect and protect’ so as to confer immunity from 
attack upon all wounded or sick enemy combatants would render article 41(2)(c) of 
Additional Protocol I redundant: why should this provision prohibit attacks against enemy 
combatants rendered unconscious or otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, if all 
wounded and sick enemy combatants are immune from attack already? As Judge Hsu Mo 
pointed out in his dissenting opinion in the Ambatielos case, ‘[i]t is a well-recognized principle 
of interpretation that a specific provision prevails over a general provision’.371 In the present 
context, the hors de combat rule is the more specific provision, as it is specifically designed to 
deal with a wounded or sick combatant’s liability to direct attack, whereas the ‘respect and 
protect’ rule is wider in scope and addresses their liability to attack only implicitly. 
Accordingly, the duty to ‘respect and protect’ the wounded or sick under articles 12 of the 
First and Second Geneva Conventions must be interpreted in such a way that it does not 
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render enemy combatants outside medical facilities immune from direct attack unless they 
are unconscious or otherwise incapacitated by their wounds or sickness, and therefore 
incapable of defending themselves. In our experience, state practice endorses such a 
conclusion.372 
 Wounded or sick members of hostile armed forces or groups are thus protected from 
direct attack on the basis of their medical condition if they are receiving medical assistance 
or care in a medical facility without having resumed their normal military duties or if they 
are unconscious or otherwise incapacitated by their wounds or sickness, and therefore 
incapable of defending themselves, and their condition has become apparent to the 
attacking force or should have been recognised in the circumstances.373 Since in these cases 
enemy combatants are protected from direct harm, there is no reason why they could not 
be included, in principle, in the calculation of incidental harm under an extended 
proportionality rule. 
V. EXTENDING PROPORTIONALITY TO NON-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 
Most commentators accept that the proportionality rule, as codified in Additional Protocol 
I and reflected in customary international law, is limited to civilian harm. Bill Boothby, 
Yoram Dinstein and Ian Henderson take this view,374 amongst others.375 However, several 
authors support the extension of the proportionality rule to military objectives benefitting 
from special protection by analogy. Professor Dinstein, for example, adopts this position 
and suggests that specially protected military objectives should be assimilated to civilians or 
civilian objects.376 Bill Boothby and Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg suggest that a powerful 
argument can be made in favour of interpreting the rule to encompass incidental harm to 
protected enemy personnel.377 Others have gone further.378 Laurent Gisel, a legal advisor at 
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the ICRC, has argued that incidental harm caused to military medical personnel and 
wounded and sick combatants falls within the scope of the proportionality rule, properly 
construed, under both Additional Protocol I and customary international law.379 This 
reflects the position of the ICRC itself. In its view, ‘any assessment of the expected 
incidental harm under the rule of proportionality must take into account potential harm 
among all medical personnel and objects, including military medical ones’.380  
 The purpose of this section is to review the principal legal arguments that have been 
advanced in support of extending the proportionality rule to non-civilian harm. For the 
reasons we explain below, none of these arguments are convincing. Faced with this 
outcome, we revisit the liability of protected enemy personnel to incidental harm in order 
to clarify its legal basis and limits. We suggest that such personnel are liable to incidental 
injury as a consequence of attacks carried out against lawful military objectives, but that 
such harm must be justified with reference to the principle of military necessity. We believe 
that this approach offers a legally and intellectually more compelling rationale for applying 
proportionality considerations to enemy personnel benefiting from special protections. 
A. Arguments advanced in favour of extending the proportionality rule 
 
1. The object and purpose of Additional Protocol I 
Relying on the law of treaties, Laurent Gisel has suggested that the rules governing the 
conduct of hostilities must take into account incidental harm suffered by all persons 
protected against direct attack, irrespective of their military or civilian status, as any other 
interpretation would contradict the object and purpose of Additional Protocol I.381 This 
argument raises both methodological and substantive questions. The interpretation of 
Additional Protocol I is governed by the rules of treaty interpretation codified in articles 31 
and 32 of the VCLT. Despite combining elements drawn from different schools of 
interpretation,382 the starting point and ultimate object of interpretation is the actual text of 
a treaty. This is reflected in the general rule of interpretation set out in article 31 of the 
VCLT, which stipulates that a treaty is to be construed ‘in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose’. The interpretation of a treaty’s terms thus takes priority over 
other, subsidiary means of interpretation.383 As the International Court of Justice explained 
in the Admission of a State to the United Nations case, 
 
[i]f the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the 
matter. If, on the other hand, the words in their natural and ordinary meaning are ambiguous or lead to an 
unreasonable result, then, and then only, must the Court, by resort to other methods of interpretation, seek 
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to ascertain what the parties really did mean when they used these words.384 
 
Recourse to the object and purpose of a treaty is not one of the ‘other methods of 
interpretation’ mentioned by the Court but forms an integral part of ascertaining the 
meaning of its terms under the general rule of interpretation. The relationship between the 
ordinary meaning of a treaty’s terms and its object and purpose is therefore complementary, 
rather than hierarchical. Precisely for this reason, one may not override the other. An 
interpretation that construes the terms of a treaty in a manner that contradicts its object 
and purpose is difficult to sustain.385 Similarly, appeals to a treaty’s object and purpose 
cannot supersede the express meaning of its terms.386 As we have seen earlier,387 the meaning 
of articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I is free from ambiguity: 
the scope of the proportionality rule is confined to civilian harm and does not extend to 
collateral damage caused to military personnel and other military objectives. We have also 
seen that this meaning is consistent with the traditional scope of the rule and is confirmed 
by the drafting history of Additional Protocol I. Under these circumstances, relying on the 
object and purpose of the Protocol to extend the scope of articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 
57(2)(b) to non-civilian harm contradicts the express meaning of these provisions as well as 
the intentions of its drafters. Such a purposive reading would represent a revision, rather 
than an interpretation, of Additional Protocol I.388 
 Even if relying on the object and purpose of Additional Protocol I in the manner 
suggested by Gisel were permissible under the rules of treaty interpretation, it is 
questionable whether they actually support his argument. Determining the object and 
purpose of a treaty is a notoriously difficult undertaking.389 In the case of the founding 
treaties of the law of armed conflict, there is a tendency to assume that their object and 
purpose is to maximise the protection of persons adversely affected by war.390 
Humanitarianism is certainly one of the principal drivers of the law, but it is not its sole 
concern or priority. If it were, the founding treaties would have proscribed all war. Instead, 
they regulate the conduct of warfare in an attempt to confine it within certain boundaries. 
The proportionality rule itself illustrates this point.391 Gisel is therefore right to suggest that 
the object and purpose of the rules governing the conduct of hostilities, including 
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proportionality stricto sensu, is to find an ‘appropriate balance between the principles of 
military necessity and humanity’.392 Indeed, it is not unreasonable to treat this as the object 
and purpose of Additional Protocol I more generally.393 However, this means that a re-
interpretation of the proportionality rule to expand its scope with reference to the object 
and purpose of Additional Protocol I is actually a non sequitur.  
 The purpose of the conventional law of armed conflict is, in the words of the St 
Petersburg Declaration, to fix the ‘limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to 
the requirements of humanity’.394 The terms of Additional Protocol I reflect whatever the 
negotiating States decided was the appropriate balance between military necessity and 
humanity. Relying on the object and purpose of Additional Protocol I to alter that balance 
defeats the very idea of codifying it in the first place and arrogates a law-making function 
to those who are meant to interpret and apply the law. Moreover, even if recourse is made 
to the object and purpose solely to guide the interpretation of ambiguous terms—rather 
than to override the meaning of clear provisions, as is the case here—it does not follow 
that such ambiguities must be resolved in favour of humanitarian considerations at the 
expense of military necessity. Such a bias contradicts the idea that the object and purpose 
of Additional Protocol I is to strike a balance between military necessity and humanity.  
 Nevertheless, Gisel suggests that excluding military medical personnel and wounded 
and sick combatants from the proportionality calculation would introduce an arbitrary 
distinction into the rules governing that conduct of hostilities.395 This is so, we are told, 
because civilian and military medical personnel and civilian and military wounded and sick 
are immune from direct attack irrespective of their civilian or military status and therefore 
can be said to have the same ‘value’ under the principles of military necessity and humanity. 
Consequently, limiting the proportionality rule to civilian harm would distinguish between 
these persons on the basis of their civilian or military status, which Gisel suggests would be 
arbitrary in relation to the object and purpose of finding an appropriate balance between 
military necessity and humanity.396 This argument rests on a false premise. If it was for the 
drafters of Additional Protocol I to determine where the appropriate balance between 
military necessity and humanity lies, then by definition the balance drawn by the individual 
provisions of Additional Protocol I cannot be inappropriate and thus arbitrary.397 
 In this respect, it is important to recognise that the law does not accord the same value 
to civilian and military medical personnel and to civilian and military wounded and sick. 
Civilians enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations,398 yet 
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this does not confer upon them absolute immunity against the effects of warfare.399 In 
particular, the general protection conferred upon them includes the proportionality rule, 
meaning that civilians are protected against incidental harm only if it is excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Causing non-excessive incidental 
harm to civilians is therefore permissible not because it is an exception to the general 
protection they enjoy against the dangers of military operations, but because civilians are 
not protected against such harm in the first place.400 By contrast, any immunity that specially 
protected members of enemy forces enjoy from direct and indirect harm constitutes an 
exception to their general liability to attack and collateral damage. The two sets of 
protections are based on completely different rationales. Civilian medical personnel and 
wounded and sick civilians are protected against excessive incidental harm as a result of 
their general protection by virtue of being civilians, not by virtue of being medical personnel 
or being wounded or sick.401 Consequently, there is no reason why members of the armed 
forces that qualify as medical personnel, wounded or sick should enjoy the same protections 
that civilians derive on the basis of their civilian status. It is not arbitrary to confer different 
levels of protection on civilians and military personnel finding themselves in comparable 
situations, and thus weigh military necessity and humanity differently, precisely because the 
underlying status of these two categories of persons is and remains different. 
 
2. The general principle of proportionality 
Behind the specific rules of the law of armed conflict we find, as Jean Pictet has put it, ‘a 
number of principles which inspire the entire substance’ of the law.402 Proportionality is 
widely regarded as one of these principles.403 Some have relied on proportionality as a 
general principle to suggest that belligerents must take into account collateral damage 
suffered by specially protected military personnel and objectives when calculating the 
proportionality of an attack. In their commentary to Additional Protocol I, Bothe, Partsch 
and Solf argue that proportionality as a general principle of the law of armed conflict is not 
restricted to the protection of the civilian population.404 They suggest that for this reason, 
collateral damage caused to military medical units is subject to a proportionality 
requirement. Similarly, Rogier Bartels has argued that proportionality as a general principle 
is broader in its scope than the proportionality rule codified in Additional Protocol I. In his 
view, the ‘principle underlying articles 52 and 57 of Additional Protocol I’ applies to attacks 
that cause excessive collateral damage to protected military personnel.405 
 This line of argument is not convincing. According to Bothe, Partsch and Solf, the 
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principle of proportionality applies to incidental harm caused to military medical units 
because ‘the rules which protect the civilian population against such damage constitute also, 
at least in principle, an adequate solution concerning the same problem as it arises in relation 
to medical units’.406 It is not immediately clear what, according to these authors, constitutes 
the ‘problem’ that needs to be addressed. One issue that was clearly on their minds is the 
fact that incidental harm to specially protected military personnel and objectives is an 
inevitable feature of warfare just as much as collateral damage to civilians and civilian 
objects is.407 The law would not be viable if it rendered protected military objectives immune 
from incidental harm. To support this argument, Bothe, Partsch and Solf point to the 
existence of sickbays on warships, stating that ‘[i]f it were inadmissible to subject medical 
units to collateral damage, no attempt to sink a warship with a sickbay aboard would be 
permissible’.408 This is a powerful reason for accepting that military objectives benefiting 
from special protection are liable to incidental harm. However, it does not follow that they 
must also be protected from excessive collateral damage. The conduct of hostilities is 
perfectly viable, and the ‘problem’ solved, even without imposing an upper limit on the 
amount of incidental harm to which protected military objectives may be exposed. Of 
course, shielding such military objectives from excessive incidental harm would be in line 
with the generic notion of proportionality, which demands that there should be a reasonable 
relationship between means and ends. Yet the question is not whether extending 
proportionality stricto sensu to non-civilian harm is compatible, in theory, with the general 
principle of proportionality—it clearly is. The question is whether the general principle has 
the effect of extending proportionality stricto sensu to non-civilian harm as a matter of 
existing law. Two variants of the argument must be distinguished in this respect.  
 The first variant postulates that the proportionality rule codified in Additional Protocol 
I represents only one aspect of a broader, uncodified proportionality rule that prohibits 
causing excessive incidental harm to civilian and non-civilian persons and objects. This 
appears to be the position taken by Bartels. In essence, this argument suggests that the 
customary proportionality rule is wider in scope than the conventional one. We have already 
examined this matter and found it not to be the case: the customary and conventional rule 
are identical in scope.409 The second variant, which appears to be the one adopted by Bothe, 
Partsch and Solf, holds that the general principle of proportionality alters the scope of 
proportionality stricto sensu by extending it to non-civilian harm. There is a degree of 
circularity in this argument. Proportionality stricto sensu is widely regarded as one of the main 
manifestations of proportionality as a general principle of the law of armed conflict, yet this 
general principle is now being relied upon to expand the scope of the rule from which it 
supposedly derives. Leaving the circularity aside, there is little evidence in state practice to 
support this variant of the argument. For example, we may recall that the Canadian manual 
defines the principle of proportionality to involve the weighing of ‘the interests arising from 
the success of the operation on the one hand, against the possible harmful effects upon 
protected persons and objects on the other’.410 However, there is no trace of this broader approach 
in the manual’s definition of the ‘proportionality test’, which faithfully replicates the terms 
of articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I.411 If the general 
principle of proportionality really did expand the scope of proportionality stricto sensu, we 
would expect to see this widely reflected in national military manuals and other statements 
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of the rule, yet this is not the case.  
 
3. Specially protected military personnel cannot be less protected than civilians 
In certain fields, the special protections accorded to military personnel are more stringent 
than the general protection enjoyed by civilians against the dangers arising from military 
operations. For example, while the protection of military medical establishments and units 
ceases only after due warning has been given,412 no such warning needs to be issued before 
belligerents may attack civilians directly participating in hostilities.413 Based on this, Laurent 
Gisel argues that it would contradict the system of special protection to claim that military 
personnel subject to special protection may benefit from fewer safeguards than civilians.414 
This argument does not stand up to closer scrutiny. 
As Bill Boothby points out in relation to civilian objects subject to special 
protection, ‘[t]he adjective “special” implies that there is an identifiable feature to the 
protection that in some way exceeds that accorded to civilian objects in general’.415 For 
example, civilian schools,416 the natural environment417 and cultural objects418 enjoy 
protections that in some respects extend beyond the general protection conferred on other 
civilian objects. From this perspective, special protections may be described as a form of 
enhanced protection.419 However, an entirely different logic is at work in the case of military 
objectives. Military objectives do not enjoy general protection against dangers arising from 
military operations. Consequently, the legal protection conferred upon certain military 
objectives is ‘special’ not because it grants them a form of enhanced protection compared 
to a baseline of general protection, but because it affords them more favourable treatment 
in comparison to other military objectives that remain liable to attack. There is no reason, 
therefore, why the special protections enjoyed by military personnel must exceed the general 
protection enjoyed by civilians. The two are unrelated. 
Claims to the contrary overlook the fact that the content of special protection varies 
across different contexts and beneficiaries. For example, civilian internees and prisoners of 
war find themselves in broadly similar circumstances. Yet civilians in occupied territory may 
be interned only if ‘imperative reasons of security’ justify this measure,420 whereas prisoners 
of war may be interned irrespective of such considerations.421 The fact that specially 
protected military objectives may be less protected than civilians is not counterintuitive at 
all,422 but reflects the logic of the principle of distinction. In fact, what is counterintuitive is 
to suggest that civilians and military personnel falling within the same class of protected 
persons, for instance the wounded and sick, must necessarily enjoy the same level of 
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protection.423 Wounded and sick civilians benefit from special protection on top of their 
general protection, whereas wounded and sick military personnel benefit from special 
protection despite their general liability to attack. Wounded and sick civilians are protected 
both against direct attacks and against excessive incidental harm as a consequence of their 
general protection against the dangers of military operations. By qualifying as wounded or 
sick, military personnel do not become civilians. Accordingly, the fact that wounded and 
sick civilians are protected against excessive incidental harm as a result of their general 
protection does not mean that wounded and sick military personnel must be protected 
against excessive incidental harm on account of their specially protected status. There is 
simply no logical connection here.  
 
4. Specially protected persons cannot be less protected than objects 
As an alternative argument, Gisel suggests that military medical units do not meet the 
definition of a military objective under article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I. An object 
constitutes a military objective provided that it makes an effective contribution to the 
enemy’s military action by its nature, location, purpose or use and its total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralisation offers a definite military advantage in the 
circumstances ruling at the time. Gisel denies that military medical units make an effective 
contribution to enemy military action and that their destruction can be considered to offer 
a definite military advantage.424 In turn, this means that military medical units are civilian 
objects and as such fall within the ambit of the proportionality rule. If we accept that it 
would be wrong for the law to accord greater levels of protection to military medical objects 
than to military medical personnel, it follows that military medical personnel must benefit 
from the same protection against excessive incidental harm as military medical units do 
under the preceding analysis.425 This intricate argument involves several steps, but at its 
foundation lies the claim that military medical units do not make an effective contribution 
to enemy action and that their destruction offers no definite military advantage. This claim 
is mistaken, rendering the rest of the argument unsustainable. 
 Gisel does not explain why, in his view, military medical units do not make an effective 
contribution to military action or why their destruction does not offer a definite military 
advantage. Presumably, the threshold of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘definiteness’ are not met. It is 
broadly accepted that the notion of a ‘definite’ military advantage entails a concrete and 
perceptible military advantage rather than a hypothetical and speculative one.426 By contrast, 
it is less clear what an ‘effective’ contribution to enemy military action must entail.427 It 
seems logical to assume, a contrario, that an object which makes an ‘ineffective’ contribution 
to military action does not qualify. However, effectiveness and ineffectiveness are relative 
concepts. An armoured personnel carrier may be totally ineffective in an anti-aircraft role, 
but it may lend effective support to enemy ground forces. An antiquated tank may be no 
match against a modern equivalent, but it may still make an effective contribution against 
dismounted troops. A disabled aircraft may only be a source of spare parts, but those parts 
may keep other aircraft flying.428 Given the many different forms in which an object may 
contribute to enemy action, some care is required before one can safely conclude that an 
object is incapable of making any kind of effective contribution at all. Moreover, it is the 
                                                 
423.  Cf ibid, 224–25. 
424.  Ibid, 219–20. 
425.  Ibid, 221. 
426.  DoD, Law of War Manual (December 2016), § 5.6.7.3; MoD, Joint Service Manual, para 5.4.4(j). See Bothe, 
Partsch and Solf, Commentary, 352, § 2.4.6; Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, Commentary, para 2024. 
427.  See Jachec-Neale, Military Objectives, 83–110.  
428.  We owe the last example to Henderson, Contemporary Law of Targeting, 56. 
 
effectiveness of the contribution, not the effectiveness of the military action itself, that 
matters. An object that makes an effective contribution to a totally futile military action, 
such as using a dinghy in an attempt to ram an aircraft carrier, could still qualify as a military 
objective, provided that the other conditions of the definition are satisfied.  
 Military medical units perform a humanitarian function, yet it strains credibility to 
suggest that this function is devoid of military benefits. The point was made with unusual 
clarity in a report submitted to the plenary assembly of the diplomatic conference that 
drafted the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The key passage merits quoting at length:  
 
[a]t present the Medical Service is an integral part of the armed forces, and is closely bound up with every 
aspect of their activity. The part it plays in the recruiting and selection of the troops, the supervision which it 
exercises over training, the numerous preventive measures which it takes in the field of hygiene and 
epidemiology, all these functions result in the fact that it makes an important contribution to the creation and 
maintenance of the fighting value of the troops. The efficacity of its power of restoring to physical fitness has 
even become so great in the case of a sufficiently prolonged conflict that it is thanks to the Medical Service 
that the numerical strength of the troops is maintained; it may even be said that the concluding battles are 
won by former wounded who have been cured and sent back to the front. 
It is tempting to conclude from these facts that the enemy would have every reason to diminish the efficiency 
of the Medical Service, either by reducing its numerical size, by making prisoners of war of those of its 
members who fall into his hands, or by limiting its activity by ceasing to protect it on the field of battle. It is 
only a step from such a realization to the planning of systematic bombing of medical units, or the organization 
of raids on these units with the deliberate intention of capturing the greatest possible number of the members 
of the Medical Service.  
There is no need of long arguments to prove that, if such a point of view were adopted, it would be the 
negation of all the work done by the Conventions to protect the wounded and sick.429 
 
It is apparent from this passage, which has lost none of its relevance in the face of 
contemporary warfare, that the special protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 to military medical personnel and units were largely meant to counteract the fact that 
such personnel and units do make an effective contribution to an adversary’s military action 
and that their destruction may well offer a definite military advantage. From a functional 
perspective, military medical personnel and units play a role that is in some respects 
comparable to the role played by combat service support personnel and units. While it 
would be too crude an analogy to suggest that field hospitals fix soldiers just like mechanics 
fix tanks, the fact is that both contribute to preserving a force’s fighting power. As Ian 
Henderson rightly points out, a military medical unit carrying out its ordinary medical 
function therefore ‘prima facie meets the test for a military objective’ under article 52(2) of 
Additional Protocol I.430 The fact that such medical units contribute to military action only 
indirectly is not relevant,431 as long as they do so effectively. There can be no serious doubt 
that maintaining the combat effectiveness of military personnel constitutes an effective 
contribution to military action, irrespective of the impact this contribution has on the 
effectiveness of the military action itself.432 Nor can there be any serious doubt that the 
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destruction, capture and neutralisation of military medical units is capable, in principle, of 
offering a definite military advantage. For example, destroying a fixed medical establishment 
may force the enemy to rely on mobile medical units that are less effective and may consume 
more resources. There is nothing hypothetical or speculative about such a military 
advantage. 
 To avoid any misunderstandings, let us emphasise that we are not suggesting that 
military medical personnel and units should be treated as military objectives liable to attack. 
Rather, our point is that they benefit form special protections under the law of armed 
conflict precisely because without those protections they would, prima facie, qualify as military 
objectives subject to direct attack. Accordingly, since military medical personnel and units 
are not civilians and civilian objects, they are not covered by the proportionality rule as 
traditionally understood. 
 
5. Safeguarding the effectiveness of the law 
The reality of warfare is such that incidental harm to the civilian population cannot be 
avoided completely. Faced with this fact, belligerents would not be able to conduct their 
operations lawfully if the law of armed conflict were to protect civilians and civilian objects 
against collateral damage in absolute terms. As the Prosecution conceded in the Galić case,433 
the law must accept that at least some degree of incidental civilian harm is permissible if it 
is to serve as a viable framework for regulating the conduct of hostilities.434 The link between 
the inevitability of incidental harm and its permissibility has long been recognised. For 
example, the drafters of Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces 
in Time of War of 1907 decided that commanders should not bear responsibility for ‘any 
unavoidable damage’ resulting from lawful naval bombardments,435 since prohibiting the 
bombardment of undefended localities in a manner that was ‘too absolute would be placing 
commanders of naval forces in a position where it would be impossible to obey it’.436 In the 
context of aerial bombardment, Hugh Trenchard, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, 
expressed the point in the following terms in 1928:  
 
The fact that [an air attack against a military objective may result in the incidental destruction of civilian life 
and property] is no reason for regarding the bombing as illegitimate, provided that all reasonable care is taken 
to confine the bombing to the military objective. Otherwise a belligerent would be able to secure complete 
immunity for his war manufactures and depots merely by locating them in a large city, which would, in effect, 
become neutral territory—a position which the opposing belligerent would never accept.437 
 
The modern proportionality rule is grounded in this reality. By imposing an upper ceiling 
on the amount of incidental harm that may be inflicted on the civilian population, the rule 
recognises that collateral damage falling below this threshold is permitted.438 The fact that 
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civilians do not enjoy absolute protection against dangers arising from military operations 
is therefore in large measure a consequence of proportionality stricto sensu.439 
 Seen from this perspective, one benefit of extending the proportionality rule to non-
civilian harm is that doing so would confirm that specially protected military personnel are, 
in principle, liable to incidental harm. If collateral damage to protected enemy personnel 
and objects is an inevitable feature of warfare, then inflicting at least some degree of 
incidental harm upon them must be permissible, otherwise the lawful conduct of military 
operations becomes impossible. We are thus compelled, it seems, to extend proportionality 
stricto sensu to non-civilian harm in order to safeguard the effectiveness of the law. Bothe, 
Partsch and Solf rely on precisely this reasoning in support of an expansive interpretation 
of proportionality.440 However, as we have indicated earlier,441 their argument proves too 
much. Since civilians are immune from direct attack and enjoy general protection against 
dangers arising from military operations, their liability to incidental harm needs to be 
demonstrated. However, military personnel and objectives subject to direct attack are also 
liable to indirect attack. There is no need, therefore, to draw on proportionality to establish 
their underlying liability to incidental harm. At the most, the proportionality rule might 
prove that military personnel and objectives remain liable to incidental injury even when 
they are subject to special protections. However, the law already recognises that protected 
military personnel and objects are subject to incidental harm.  
 Military necessity, says the Lieber Code, admits the destruction of the life or limb of 
armed enemies and of ‘other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the 
armed contests of the war’.442 This principle renders all persons other than armed enemies, 
including protected enemy personnel, such as medical personnel and hors de combat 
combatants, liable to incidental harm. In the past, this point was widely recognised.443 The 
government representatives drafting the Brussels Declaration of 1874, for example, were 
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agreed that non-combatants, including medical and religious personnel, ‘are exposed to the 
same vicissitudes and dangers of war as the corps to which they are attached, but that they 
can only be engaged in isolated combat in consequence of a mistake’.444 According to the 
sixth edition of the British Manual on Military Law published in 1914, there is ‘no just cause 
for complaint … if in the execution of their duty members of the medical personnel and 
army chaplains are accidentally killed or wounded; they are only protected from deliberate 
attack’.445 The point was reiterated in the 1958 edition of the manual.446 In a similar vein, 
successive editions of the United States Army’s manual on The Law of Land Warfare 
interpreted the duty to ‘respect and protect’ to mean that military medical personnel and 
chaplains must not be knowingly attacked, but that ‘the accidental killing or wounding of 
such personnel, due to their presence among or in proximity to combatant elements actually 
engaged, by fire directed at the latter, gives no just cause for complaint’.447  
 The states that negotiated Additional Protocol I shared these understandings. As 
originally formulated by the ICRC, the draft of what became article 41 of Additional 
Protocol I prohibited the killing or injuring of enemy hors de combat.448 The delegates decided 
to revise this wording and prohibit making hors de combat the object of attack so as ‘to make 
clear that what was forbidden was the deliberate attack against persons hors de combat, not 
merely killing or injuring them as the incidental consequence of attacks not aimed at them 
per se’.449 Drawing these different strands together, the US Air Force Pamphlet 110–31, 
published in 1976, declared that all military personnel and objects protected under the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 are liable to incidental harm.450 More recently, the 
Department of Defense Law of War Manual confirmed that incidental harm to wounded, 
sick or shipwrecked enemy personnel451 and to military medical and religious personnel452 
is not prohibited. 
 The underlying principle is clear, notwithstanding the absence of a single norm or 
restatement expressing it in general terms: military personnel benefitting from special 
protections are liable to incidental harm notwithstanding their special protections. 
Consequently, there is no need to extend the application of the proportionality rule to 
protected enemy personnel merely to confirm their liability to incidental harm.  
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6. The Martens Clause 
In a recent paper, Geoffrey Corn and Andrew Culliver argue that a qualified duty to extend 
the proportionality rule to protected military objects and personnel may be derived from 
the Martens Clause.453 The modern restatement of the Clause may be found in article 1(2) 
of Additional Protocol I,454 which declares as follows:  
 
[i]n cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain 
under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, 
from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. 
 
Describing the Martens Clause as an important ‘gap filler’ designed to address areas of 
uncertainty in the law of armed conflict, Corn and Culliver argue, in essence, that the Clause 
could provide a rationale and normative foundation for extending the proportionality rule 
to non-civilian harm in certain circumstances.455 They suggest that relying on the Martens 
Clause in this manner would allow the proportionality rule to be applied with greater nuance 
compared to what competing approaches permit. Accordingly, Corn and Culliver propose 
that the Martens Clause should trigger the application of the proportionality rule only where 
‘elemental considerations of humanity’ are at play.456 Such considerations would apply 
where protected enemy personnel are present in ‘mature medical treatment locations’, but 
not where they are incidentally harmed in the midst of active combat engagements.457 
  While this approach successfully reconciles humanitarian concerns with operational 
logic, it is less convincing from a normative perspective. The meaning and effect of the 
Martens Clause is subject to disagreement.458 In particular, opinions diverge as to whether 
the Clause has recognised the ‘principles of humanity’ and the ‘dictates of public conscience’ 
as distinct sources of law,459 whether it merely serves as a reminder that, beyond their 
conventional obligations, states remain bound by the customary principles of the law of 
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armed conflict,460 or whether its real purpose lies somewhere in-between these two extremes 
and consists of guiding the interpretation of the law.461 Corn and Culliver press the Martens 
Clause into a quasi-legislative function to increase the scope of an existing treaty rule in an 
effort to close a perceived gap in the law. This reflects the broadest and most controversial 
use of the Clause. As such, it comes up against the force of countervailing authority, 
including the Kupreškić case, where the ICTY Trial Chamber declared that the Martens 
Clause ‘may not be taken to mean that the ‘principles of humanity’ and the ‘dictates of 
public conscience’ have been elevated to the rank of independent sources of international 
law, for this conclusion is belied by international practice’.462 Leaving aside such principled 
objections against employing the Martens Clause for quasi-legislative purposes,463 its use in 
the present context is barred by its own terms. The Clause applies in cases not covered by 
Additional Protocol I, other international agreements or the law of armed conflict more 
generally. However, the present case is covered by articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) 
of Additional Protocol I. Rather than being faced with a gap in the law, we are confronted 
by the fact that the proportionality rule as codified in Additional Protocol I is limited to 
civilian harm. We have shown that this is not a mere oversight, an editorial omission or a 
drafting error, but a deliberate choice by the States that negotiated the text, confirmed by 
their corresponding practice and opinio juris under customary international law.464 Under 
these circumstances, invoking the Martens Clause to broaden the scope of proportionality 
stricto sensu amounts to an exercise in treaty revision, not gap filling. This cannot be 
reconciled with the terms of the Clause and raises similar objections as attempts to revise 
the scope of the proportionality rule with reference to the object and purpose of Additional 
Protocol I.465 
 Nor is Corn and Culliver’s attempt to justify recourse to the Martens Clause on the 
basis that it permits a more nuanced approach entirely convincing. It is difficult to see why 
the ‘principles of humanity’ and the ‘dictates of public conscience’ should compel the 
application of the proportionality rule to non-civilian harm solely in situations where 
‘elemental considerations of humanity’ are involved, as Corn and Culliver insist.466 The 
authors introduce this threshold in order to prevent the proportionality rule from applying 
to enemy military objects and personnel in situations of active combat. In doing so, they 
essentially seek to avoid the full implications of their own reliance on the Martens Clause. 
While it is perfectly legitimate to set limits to the logic of humanitarianism, such limits can 
hardly be justified under the Martens Clause itself. The Clause either imposes a duty to 
extend proportionality stricto sensu to non-civilian harm or it does not. If it does, the 
application of the proportionality rule to non-civilian harm in the midst of combat depends 
on whatever the ‘principles of humanity’ and the ‘dictates of public conscience’ demand. 
This question is left unanswered by Corn and Culliver’s reasoning.  
 Revisiting and clarifying the circumstances in which the proportionality rule may apply 
to non-civilian harm offers a more coherent way of reconciling humanitarian and 
operational considerations. As we have shown, the proportionality rule can apply only to 
persons who are immune from direct attack. This limits the range of enemy personnel who 
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may, in principle, benefit from proportionality stricto sensu.467 We have also shown that the 
law does not require belligerents to afford special protections to enemy personnel merely 
because there are ‘reasons to believe’ that they are entitled to those protections.468 Rather, 
protections are due to enemy personnel whenever belligerents have ascertained their 
protected status before launching an attack or because their protected status has become 
apparent during the course of an ongoing attack. The duty of belligerents to afford special 
protection to enemy personnel in situations of active combat therefore is not absolute but 
circumscribed by the extent of their precautionary duties. The scope of these duties takes 
full account both of humanitarian and of operational considerations. 
 
7. The duty to ‘respect and protect’ 
Speaking in 2013, the Vice-President of the ICRC suggested that belligerents are bound to 
take into account incidental harm caused to military medical personnel and hors de combat 
combatants in their proportionality calculations as part of their ‘central obligation to 
“respect and protect” these persons’.469 Laurent Gisel has developed this point in greater 
detail, arguing that the duty to ‘respect and protect’ medical personnel and enemy wounded 
and sick encompasses a prohibition of exposing them to excessive incidental harm.470 This 
is so, according to Gisel, because there is no reason why the obligation to ‘respect and 
protect’ should be limited to a prohibition of direct attacks and ‘not extend to all the rules 
on the conduct of hostilities’.471 The new ICRC Commentaries to the First and Second 
Geneva Conventions adopt the same position. The Commentary to the First Convention 
declares that ‘the obligation to respect imposes an obligation not to directly or 
indiscriminately attack’472 and affirms the application of the proportionality rule to enemy 
wounded and sick as follows:  
 
in view of the specific protections accorded to the wounded and sick, namely the obligation to respect (and 
to protect) them in all circumstances, a fortiori they should also benefit from the protection accorded to 
civilians. In other words, if civilians are to be included in the proportionality assessment all the more so should 
the wounded and sick. Indeed, if the wounded and sick were not to be considered for purposes of the 
proportionality principle, their presence in the vicinity of legitimate military objectives would be legally 
irrelevant. However, this would contradict the explicit obligation to respect them in all circumstances and the 
basic rationale of according special protection to them. It would be unreasonable to consider that direct or 
indiscriminate attacks against the wounded and sick would be strictly prohibited and would amount to a grave 
breach, while incidental harm and even excessive incidental casualties would not be prohibited.473 
 
The Commentary to the Second Convention extends this reasoning to shipwrecked 
personnel,474 subject to a minor variation.475 In addition, the two Commentaries suggests 
that the duty to ‘respect’ entails an obligation not to attack military medical personnel, 
chaplains, the religious, medical and hospital personnel of hospital ships and their crews in 
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violation of the principle of proportionality.476 
 The reasoning offered in the passage quoted above is not convincing. In suggesting 
that the special protection accorded to sick and wounded should a fortiori include the 
protections accorded to civilians, the ICRC Commentary appears to be inspired by Gisel’s 
claim that protected civilians and military personnel have the same ‘value’ under the 
principle of military necessity and humanity.477 As we have explained,478 this overlooks the 
fact that the special protections enjoyed by wounded and sick civilians are additional to their 
general protection against dangers arising from military operations, whereas the special 
protections accorded to wounded and sick military personnel operate as an exception to 
their general liability to attack. Since civilians benefit from the prohibition of excessive 
incidental harm on account of their general protection, in other words by virtue of their 
civilian status, the fact that civilians and military personnel may both qualify as wounded 
and sick presents no reason for extending the proportionality rule to protected military 
personnel. The a fortiori reasoning is therefore misplaced. Corn and Culliver suggest that the 
ICRC’s argument suffers from an additional logical flaw.479 If the duty to ‘respect and 
protect’ shields military personnel from direct and indirect harm, whereas the 
proportionality rule implicitly renders individuals liable to incidental harm, then 
proportionality can only operate as an exception to the duty to ‘respect and protect’. If this 
is so, the proportionality rule cannot be derived from the duty to ‘respect and protect’, 
contrary to what the ICRC suggests. However, this objection is predicated on the 
assumption that the duty to ‘respect and protect’ prohibits all incidental harm. We will 
examine below whether this is in fact the case.480 
 The Commentary also claims that the presence of wounded and sick military personnel 
in the vicinity of legitimate military objectives would be legally irrelevant if they were not 
covered by the proportionality principle. This is true, but it merely amounts to saying that 
the principle must apply or else it would not apply. Nor is it more convincing when the 
Commentary argues that not extending the proportionality rule to wounded and sick enemy 
personnel would contradict the obligation to respect them ‘in all circumstances’. While the 
duty to ‘respect and protect’ is often said to apply ‘at all times and in all places’,481 the 
obligations it imposes are not absolute. Nor do they apply in a unitary manner across 
different contexts. For example, should they engage in acts harmful to the enemy outside 
their humanitarian duties, military medical and religious personnel retain their status as non-
combatants, but lose their protection from direct attack.482 Belligerents are thus not obliged 
to ‘respect and protect’ them literally under all circumstances. Similarly, in the context of an 
ongoing attack, the attacking force is bound to comply with the duty to ‘respect and protect’ 
only if the protected status of the target has ‘become apparent’.483 This means that it is 
possible for enemy combatants to qualify as wounded or sick without the adverse party 
being bound to ‘respect and protect’ them. Whilst on board a medical aircraft present in or 
over areas controlled by the adversary or areas the physical control of which is not clearly 
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established, any wounded, sick, shipwrecked, medical personnel and chaplains share the 
same risk of misidentification and accidental attack as the aircraft itself.484 Moreover, in 
areas controlled by an adverse party, medical aircraft recognised as such are subject to attack 
should they fail to comply with an order to land or to alight on water, or to take other 
measures to safeguard their own interests.485 This rule implies that any protected persons 
on board such aircraft may be attacked too, at least indirectly. In the context of naval 
warfare, should fighting occur on board a warship, sick-bays are to be respected and spared 
‘as far as possible’.486 This too implies that any protected personnel inside such sick-bays 
must be shielded from the fighting only ‘as far as possible’.487 It is also worth noting that 
the duty to ‘respect and protect’ military and other hospital ships applies ‘on condition that 
their names and descriptions have been notified to the Parties to the conflict ten days before 
those ships are employed’.488 If this condition is not met, protected personnel on board 
such vessels must bear the risk that the absence of protection for the ship entails. Nor is it 
convincing for the Commentary to suggest that it would be unreasonable to prohibit direct 
attacks on wounded and sick enemy personnel without protecting them from incidental 
harm. On this logic, the proportionality rule as codified in Additional Protocol I itself must 
be considered unreasonable.  
 By contrast, the Commentary does make a compelling point when it declares that not 
considering the wounded and sick for the purposes of the proportionality principle would 
seem to contradict the ‘basic rationale of according special protection to them’.489 However, 
the solution to this incongruity does not lie in extending the application of articles 51(5)(b), 
57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I to protected military personnel. The 
arguments advanced in favour of expanding the scope of the proportionality rule do not 
enable us to do so without arrogating to ourselves a quasi-legislative competence to override 
the clear meaning of Additional Protocol I and the corresponding norm of customary 
international law. Rather, the solution lies in revisiting and clarifying the relationship 
between the liability of protected military personnel to incidental harm and the duty to 
‘respect and protect’. The ICRC Commentary thus points broadly in the right direction, 
even though its reasoning is unconvincing. In what follows, we therefore attempt to place 
the prohibition of exposing protected military personnel to excessive incidental harm on a 
more solid foundation. 
B. The limits of the liability to incidental harm 
At the outset, it is useful to recall that members of enemy forces are, as a general rule, 
subject to direct attack and incidental harm. Special protections alter this baseline position. 
Accordingly, it is firmly established that directly attacking specially protected personnel is 
incompatible with their protected status.490 This is confirmed by several treaty provisions, 
which stipulate that the duty to ‘respect’ entails an obligation not to directly attack protected 
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persons or objects.491 By contrast, it is unclear to what extent, if any, the duty to ‘respect 
and protect’ shields protected military personnel from incidental harm. We may distinguish 
between two hypotheses. The first suggests that the duty to ‘respect and protect’ 
comprehensively prohibits causing any kind of injury to protected enemy personnel. Their 
liability to incidental harm thus constitutes an exception to their comprehensive protection. 
The second hypothesis holds that the duty to ‘respect and protect’ shields protected enemy 
personnel from direct injury, but not from all forms of incidental harm.  
 The first hypothesis is unlikely. Although the duty to ‘respect and protect’ prohibits 
violence against protected personnel, this prohibition is neither absolute nor complete. 
Military medical and religious personnel are subject to direct attack should they engage in 
acts harmful to the enemy outside their humanitarian duties,492 while all protected personnel 
are exposed to harm when present in protected objects that enjoy only limited immunity 
from attack.493 In both cases, the liability to harm is the result of an absence of protection, 
not an exception to protection. This supports the conclusion, reflected in our second 
hypothesis, that protected military personnel are liable to incidental harm because the duty 
to ‘respect and protect’ does not comprehensively shield them from collateral damage. This 
corresponds with the long-held understanding that the law safeguards protected enemy 
personnel only against deliberate attack, but not against incidental harm resulting from 
lawful attacks.494 It also reflects the logic of civilian liability to incidental harm. Civilians are 
exposed to collateral damage not by way of exception to their general protection against the 
dangers arising from military operations, but because they do not benefit from protection 
against incidental harm unless it is excessive.495 This suggests that protected personnel are 
liable to incidental harm because the duty to ‘respect and protect’ does not exempt them 
from this kind of damage under all circumstances. 
 While this conclusion sheds light on the legal basis of protected personnel’s liability to 
incidental harm, it does not reveal whether that liability is unlimited in scope or subject to 
restrictions. Should limits exist, we may expect them to be inherent in the right of 
belligerents to expose protected enemy personnel to incidental injury or to derive from the 
duty to ‘respect and protect’. We explore these avenues below. 
 
1. Limitations flowing from the principle of military necessity 
At the core of the modern law of armed conflict lies the idea that a reasonable connection 
must exist between the harm caused by a belligerent and the overall objective of overcoming 
the enemy.496 The principle that violence and devastation ‘must be part and parcel of some 
military design to overcome the hostile army’ thus ‘furnishes the criterion of the right or 
wrong of any given destruction or seizure’.497 The idea is embodied in the principle of 
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distinction, which permits belligerents to attack certain persons and objects due to the 
inherent or actual military benefit that their neutralisation entails. The liability of enemy 
combatants to attack thus flows from the military benefit inherent in their destruction,498 
while objects are liable to attack if the military benefit of their destruction, capture or 
neutralisation can be established on a case-by-case basis with reference to article 52(2) of 
Additional Protocol I.499 By contrast, attacks that do not pursue a legitimate military benefit 
are not permissible.500 The harm resulting from such an attack, whether caused directly or 
indirectly, would be wanton and unnecessary.501 The underlying logic of the law of armed 
conflict thus suggests that incidental harm inflicted upon protected enemy personnel must 
be justifiable with reference to the principle of military necessity.502 
 In the case of enemy combatants who are liable to attack, the military benefit that 
permits targeting them directly also justifies exposing them to comparable incidental 
harm.503 If an enemy solider may be killed directly due to his battlefield status, he may also 
be harmed indirectly for the same reason. However, different considerations apply to 
persons protected against attack. Since such persons are immune from direct harm, their 
liability to incidental injury must rest on some other basis. Under the traditional 
proportionality rule, causing incidental harm to civilians is permissible as long as it is not 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the 
attack. The military advantage invoked by the rule serves a dual purpose. It justifies the 
decision to prosecute the military objective which is the actual target of the attack and it 
also justifies the harm that civilians and civilian objects are expected to suffer incidentally.504 
Protected military personnel are in a comparable position. Since making protected 
personnel the objects of direct attack provides no legitimate military advantage, injuring 
them indirectly cannot confer a permissible military benefit either.505 The military benefit 
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that justifies exposing them to incidental harm must therefore derive from elsewhere. The 
only alternative source is the military advantage anticipated from prosecuting another target 
that constitutes a lawful military objective, as in the case of civilians. Accordingly, any 
incidental harm that protected military personnel are expected to suffer as a consequence 
of an attack on a lawful military objective must be justified with reference to the military 
advantage anticipated from engaging that objective.  
 Provided that an attack against a military objective is anticipated to offer some 
permissible military benefit, it follows that any incidental injury that this attack is expected 
to inflict upon protected enemy personnel would not, in principle, be wanton and 
unnecessary. However, could a minimum of military advantage justify a maximum of 
incidental harm? To use a hypothetical and deliberately extreme example: could the military 
advantage anticipated from an attack designed to destroy a small ammunition dump justify 
the incidental destruction of hundreds of enemy military medical personnel congregating 
for a training event nearby, assuming that it is beyond doubt that the attack would be 
excessive if the persons involved were civilians? Intuitively, this cannot be right. We suggest 
that it would not be lawful either. 
 As the Lieber Code underlines, the principle of military necessity sanctions the 
destruction of the life or limb of persons other than armed enemies only to the extent that 
such destruction is ‘incidentally unavoidable’.506 Similarly, article 2 of Hague Convention IX 
of 1907 absolves naval commanders from liability for ‘any unavoidable damage’ caused by 
the bombardment of lawful objectives situated in undefended localities. These provisions 
render explicit what is implied in the principle of military necessity, namely that only that 
amount of incidental harm is permissible which is unavoidable and hence necessary in order 
to achieve the lawful military objective pursued by an attack.507 What amounts to 
‘unavoidable’ harm is a question of fact and law. Experience shows that collateral damage 
cannot be prevented completely, short of avoiding combat and military operations all 
together. Accidents and mistakes are inevitable in warfare. The law of armed conflict 
recognises this fact, but imposes a duty on belligerents to ‘take all feasible precautions in 
the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to 
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian 
objects’.508 As a result of this precautionary duty, ‘unavoidable’ incidental harm to civilians 
and civilians objects means harm which a belligerent could not avoid or further minimise 
by taking all feasible precautions in its choice of means and methods of attack. 
 As formulated in article 57(2)(a)(ii) of Additional Protocol I, the precautionary duty to 
minimise incidental harm is limited to damage caused to civilians and civilian objects. 
However, if, as we have established, military necessity permits belligerents to cause 
incidental harm to protected enemy personnel only to the extent that this is unavoidable, it 
follows that belligerents knowingly exposing protected personnel to such harm must 
undertake affirmative measures to minimise the damage. Accordingly, a positive duty to 
minimise incidental harm is implicit in the rule that collateral damage against protected 
personnel must be confined to what is unavoidable.509 This connection between the 
permissibility of collateral damage and efforts to minimise it is confirmed by article 2 of 
Hague Convention IX of 1907, which expressly directs naval commanders embarking on 
the bombardment of military objectives in an undefended locality to ‘take all due measures 
in order that the town may suffer as little harm as possible’. The link was also evident at the 
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diplomatic conference drafting the Additional Protocols, where the adoption of the duty to 
minimise incidental civilian harm proved instrumental in overcoming the objections initially 
voiced against the proportionality rule by many delegations.510 In this context, it is also 
worth noting that the Department of Defense Law of War Manual declares that combatants 
must take feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to ‘the civilian population and 
other protected persons and objects’.511 
 Earlier in this paper, we questioned the appropriateness of portraying proportionality 
as a general principle of the law of armed conflict.512 We did so partly because the core 
demand of proportionality—the existence of a reasonable relationship between means and 
ends—is embedded in the principle of military necessity. In the law of armed conflict, the 
generic idea of proportionality thus manifests itself largely as an aspect of military necessity 
and its interplay with considerations of humanity, rather than as a self-standing principle. It 
is important to recall at this juncture that the principle of military necessity has both an 
enabling and a constraining function within the law of armed conflict.513 The Department 
of Defense Law of War Manual focuses on military necessity as a justification for violence.514  
Yet the Lieber Code makes clear that military necessity also acts as a limit on belligerent 
action.515 Any act of violence visited upon the enemy must be necessary for securing the 
permissible ends of war. Hence the requirement that there must be some reasonable 
connection between the destruction and the overcoming of enemy forces,516 that is some 
reasonable connection between means and ends.  
 To the extent that the principle of military necessity requires belligerents to establish a 
reasonable connection between means and ends when conducting attacks, it follows that 
there must also be a reasonable connection between the military benefit anticipated from 
prosecuting a lawful military objective and the incidental harm the same attack is expected 
to cause to protected military personnel. Not only must there be a direct causal link between 
the military benefit and the incidental harm, in the absence of which the harm would be 
wanton and unnecessary, but that the military advantage pursued by the former must be 
capable of justifying the collateral damage expected. If it were otherwise, belligerents would 
be entitled to inflict an evil that exceeds whatever legitimacy they may derive from pursuing 
a permissible military objective, thus breaking the reasonable connection between means 
and ends. Put differently, the extent of the incidental harm must be proportionate to the 
level of the military advantage anticipated, or else the harm could not be reasonably justified 
with reference to the military benefit sought.517 
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 This conclusion is reinforced by the prohibition, laid down in article 35(2) of 
Additional Protocol I, to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare 
of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. The rule is widely 
understood to prohibit the use of weapons which, in their normal or expected use, would 
inevitably cause injury or suffering that is manifestly disproportionate in relation to their 
military effectiveness.518 Although the harm envisaged under this rule is principally the 
injury and suffering inflicted upon the person targeted by the weapon directly, the wording 
of article 35(2) is not limited to direct harm. Any injury or suffering that results from the 
normal or expected use of a weapon, whether caused directly or indirectly, must be 
accounted for. Even harm inflicted upon enemy combatants incidentally could be 
superfluous or unnecessary if it manifestly exceeded the military benefit entailed by its 
use.519 To the extent that this rule applies to protected enemy personnel, and there is no 
reason to believe that it does not, it requires belligerents to ensure that they do not employ 
means and methods of combat that expose such personnel to incidental injury or suffering 
‘greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives’.520 Accordingly, this 
rule requires the application of proportionality considerations to protected enemy personnel 
in the use of means and methods of warfare.521 The broader point, however, is that article 
35(2) reflects the underlying proportionality considerations that flow from the principle of 
military necessity.522 
 
2. Limitations flowing from the duty to ‘respect and protect’ 
The duty to ‘respect and protect’ certain categories of persons is well-established in the law 
of armed conflict, stretching back to the first Geneva Convention of 1864.523 Today, it 
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features prominently in the First,524 Second525 and Fourth Geneva Conventions,526 as well 
as in Additional Protocols I527 and II.528 Despite the mass of treaty provisions incorporating 
the standard, no single provision exhaustively defines what ‘respect and protect’ means. 
Nevertheless, there is broad agreement on its general outlines. As the ICRC’s 1952 
Commentary to the First Geneva Convention explains, to ‘respect’ involves a negative duty 
‘to spare, not to attack’, while to ‘protect’ entails a positive duty ‘to come to someone’s 
defence, to lend help and support’.529 
 As we have noted already, it is firmly established that the duty to ‘respect’ involves an 
obligation to refrain from directly targeting protected personnel.530 This is precisely why 
belligerents cannot justify exposing protected personnel to incidental harm other than by 
reference to the military advantage anticipated from attacking another, lawful, military 
objective. The duty to ‘respect’ also entails an obligation to refrain from various forms of 
mistreatment and violence, including murder, torture and biological experiments.531 This 
obligation is generally understood to apply not only to the wounded, sick or shipwrecked, 
but to all personnel protected under the First and Second Geneva Conventions,532 as 
confirmed by their grave breaches provisions.533 However, the duty to refrain from 
mistreatment and violence arises only in relation to protected personnel who are ‘in the 
power’534 of an adverse party. It cannot restrict the liability of protected personnel to 
incidental harm in other circumstances, including during active combat. Nevertheless, it is 
certainly true that it would contradict its ‘basic rationale’535 if the duty to ‘respect’ left 
protected personnel exposed to incidental harm without restrictions. If belligerents were 
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entitled to inflict any amount of harm on protected persons as long as they did so indirectly, 
would that not negate their protection from direct attack? The duty to ‘respect’ thus 
provides a compelling reason for imposing some kind of limit on the liability of protected 
personnel to incidental harm. However, for the reasons we gave earlier,536 the duty is 
incapable of justifying the extension of the traditional proportionality rule to non-civilian 
harm in contradiction to the clear terms of Additional Protocol I. Nor does it provide any 
guidance as to where exactly these limits should be drawn. 
 The duty to ‘protect’ requires belligerents to undertake affirmative action to safeguard 
the essential interests of protected personnel. The obligations involved are broad. For 
example, belligerents must adopt a wide range of positive measures to provide for the 
health, welfare, maintenance and protection of enemy wounded, sick and shipwrecked.537 
However, this duty applies only to enemy personnel who find themselves ‘in the power’ of 
their adversary. Consequently, it cannot limit the liability to incidental harm of protected 
personnel who are not in the power of the enemy. By contrast, the duty to search for and 
collect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked applies even before these protected persons are 
in the power of the adversary.538 The purpose of searching for and collecting the wounded, 
sick and shipwrecked is to provide them with the care they require, including by removing 
them from the battlefield and other zones of danger if their condition and the circumstances 
so warrant.539 Accordingly, belligerents may not remain indifferent to the fate of the 
wounded, sick or shipwrecked, but are bound to undertake positive steps aimed at 
alleviating their condition even when they are not yet within their power. Evidently, these 
obligations are difficult to reconcile with the idea that belligerents may expose the wounded, 
sick or shipwrecked to incidental harm without limitations. Incidental harm resulting from 
attacks against lawful military objectives is one of the dangers against which such persons 
ought to be protected. The obligation to search for and collect the wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked thus provides another compelling reason for rejecting the idea that incidental 
harm is without limitations. However, just like the duty to ‘respect’, this obligation furnishes 
no guidance as to where those limits lie. Moreover, its application is limited to the wounded, 
sick and shipwrecked and it cannot be simply extended to cover all protected personnel.  
 Overall, the duty to ‘respect and protect’ underscores that any incidental harm inflicted 
upon protected enemy personnel is in need of justification. The duty also supplies powerful 
reasons for recognising that at least certain categories of protected persons cannot be liable 
to incidental injury without limitations. However, contrary to what Gisel and the ICRC 
suggest, no specific limits flow from the duty to ‘respect and protect’. This is so because 
the duty does not contain a substantive standard, whether one of excessiveness, 
reasonableness or something else altogether, which would determine where such a limit 
should lie. The duty to ‘respect and protect’ thus lends support to our earlier conclusion 
that disproportionate incidental harm to protected enemy personnel is not permitted, but 
it does not provide a distinct and sufficient legal basis for this prohibition without recourse 
to the principle of military necessity and the concept of military advantage. 
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VI. THE NON-CIVILIAN PROPORTIONALITY RULE 
In the preceding section, we established that protected enemy personnel are liable to 
incidental harm as a consequence of attacks carried out against lawful military objectives, 
but that such harm must be justified with reference to the principle of military necessity. 
This finding has three implications. First, incidental harm caused to protected personnel 
must be justified on the basis of the military advantage anticipated from prosecuting the 
lawful military objective that is the intended target of the attack. Second, the attacking force 
is subject to a precautionary duty to minimise any incidental harm that protected enemy 
personnel are expected to suffer in order to confine that injury to what is unavoidable. 
Finally, belligerents must ensure that the incidental harm they expect to cause is 
proportionate to the military benefit anticipated from the attack. Taken together, these 
considerations impose a legal obligation on belligerents not to expose protected enemy 
personnel to incidental harm that is disproportionate to the military advantage expected 
from an attack directed against a lawful military objective. This legal obligation, which sets 
an upper limit on the amount of incidental harm that may befall protected enemy personnel, 
merely reflects what is demanded by the principle of military necessity. Though one should 
be slow to extract a novel rule of law from the wellspring of necessity,540 we have argued 
that in our case the rule flows from the underlying duty to justify violence in armed conflict 
and from the corresponding prohibition of inflicting unnecessary and wanton destruction. 
We are not therefore wringing a new rule from a general principle,541 nor are we engaged in 
re-drawing the underlying balance between military necessity and humanity by appealing to 
the constraining function of the former.542 Instead, we are applying a pre-existing rule of a 
general character—the prohibition of destruction and harm that is unnecessary to secure a 
military advantage543—to a question that falls within the ambit of that general rule, but is 
not explicitly addressed by more specific conventional or customary norms.544 It is 
important to underline that we are not suggesting that the principle of military necessity has 
the effect of extending the scope of the proportionality rule as codified in Additional 
Protocol I to non-civilian harm. We have considered in depth the various arguments 
advanced in favour of re-interpreting the rule in this manner and have found them wanting. 
Rather, our argument is that the law of armed conflict renders protected military personnel 
liable to incidental harm only in proportion to the military advantage anticipated from the 
attack, because inflicting more extensive incidental injury cannot be justified with reference 
to the principle of military necessity and the prohibition of unnecessary and wanton 
destruction. This rule, which we will term the ‘non-civilian proportionality rule’,545 is distinct 
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from proportionality stricto sensu. The protection that proportionality stricto sensu confers 
upon civilians and civilian objects against excessive incidental harm forms part of their 
general protection from the dangers of military operations, as codified in articles 51 and 57 
of Additional Protocol I. By contrast, the safeguard that specially protected enemy 
personnel enjoy against disproportionate incidental harm flows from their limited liability 
to incidental damage, which results from the combined effect of their protected status and 
the need to justify acts of warfare with reference to military necessity. 
 The fact that proportionality stricto sensu and the non-civilian proportionality rule rest 
on distinct legal foundations means that belligerents are confronted with two separate 
assessments of ‘harm’, ‘advantage’ and ‘proportionality’. Proportionality stricto sensu is a 
codified rule that benefits from specific terms of art, in particular the notions of ‘excessive’, 
‘concrete and direct’ and ‘military advantage’. Although the rule is generally seen as allowing 
for a broad margin of judgment,546 its contours are fairly well understood. The non-civilian 
proportionality rule, in contrast, remains uncodified and thus lacks this specialised 
terminology. As a derivative of the principle of military necessity, it simply demands that 
the extent of any incidental harm caused to enemy personnel protected from direct attack 
must be proportionate to the military benefit anticipated. Due to their distinct genesis and 
the contrasting level of specificity, lex lata dictates that proportionality stricto sensu and the 
non-civilian proportionality rule require discrete proportionality assessments by military 
forces prior to an attack.  
 Accordingly, those who plan, decide upon and conduct attacks must calculate both the 
civilian and the non-civilian harm expected and compare it to the military advantage 
anticipated from the attack. Carrying out this assessment in two steps using two separate 
formulas would impose an additional burden on warfighters and complicate what is already 
a difficult legal assessment. From a practical point of view, it therefore seems expedient to 
streamline, to the extent possible, the application of the two proportionality rules during 
the targeting process. This could be achieved, for example, by restating proportionality stricto 
sensu to include a reference to protected enemy personnel and by instructing warfighters, in 
the form of military manuals, doctrine and procedures, to apply this combined test. 
However, combining the civilian and non-civilian proportionality rules into a single test 
compounds the conceptual and practical dilemmas that have beset the application of 
proportionality stricto sensu. Two difficulties in particular need to be overcome in this respect, 
as we discuss below. If these difficulties can be addressed, it would be open for States to 
choose, as a matter of policy, to combine proportionality stricto sensu and the non-civilian 
proportionality rule into a single test.547 
A. Formulating the rule 
Whereas proportionality stricto sensu is codified in Additional Protocol I, the terms of the 
non-civilian proportionality rule remain uncodified. If states were to choose, as a matter of 
policy and expediency, to combine the two rules into a single test, the non-civilian 
proportionality rule would take on a degree of specificity and exactness that it does not 
possess in its uncodified form. Rather than prohibiting incidental harm that is 
disproportionate to the military benefit anticipated from the attack, the non-civilian 
proportionality rule would thus be recast to prohibit incidental harm that is ‘excessive’ in 
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relation to the ‘concrete and direct’ military advantage anticipated. This formula would be 
inappropriate, and thus open to serious objections, if it were to increase the burden that the 
non-civilian proportionality rule actually imposes on belligerents. However, as we will 
demonstrate, this is not necessarily the case. 
 The excessiveness standard adopted in articles 51 and 57 of Additional Protocol I is 
widely regarded to grant commanders a broad margin of discretion.548 Depending on the 
circumstances, it may permit an attacking force to assume greater levels of incidental harm 
than a rule which simply required collateral damage to be proportionate to the military 
benefit,549 given that not every instance of disproportionality will reach the point of 
excessiveness.550 Adopting the excessiveness standard should also make it easier for 
belligerents to demonstrate that their actions comply with the law. The normative function 
of excessiveness is to fix the relationship between the competing values of collateral damage 
and military advantage. A rule which simply required incidental harm suffered by protected 
personnel to be proportionate to the military benefit anticipated would not offer guidance 
as to the relative weight to be accorded to the competing values, other than that they should 
be balanced in a reasonable manner.551 In the absence of more precise guidance, targeting 
decisions based on proportionality assessments involving protected enemy personnel would 
remain forever contestable on the basis of alternative balancing ratios.552 The excessiveness 
standard is therefore critical for greater legal certainty. Moreover, the law could be dismissed 
as idiosyncratic if incidental harm to civilians is judged against the standard of excessiveness, 
only for incidental harm caused to hors de combat enemies on the battlefield to be potentially 
more restrictive in nature. 
 Adopting the language of articles 51 and 57 also means that the military benefit 
anticipated would have to amount to a ‘concrete and direct’ military advantage. The first 
part of this formula does not increase the burden on the attacking party if one bears in mind 
that all attacks expected to cause incidental harm must offer, as a minimum, a ‘definite’ 
military advantage. This is so because any object that constitutes the intended target of an 
attack may be engaged only if its destruction, capture or neutralisation offers a definite 
military advantage in line with article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I.553 The word ‘definite’ 
is widely understood to refer to a concrete and perceptible benefit.554 Attacks directed 
against persons must satisfy this condition too, given that the duty of target verification 
imposed by article 57(2)(a)(i) requires an attacking party to specifically direct its operations 
only against individuals liable to direct attack, whose neutralisation offers a definite military 
advantage by definition. Accordingly, it is only the second part of the formula, the 
requirement of directness, which might give cause for concern.  
 Bothe, Partsch and Solf suggest that the word ‘direct’ means ‘without intervening 
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condition or agency’.555 In other words, no intervening causal link may separate the use of 
violence and the military advantage anticipated: the latter must be an immediate 
consequence of the former. This condition might be thought to preclude an attacking party 
from justifying incidental harm in situations where the attack serves a broader purpose, for 
example where it is designed to deceive the enemy.556 However, we should not rush to this 
conclusion. The fact that attacking an object offers a definite military advantage as part of 
a deception operation is not sufficient to transform it into a military objective unless that 
object also makes an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action by its nature, 
location, purpose or use.557 In the majority of cases, the neutralisation of an object that 
makes such a contribution will offer a military advantage in its own right.558 Destroying a 
tank, for example, weakens the military capability of the enemy and thus offers a military 
advantage that is both concrete and direct, whether or not the strike also contributes to 
deceiving the enemy. This means that, as a minimum, an attacking party will be able to 
justify incidental harm that is not excessive in relation to the immediate military advantage 
it derives from neutralising an individual target. Moreover, while the ultimate purpose of a 
diversionary attack is to support another operation, we should not lose sight of the fact that 
its immediate aim is to mislead the enemy. Altering the enemy’s perception of reality may 
offer as direct a military advantage as weakening its military capability.559 Accordingly, the 
burden imposed by the directness requirement should not be overestimated. Attacks that 
pursue an indirect military advantage will almost inevitably pursue a direct advantage as 
well. Although the direct advantage of an attack may be narrower than its indirect benefit,560 
the higher the collateral damage and the more remote the benefit, the less likely it is that 
appeals to indirect military advantage will actually offer a compelling justification for 
incidental harm. 
 Overall, casting the non-civilian proportionality rule in the familiar terminology of the 
proportionality stricto sensu provides an attacking party with more exact guidance at little to 
no opportunity cost. Most importantly, it avoids the confusion that the use of two 
differently worded proportionality tests would generate. On balance, we therefore suggest 
that the non-civilian proportionality rule should be stated in the same terms as 
proportionality stricto sensu. Accordingly, to give effect to their obligations towards protected 
enemy personnel, belligerents should instruct their forces to complement the civilian 
proportionality rule codified in articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) of Additional 
Protocol I with the following rules: 
 
(1) An attack is to be considered indiscriminate if it may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of life of or injury to members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict561 or 
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members of other organised armed groups562 subject to special protection,563 or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated. 
(2) Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall refrain from deciding to launch any 
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of life of or injury to members of 
the armed forces of a Party to the conflict or members of other organised armed groups 
subject to special protection, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
(3) An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that it may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of life of or injury to members of the armed forces of 
a Party to the conflict or members of other organised armed groups subject to special 
protection, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
B. Calculating non-civilian harm  
The second difficulty concerns the calculation of incidental harm. By combining 
proportionality stricto sensu and the non-civilian proportionality rule into a single test, 
belligerents would have to aggregate the harm that civilians, civilian objects and protected 
enemy personnel are expected to suffer and compare this combined harm against the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack. The difficulty lies in the 
fact that the law does not place the same value on the physical integrity of combatants and 
civilians. 
 Combatants are liable to attack because their destruction constitutes a lawful means of 
forcing an adversary into submission, while civilians enjoy immunity from attack because 
of their non-combatant character. In the eyes of the law of armed conflict, the value of 
enemy combatants is first and foremost instrumental, whereas the value of civilians is 
intrinsic.564 This difference is reflected in the proportionality rule itself. Harm inflicted upon 
enemy combatants that are subject to lawful direct attack falls to be considered under the 
heading of military advantage. The value of this harm is contextual, rather than constant. 
Other things being equal, killing a brigadier offers a greater military advantage than killing 
a private soldier. Similarly, neutralising an infantry section poised to attack friendly forces 
provides a greater advantage than engaging the same soldiers on their way to the canteen. 
Civilians, by contrast, benefit from general protection against the dangers arising from 
military operations by virtue of not being members of the armed forces.565 Their immunity 
from attack and protection against excessive incidental harm derives from this baseline 
status. While most commentators agree that criteria such as nationality do not adversely 
affect their value,566 it would contradict neither the letter nor the spirit of the law to accord 
greater weight to civilians benefitting from relevant special protections, as we noted 
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earlier.567 However, this does not seem to reflect state practice. The United States CDE 
Methodology, for example, assigns the same value to all civilian collateral concerns. This 
indicates that, in practice, the value of civilians appears to be constant. 
 It is not immediately clear what value the law of armed conflict assigns to the life and 
limb of protected enemy personnel,568 in particular whether it is contextual or constant in 
nature. We saw earlier that the protections conferred by the law of armed conflict do not 
rest on a single rationale. Humanitarian concerns outweigh the instrumental significance of 
enemy soldiers at different points. While combatants rendered hors de combat gain immunity 
from attack, an enemy solider who has laid down his weapons to take a rest remains a lawful 
target.569 Humanitarian considerations do not, as a matter of law,570 override his 
instrumental value. By contrast, military medical personnel benefit from protection despite 
generally making an effective contribution to enemy action.571 The humanitarian nature of 
their function thus outweighs instrumental considerations. We also saw that the duty to 
respect and protect does not impose identical obligations of care.572 There is no obligation 
to search for and collect enemy military medical personnel, for instance. 
 With this in mind, it does not seem unreasonable to assign different values to different 
categories of protected personnel for the purposes of applying the non-civilian 
proportionality rule. For example, exposing military medical personnel to incidental harm 
may prevent them from discharging their medical functions, which in turn may have further 
adverse effects on those who need their assistance.573 The humanitarian impact is thus more 
severe compared to the incidental killing or injuring of soldiers rendered hors de combat by 
their wounds. Seen from this perspective, incidental harm suffered by military medical 
personnel should carry more weight than comparable harm suffered by those who are hors 
de combat. Nevertheless, this logic, though legally sound, runs into difficulties. Some may 
find ascribing different values to human lives objectionable as a matter of principle.574 While 
the law of armed conflict does not shy away, as we saw, from drawing such distinctions, it 
offers little guidance as to what the relative weight of different categories of protected 
enemy personnel is.575 It may seem reasonable to place greater weight on military medical 
personnel, but should we then not also differentiate between those who are wounded and 
those who have been rendered hors de combat by their wounds? Does inflicting incidental 
harm on a person in greater medical need not require more justification than causing 
identical harm to a person suffering from a less serious condition?576 If so, how should we 
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quantify the difference? And to what extent is it feasible to implement such a differentiated 
assessment on the battlefield?577 
 In the absence of authoritative guidance to these questions, states are faced with two 
options. Bearing in mind the practical difficulties involved,578 they may choose not to adopt 
a differentiated regime that assigns different values to diverse categories of protected enemy 
personnel, but instead treat them as equal to civilians. Incidental harm inflicted on any type 
of protected personnel would thus carry the same weight as incidental harm caused to 
civilians. Normatively, this approach can be justified on the basis that protected personnel 
and civilians are ‘on the same footing’579 in so far as they are all immune from direct attack, 
even though they benefit from this immunity for different reasons. Immunity from attack 
thus represents a common baseline that warrants according protected personnel the same 
value as civilians in relation to the military advantage anticipated from an attack. The 
attraction of this approach lies in its simplicity. There is no need to distinguish, as part of 
the targeting process, between different persons raising collateral concerns in order to 
determine their exact legal status. It is sufficient to know that they are individuals not liable 
to direct attack and who all carry the same value. This also allows proportionality stricto sensu 
and the non-civilian proportionality rule to be applied as a single, combined test. The 
weakness of this approach is that it sets aside the normative differences that do exist 
between different categories of protected personnel and between such personnel and 
civilians. In doing so, it potentially imposes greater constraints on commanders than what 
the law requires.  
 According to the Department of Defense Law of War Manual, wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked combatants and military medical and religious personnel are deemed to have 
accepted the risk of death and injury due to their proximity to military operations.580 Earlier 
editions of the Manual invoked this point as a justification for excluding such personnel 
from proportionality assessments altogether.581 This has been criticised,582 and rightly so. 
However, the fact remains that protected enemy personnel and units not only bear the risk 
of suffering incidental harm, as civilians do too,583 but in certain circumstances also bear 
some responsibility for that risk.584 Article 30 of the Second Geneva Convention thus 
stipulates that hospital ships ‘act at their own risk’ during and after each engagement.585 The 
ICRC’s Commentary of 1960 suggests that this phrase should be understood to mean that 
a hospital ship ‘must take the responsibility for any damage which it may incur 
accidentally’.586 The idea that hospital ships bear sole responsibility for any incidental harm 
they may suffer is not tenable in the light of an attacking party’s precautionary duty to limit 
collateral damage to what is unavoidable.587 The updated ICRC Commentary of 2017 takes 
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a different view and declares that hospital ships may not be exposed to excessive incidental 
harm.588 We agree with the new Commentary that the incidental harm may not be excessive 
in relation to the military advantage anticipated, though for different reasons than those 
advanced by the ICRC.589 Nevertheless, to give effect to the allocation of risk in article 30, 
the attacking party may take into account whether the ship has increased the risk of 
incidental harm through its own actions when determining whether or not the expected 
harm is excessive. 
 The same principle may be applied to opposing forces more generally. During and 
after each engagement, an attacking party may take into account the fact that enemy 
personnel not or no longer liable to attack have exposed themselves to the risk of incidental 
harm as a result of their prior actions. This is the case, for example, when military medical 
personnel tend to the wounded in the proximity of military objectives590 or when 
combatants are incapacitated by their wounds as a consequence of their participation in 
combat. In both situations, the persons concerned have placed themselves in harm’s way. 
While this does not lessen the attacking party’s precautionary duties, it is a factor to be 
considered in assessing whether unavoidable incidental harm is excessive or not. 
Consequently, an attacking party may assign a lower weight to protected enemy personnel 
who, through their actions during and after an engagement, have assumed the risk of 
incidental harm compared to the weight accorded to civilians591 and to protected enemy 
personnel in other circumstances. 
 This second approach recognises that the normative value of protected enemy 
personnel is neither uniform nor necessarily identical with the normative value of civilians. 
Its principal downside is that it requires a differentiated treatment of different collateral 
concerns. Doctrinally, such a differentiated treatment could be accommodated by existing 
procedures without too much difficulty. For example, the Joint Chief’s CDE Methodology 
already operates with fractional values of harm. Indoor collateral concerns that fall within 
the outer half of the collateral effects radius of a weapon’s intended impact point carry a 
casualty factor of 0.25.592 All other collateral concerns carry a value of 1.593 This fractional 
value of 0.25 is designed to account for the decreased likelihood that persons inside 
structures located in the outer half of the collateral hazard area will suffer collateral damage. 
In principle, a fractional value could also be assigned to protected enemy personnel who 
expose themselves to the risk of incidental harm during or after an engagement. However, 
this approach creates substantial practical difficulties. Planners and those conducting attacks 
would have to distinguish protected enemy personnel who carry a fractional value from 
other collateral concerns on the battlefield, yet the available intelligence and the speed with 
which the tactical situation changes will not allow for this at all times. In situations where 
the exact legal status of a collateral concern cannot be determined, it would have to be 
assigned a full casualty factor, rather than a reduced one. A process which assigns different 
weight to different classes of collateral concerns thus risks increasing the complexity of the 
targeting process whilst potentially generating only marginal operational benefits. States will 
therefore need to decide how they wish to deal with this facet of the non-civilian 
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proportionality rule, based on these competing operational considerations. 
C. Putting the Law in to Practice 
The genesis of this paper was a real-world targeting query. In the present section, we 
therefore address two fictitious targeting scenarios to expound the non-civilian 
proportionality rule and demonstrate its application to targeting decisions in a practical 
context.594 
 
1. Scenario A 
A mortar team positively identified as belonging to an organised armed group, known as 
the Non-State Freedom Fighters (NSFF), has recently been observed firing on the armed 
forces of Adana, a state engaged in a non-international armed conflict against the NSFF on 
its territory. The three-man mortar team is positioned close to friendly forces in an 
unpopulated area. The team is under surveillance by an unmanned aerial vehicle operated 
by the armed forces of Borovia, a third state supporting the government of Adana. To 
remove the threat to friendly forces on the ground, and acting at their request, Borovian 
fast jets use a laser guided bomb to attack the mortar team. It becomes apparent after the 
attack that two members of the team were killed, while the third was severely wounded. 
Video imagery supplied by the unmanned aerial vehicle overhead reveals that the surviving 
member is hors de combat.  
 Not long after the initial attack, a pick-up truck is observed driving towards and 
stopping alongside the hors de combat fighter. The vehicle has a machine gun fixed to its rear 
and is known as a ‘technical’.  Intelligence confirms that the same technical had been 
observed firing on friendly forces earlier that day. Two men in distinctive camouflage 
clothing and rifles slung over their backs, confirmed through intelligence as the sole 
occupants of the technical, carry the injured fighter and place him in the back of the vehicle. 
Friendly forces request that the Borovian fast jets use a precision-guided munition to attack 
and destroy the technical. 
 There is no doubt that the technical constitutes a military objective liable to attack, 
whether on account of its nature, use or purpose.595 The fact that the vehicle is employed 
to carry a person who is hors de combat due to his wounds does not transform it into a medical 
transport protected from attack.596 Customary international law applicable to both 
international and non-international armed conflicts provides that vehicles must be assigned 
exclusively to medical transportation to be immune from attack,597 which is not the case here. 
There also seems to be little doubt that the two original occupants of the technical are 
members of the NSFF and as such are liable to attack.598 Assuming that there are no civilians 
or civilian objects within the collateral effects radius of the weapon to be utilised, there are 
no collateral concerns to be considered under proportionality stricto sensu. Finally, it is also 
beyond doubt that the fighter rendered hors de combat cannot be made the object of attack.599 
 This leaves us with one unanswered question: would a strike on the technical be lawful, 
notwithstanding the presence of the hors de combat fighter in the back? Since the intended 
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target of the attack is the technical, rather than the incapacitated fighter, the attack would 
not contravene the prohibition of making a hors de combat person the object of attack. 
However, it must be expected that the use of a precision-guided munition against the vehicle 
will expose the protected fighter to incidental harm. This triggers a duty, as we have 
explained earlier,600 to take precautionary measures to minimise this harm by confining it to 
what is unavoidable. For example, the Borovian pilots may consider employing a different 
weapon if this were to reduce the likelihood of incidental harm. They may also decide to 
strike the technical after it has dropped off the hors de combat fighter, provided that the pilots 
could be certain that the opportunity to attack the vehicle, or to do so without the risk of 
further collateral damage, would not be lost.601 Either way, the duty to take precautionary 
measures is limited to what is feasible. The law does not require an attacking party to forego 
the military advantage presented by an attack should the feasible precautions open to that 
party fail to avoid all incidental harm, provided the harm is not excessive in relation to the 
military advantage anticipated. In the present case, the technical may be attacked even if 
this renders the death of the protected fighter inevitable, as long as all feasible precautions 
to avoid this outcome were taken and his death does not exceed the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated from disabling the vehicle. 
 Assuming that the technical cannot be engaged without exposing the hors de combat 
fighter to the risk of further injury, we are left with the application of the non-civilian 
proportionality rule to the proposed strike. The concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated from the attack is the destruction of the technical and the two fighters operating 
it. It would be for the military commander to determine whether or not the harm the hors de 
combat fighter is expected to suffer is excessive when measured against this military 
advantage. In our view, the harm would not be excessive, and the attack could lawfully 
proceed. Such a conclusion would be reasonable even if the fighter rendered hors de combat 
was accorded the same relative value as a civilian. 
 This scenario highlights that the law of armed conflict, through the application of the 
non-civilian proportionality rule, does not dismiss as wholly irrelevant the life of the hors de 
combat fighter and yet, at the same time, would not prevent an attack from occurring where 
the advantage to be gained is sufficient to conclude that the action is proportionate. 
Scenario B builds on this analysis by exploring further practical issues stemming from the 
application of this rule.602 
 
2. Scenario B 
A United Nations Security Council Resolution has authorised the use of all necessary means 
to protect a minority group from ethnic cleansing by the authoritarian government of 
Colimar. A coalition of the willing has sent expeditionary forces to Colimar to implement 
the Security Council mandate. Coalition forces on the ground have taken control of the 
North of the country and are approaching the capital, where most members of the 
persecuted minority group are located. To reach the capital, coalition forces must cross a 
river, but its sparsely populated east bank has been fortified by large numbers of Colimaran 
troops. The coalition commander has ordered joint fires on enemy positions along the river 
bank. An initial battle damage assessment indicates that the attack has eliminated the 
majority of enemy forces and that a sizeable number of the surviving troops are now 
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wounded, with some incapacitated by their wounds. Reliable intelligence also indicates that 
substantial Colimaran reinforcements are on their way to boost the defences along the river 
in an attempt to prevent coalition forces from crossing. The coalition commander now 
seeks to understand what his options are. 
 Corn and Culliver argue that if the attacking party were bound by proportionality 
obligations towards enemy personnel in situations such as this one, then every decision to 
press on with an attack once the ‘first salvo’ has been fired would require a proportionality 
assessment to protect any wounded enemy soldiers and military medical personnel in the 
target area.603 Corn and Culliver fear that a commander would therefore be compelled to 
postpone any further attacks until such an assessment has been completed. In their view, 
this is bound to undermine a commander’s ability ‘to press tactical advantage and set the 
tempo of the engagement in order to maximize the collective impact on the enemy force’.604 
They suggest that such an approach does not reflect the reality of ground manoeuvre 
warfare and does not ring true with state practice. 
 These are legitimate concerns. However, we should recall that the duty not to make 
enemy combatants the object of attack is engaged only when their protected status has 
become apparent on the basis of observable, external factors.605 The mere fact that there is 
reason to believe that an enemy combatant has been wounded is insufficient to trigger the 
obligation to respect and protect him. Moreover, we found that wounded combatants 
present outside medical facilities do not enjoy protection from attack during active 
hostilities unless they are unconscious or otherwise incapacitated by their wounds or 
sickness, and therefore incapable of defending themselves.606 We should also bear in mind 
that the attacking party must take precautionary measures before re-attacking any targets607 
as well as during an ongoing attack.608 Prior to launching a renewed attack, a commander 
would therefore need to assess whether the civilian harm expected remains at a level that is 
not excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated. Therefore, one might ask to 
what extent the application of the non-civilian proportionality rule would blunt the 
momentum of an attack if some assessment of civilian collateral concerns must already take 
place as a matter of law. 
 In the present scenario, it has become apparent to the allied commander that some of 
the surviving Colimaran troops have become hors de combat. Allied forces must therefore 
take feasible precautions to minimise incidental harm to these individuals. For example, if 
allied troops were able to neutralise Colimaran reinforcements on route to their defensive 
positions on the river bank without sacrificing the military advantage anticipated or causing 
more extensive collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects, they would have to target 
those reinforcements before they reach their destination. Doing so would avoid or at least 
reduce the need to re-attack an area where enemy hors de combat are present. If this course 
of action is not available and allied forces have exhausted all feasible options to minimise 
the risk of incidental harm without, however, completely eliminating that risk, the allied 
commander would have to apply the non-civilian proportionality rule. 
 In the present case, neutralising the enemy defensive positions along the river bank 
offers a concrete and direct military advantage. Without overcoming those fortifications, 
coalition forces would not be able to cross the river and advance on the Colimaran capital. 
The military advantage anticipated from re-attacking the river bank positions is therefore 
considerable. Indeed, the advantage is such that a reasonable commander would need to be 
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faced with the risk of causing incidental harm to a very significant number of protected 
enemy personnel before the threshold of excessiveness is met. This is all the more the case 
if one takes the position that the protected personnel in our scenario carry a diminished 
collateral value for the purposes of the non-civilian proportionality rule as a result of having 
exposed themselves to the risk of incidental harm through their prior actions in battle. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to determine whether a party to an armed conflict must 
ensure that any incidental harm it causes to enemy military personnel not or no longer liable 
to attack remains below any form of threshold. As we indicated in the opening pages of the 
paper, this question is of considerable practical importance. It is an unfortunate, but 
inevitable, consequence of warfare that persons protected from direct attack may suffer 
incidental harm. The law of armed conflict requires belligerents to take all feasible measures 
to avoid, or in any event to minimise, inflicting such harm on civilians and civilian objects. 
However, the law also recognises that collateral damage cannot be prevented completely 
and accepts that incidental harm which is not avoidable is not unlawful, provided it falls 
below a maximum ceiling. The purpose of proportionality stricto sensu set out in articles 
51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I is to codify these rules. Yet these 
provisions only refer to civilian harm, despite the fact that enemy military personnel 
protected from attack, such as military medical personnel or combatants rendered hors de 
combat, raise similar collateral concerns. 
 The silence of the law on the position of protected enemy personnel is puzzling and 
troubling in equal measure. It may be taken to indicate that the law of armed conflict 
imposes no limits at all on the level of incidental harm that belligerents may visit on 
protected personnel. Yet this is difficult to reconcile with the humanitarian considerations 
that sustain the law. Alternatively, it may hint at a gap in the body of treaty law, but not 
necessarily in the customary rules governing the conduct of hostilities. But this would leave 
commanders guessing what level of collateral damage is or is not permissible and may lead 
them to break the law inadvertently. Given this uncertainty, it is imperative to clarify what 
obligations the law of armed conflict imposes on belligerents and individual commanders 
in this context. 
 We approached this task in a number of steps. The first part of our analysis revealed 
that proportionality stricto sensu does not extend to protected enemy personnel. The scope 
of the rule, as codified in articles 51 and 57 of Additional Protocol I, is limited to civilian 
harm only. Based on an extensive analysis of state practice, we also found that the 
proportionality rule is identical in scope under customary law and treaty law. Members of 
enemy forces do not fall within the ambit of either rule, since they do not acquire civilian 
status upon gaining immunity from further attack, but instead retain their military character. 
Nor do proportionality considerations extend to protected enemy personnel by way of a 
generic principle of proportionality.  
 In a second step, we clarified under what circumstances enemy personnel could 
nevertheless benefit, at least in principle, from proportionality considerations. Contrary to 
what proponents of the least-restrictive-means principle suggest, we argued that enemy 
combatants who are liable to attack may be engaged with means and methods of warfare 
that render their death inevitable. No proportionality considerations apply to them. By 
contrast, enemy personnel who are not liable to direct attack may, in theory, benefit from 
the proportionality rule. However, it is important to understand when exactly enemy troops 
gain immunity from further attack, especially in conditions of active combat. We therefore 
clarified the scope of the hors de combat rule and the conditions in which wounded and sick 
combatants are protected from attack.  
 
 In a third step, we reviewed the arguments put forward by the ICRC and 
commentators in favour of extending the application of the proportionality rule to 
protected enemy personnel. Although some of these arguments are more compelling than 
others, we found that none of them withstood closer scrutiny. In a final step, we therefore 
revisited the liability of protected personnel to incidental harm in an attempt to place these 
arguments onto more solid foundations. We suggested that the principle of military 
necessity, more specifically the prohibition of causing unnecessary destruction, as 
complemented by the duty to ‘respect and protect’ certain classes of enemy personnel, 
imposes an obligation on belligerents to reduce the level of incidental harm inflicted on 
protected personnel to what is unavoidable and to justify that harm with reference to the 
military benefit anticipated from an attack. Although our argument is mostly deductive in 
character,609 it is anchored in the application of existing rules, rather than more elusive 
normative considerations. We therefore concluded that the law of armed conflict, as it 
currently stands, imposes an obligation on belligerents not to inflict incidental harm on 
protected enemy personnel that is out of proportion to the military benefit pursued by an 
attack. We termed this the ‘non-civilian proportionality rule’.  
 Ultimately, it is for states to operationalise the non-civilian proportionality rule in 
practice. In the absence of a codified norm, there is no formal reason to express the non-
civilian rule in the same terms as those employed by articles 51 and 57 of Additional 
Protocol I. Commanders who order, and troops which carry out, attacks that cause 
incidental harm to protected enemy personnel are not guilty of violating the laws of war, 
including the crime of injuring or killing persons hors de combat,610 as long as they take feasible 
precautions and ensure that any collateral damage is not disproportionate in relation to the 
military benefit anticipated from an attack. However, there are good policy reasons for 
adopting the language of Additional Protocol I for the purposes of the non-civilian 
proportionality rule. Formulating the rule in the familiar terminology of proportionality 
stricto sensu helps to avoid confusion and, as we have demonstrated, provides war fighters 
with more robust guidance and greater legal certainty. Moreover, these advantages come at 
no real opportunity cost to belligerents. States will also have to decide what collateral value 
to assign to protected enemy personnel. They will have to weigh the benefits of simplicity 
that come with according the same value to all categories of protected personnel against the 
greater operational freedom that could potentially derive from operating a differentiated 
collateral value regime. We believe that both approaches are legally permissible, and we set 
out their relative advantages and disadvantages in detail. 
 Based on our analysis, we believe that the non-civilian proportionality rule is a 
necessary part of any targeting process that attempts to reconcile humanitarian imperatives 
with operational requirements during times of armed conflict.611 The rule achieves this by 
safeguarding protected enemy personnel from disproportionate, and thus unnecessary, 
incidental harm without, however, unduly impairing an attacking party’s freedom of 
manoeuvre against the enemy. Our aim in this paper was to bring clarity to a complex legal 
problem that involves the taking of human life. We hope that the paper will serve as a 
catalyst for states to express their position on the law in this area and that we have provided 
a cogent case for what that position should be. Adopting the non-civilian proportionality 
rule would bring clarity to those planning, authorising, executing and advising on targeting 
in current and future operations. 
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